Isaac Kassirer et al. v. Joshua Gotlib et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 9, 2026)
The First Department dismissed contract and declaratory judgment claims in a real estate investment dispute based on an alleged oral agreement to share interests in LLCs that would later buy and manage property, finding the deal was too vague to enforce. But it allowed the unjust enrichment claim to continue because the plaintiffs adequately alleged they paid $1.66 million that the defendants may not be entitled to keep. This matters because it shows that unclear oral business deals will not support contract claims, while a claim to recover money paid in reliance on such a deal may still survive.
Scaglia v. Haart (Appellate Division, First Department, April 9, 2026)
In this divorce case, the First Department upheld harsh sanctions against the husband, including striking his claims and granting the wife a default divorce, because of his repeated failure to follow court orders. But it sent part of the financial ruling back to the trial court, saying the judge had to better explain the basis for awarding the wife $7.4 million in management fees, a 50% interest in key business entities, and half of certain art-sale proceeds.
Luis Francisco Castro Gonzalez v. 60-74 Gansevoort Street LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, April 7, 2026)
The First Department dismissed only part of a worker’s Labor Law claim after he was injured when roof wood allegedly gave way during asbestos-abatement work, ruling that the cited safety rule applies to hazards created as demolition progresses, not to preexisting structural defects. The worker’s other Labor Law and negligence claims survived because the owner and contractor did not show they lacked notice of the unsafe condition, and their request for contractual indemnification was also denied.
Narvaez v. 12 West 31st Street Corp. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 7, 2026)
The First Department reinstated a construction worker’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim after he slipped on wet, freshly painted fire-escape stairs while welding between the 10th and 11th floors, and it granted him summary judgment on that claim. The court said the fire escape posed an elevation-related risk and the defendants failed to provide proper safety protection, and it also found that a one-time law office mistake was enough to reopen the claim when corrected promptly.
The People of the State of New York v. Josue Deleon (Appellate Division, First Department, April 7, 2026)
In a sentencing appeal, the First Department left in place Josue Deleon’s guilty-plea conviction for attempted first-degree assault and his 3½-year prison term with 2½ years of post-release supervision. But it removed the surcharge and fees imposed at sentencing in the interest of justice, showing that the court may eliminate financial penalties even when the conviction and main sentence stand.
In the Matter of Yuchen Lin, for the Judicial Dissolution of XS Franchise, L.L.C. v. Xu Sun (Appellate Division, First Department, April 7, 2026)
The First Department held that a fitness studio manager who said she was promised a 40% stake in the franchise LLC could not seek judicial dissolution because she never became a formal member. But the First Department reinstated her claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel based on allegations that she gave services and money in reliance on that promise. The decision matters because it draws a clear line between member-only rights and personal claims based on an unfulfilled ownership promise.
Jairo Moreno-Santos, et al. v. Real Builders Inc., et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 9, 2026)
The First Department held that a construction worker injured when an unsecured, partially dismantled ladder slipped was entitled to judgment on his Scaffold Law claim, because there was no proof he ignored an available safe ladder. The court also gave the owners conditional contractual indemnification against the worker’s employer, while allowing the workplace safety and negligence claims to continue because factual questions remain about whether the owners knew or should have known about the dangerous ladder.
Jose Elmer Tineo v. Timothy R. Bogart et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 9, 2026)
The First Department reversed the trial court and moved this bus-accident injury case from Bronx County to New York County, holding that claims against MTA Bus Company must be heard where the authority has its main office unless the case actually involves a facility in another county. The ruling matters because it confirms that MTA Bus Company and the New York City Transit Authority are separate entities, so the special venue rule for NYCTA did not apply here.
Mahbub Azizy et al. v. Hunts Point Terminal Produce Cooperative Association, Inc., et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 7, 2026)
This case involved workers at the Hunts Point Terminal Market who said they were seriously injured when masked attackers entered the property and assaulted them, and they claimed the operators failed to provide adequate security. The First Department reinstated the lawsuit, finding there are factual disputes about whether security measures were sufficient and whether the attack was foreseeable. The decision matters because it shows property owners cannot avoid trial in negligent security cases when key questions about security failures and causation remain unresolved.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Archie Washington et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 7, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the First Department left most of the lower court’s order in place but denied summary judgment against borrower Archie Washington. Although Deutsche Bank showed standing and default, it did not strictly prove it complied with New York’s required pre-foreclosure notice and filing rules. The decision is a reminder that lenders can lose early foreclosure relief if they cannot fully document those statutory steps.
J.A. v. City of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated claims against the New York City Department of Education and the school based on a middle-school student’s alleged pattern of bullying and assaults on school grounds, but left dismissed the claim tied to an off-campus store incident. The court said the alleged misconduct could be treated as one continuing course of wrongdoing, making the notice of claim timely, and found the school had not shown it lacked notice or that its response was adequate.
J.A. v. City of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a student’s claims that the City, the DOE, and his middle school failed to protect him from repeated bullying and assaults at school, ruling that his notice of claim could reach the full pattern of alleged abuse, not just incidents within the usual 90-day window. It left the off-campus claim dismissed, and the decision matters because schools may still face negligence claims when they knew about ongoing student attacks but cannot show they took meaningful steps to keep the student safe.
Bianco v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff asked the court to punish New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation for producing surveillance video late by blocking the footage from trial. The Second Department reversed that ruling and denied sanctions, holding that delay alone did not show the kind of willful misconduct needed to justify the serious step of excluding evidence.
Bianco v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a patient’s claims against New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation in a suit alleging she was wrongly detained and forcibly medicated after trying to leave the hospital against medical advice. The court found the hospital’s expert proof was too conclusory and depended on disputed facts, so the case could not be thrown out, but it also held that the patient had not shown she was entitled to judgment on her false imprisonment, assault, and battery claims.
Star201, LLC v. Martinez (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department ruled that the borrower did not show Star201, a foreign LLC, was doing business in New York without authorization and therefore barred from suing. The court held that filing multiple foreclosure actions in New York, by itself, does not prove regular in-state business activity, and it sent the lender’s summary judgment motion back for a decision on the merits.
Gupta v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
In this medical malpractice and wrongful death case arising from treatment at Long Island Jewish Medical Center, the Second Department reinstated the malpractice and wrongful death claims after finding that the plaintiff’s expert identified factual disputes about whether the defendants departed from accepted care and caused the patient’s death. The court still dismissed the later-added loss-of-services claim as untimely because it was filed after the statute of limitations expired and the original complaint did not give notice of that claim.
Balram v. Fiyazuddeen (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
This case asked whether a release signed to settle an earlier dispute over the sale of a property also barred the tenant’s later trip-and-fall injury claim at that same house. The Second Department reinstated the personal injury lawsuit, finding the defendant did not show that the release was meant to cover that separate negligence claim, and sent the case back for the trial court to consider the remaining arguments. This matters because a release tied to one lawsuit will not automatically wipe out different claims unless its wording clearly says so.
In the Matter of Frank M. (Anonymous) (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a lower court order that removed a wife as guardian for her incapacitated husband after their daughter claimed the wife’s health problems made her unfit to continue. The court found that the wife’s medical issue was temporary and that there was no proof of misconduct or other just cause for removal, reinforcing that a guardian cannot be replaced without clear evidence that the person’s best interests are at risk.
Cinquemani v. Money Source, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a lawsuit by an investor who says he bought an 8% ownership stake in Money Source, rejecting the company’s argument that the case was filed too late. The court said the six-year clock for this type of ownership dispute begins when the company clearly denies the claimed interest, not when the investment was allegedly made, which matters for parties fighting over equity rights years after a deal.
Benjamin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated the borrowers’ action to cancel the mortgage and held that the loan became fully due when the 2009 foreclosure case was filed, so the six-year foreclosure deadline had expired before this title-clearing suit began. The court also ruled that U.S. Bank could not use the six-month savings statute to revive the mortgage, confirming that FAPA applies retroactively and sharply limits lenders’ ability to restart old foreclosure claims.
The People v. Kareem Waters (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
In People v. Kareem Waters, the Second Department left the defendant’s weapon conviction and prison sentence in place but removed the mandatory surcharge and fees. The court held that because Waters was under 21 at the time of the offense, those costs could be waived under CPL 420.35(2-a), showing that younger defendants may be able to avoid certain financial penalties even when their convictions stand.
Four RH Corp. v. R&N Realty Holding, Inc., et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a ruling that had given Bank of America priority over a junior mortgage in a foreclosure dispute. It held that an alleged oral agreement to subordinate the junior mortgage could not be enforced because there was no written agreement, and the $22,000 closing payment did not clearly prove one. The decision matters because it underscores that changes to mortgage priority generally must be in writing, while leaving open the lender’s alternative equitable subrogation claim for further proceedings.
U.S. Bank, National Association v. Benjamin (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department held that U.S. Bank’s 2019 mortgage foreclosure case was too late because the loan had already been accelerated when a prior foreclosure action was filed in 2009, starting the six-year deadline. The court dismissed the case against the remaining defendant and ruled the bank could not rely on the six-month savings rule after the earlier case was dismissed for neglect, a decision that reinforces strict time limits on revived foreclosure claims.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Palma (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that Deutsche Bank’s foreclosure claims against the Palma defendants had to be dismissed as abandoned because the bank did not seek a default judgment within one year and had no reasonable excuse for the delay. The court also held that IPA, as a later owner of the property interest, could ask for that dismissal even without being formally substituted into the case.
The People v. John Aponte (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department upheld John Aponte’s convictions, ruling that the trial court properly refused to order another competency exam because he had recently been found fit for trial and the judge’s observations supported that finding. But the court reduced his sentence on the terroristic-threat convictions, cutting the total prison term to eight years, which matters because it shows trial judges have broad leeway on competency issues while the appeals court can still step in to lower a sentence it finds excessive.
Weiss v. Fran Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
In Weiss v. Fran Corp., a pedestrian who was hit at a dark intersection sued a private contractor that had agreed to repair the town’s street light. The Second Department dismissed the case, holding that the contractor did not owe the pedestrian a legal duty because its alleged failure to restore the light did not create or worsen the danger, and the town had not fully handed over its safety responsibilities. This matters because it reinforces that contractors are not automatically liable to injured third parties just because they have a service contract with a municipality.
Carafello v. Ruvo (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff alleged that her doctor failed to diagnose a severed tendon in her ring finger and did not promptly recommend surgical care, leading to lasting hand limitations. The Second Department reinstated the claim against the doctor, finding that his expert submissions did not directly address the plaintiff’s specific allegations and were too conclusory to justify summary judgment.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Arrigo (Appellate Division, Second Department, Not clearly stated in the text; submitted October 2, 2023)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, The Second Department held that Deutsche Bank showed it properly sent the required pre-foreclosure notices and made the required state filing. But the court still denied summary judgment and an order of reference because there was a factual dispute over whether the loan was a high-cost home loan under Banking Law § 6-1.
The decision matters because it shows that even when a lender proves notice compliance, a foreclosure can still be slowed or blocked by a viable predatory-lending defense.
Citibank, N.A. v. Yanling Wu (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a lower court order in Citibank’s mortgage foreclosure case and dismissed the complaint against the borrowers. It held that Citibank did not prove it strictly followed New York’s 90-day pre-foreclosure notice rule because it failed to show that each borrower was sent a separately addressed notice. This matters because even a technical notice defect can defeat a foreclosure action, and borrowers may raise that defense any time before a foreclosure judgment is entered.
Diaz v. Jhedrian Logistics Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
In this personal injury case arising from a rear-end crash, passengers sued the driver of their own vehicle, Jose Arce, after alleging that his car was struck from behind by another vehicle. The Second Department dismissed the claims against Arce, finding that he showed he was not at fault and that the plaintiffs offered no evidence to dispute that showing. The decision underscores that negligence claims can be thrown out early when a defendant presents proof of nonfault and the opposing side does not respond with actual evidence.
Ash Development, LLC v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Company (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
This case involved a dispute over whether a title insurer had to cover an adverse possession lawsuit and repay legal fees from a related easement case. The Second Department held that the policy’s possession-based exclusion barred coverage, and that the insurer did not have to reimburse the owner for privately chosen counsel. It matters because it shows courts will enforce clear title insurance exclusions and, in declaratory judgment cases, require a formal statement of the parties’ rights rather than a simple dismissal.
Matter of Michael L. Johnson v. Devin McManus (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 9, 2026)
The case asked whether a political committee and its treasurer could be fined under New York election law for allegedly making excessive in-kind campaign contributions. The Third Department dismissed the enforcement case, holding that the statute applies to accepting unlawful contributions, not simply making them, and that the record did not show intent to violate the law.
People v. Duplessis (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 9, 2026)
In People v. Duplessis, the Third Department said the trial court did not properly evaluate the defendant’s claim that the prosecution wrongly tried to remove the only two prospective Black jurors. The Third Department held the appeal and sent the case back so the trial court can fully decide whether the prosecutor’s stated reasons were a cover for discrimination. This matters because trial judges must complete every step of a Batson review, not stop after hearing a race-neutral explanation.
The People of the State of New York v. Gustavo Santana (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 9, 2026)
The Third Department upheld Gustavo Santana’s conviction for possessing a loaded, unlicensed firearm in public, rejecting his claims that New York’s gun law and its licensing “good moral character” standard violate the Second or Eighth Amendments. The court did, however, cut his prison term from 12 years to 8 years based on the acquittals on the more serious charges, his lack of criminal history, and his remorse. This decision reinforces that New York may continue to punish unlicensed public gun possession under its current licensing system.
Quest Diagnostics Inc. v. CSRNC, LLC, doing business as Capstone Center for Rehabilitation and Nursing (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 9, 2026)
In a payment dispute over COVID-19 and flu testing provided to a nursing facility during the pandemic, The Third Department ruled that Quest Diagnostics proved the facility breached the parties’ contract by failing to pay more than $200,000 in invoices. The court sent the case back to determine damages and made clear that late or irregular invoicing does not excuse payment when the contract’s billing terms are clear and do not make timing essential.
Harari v. Rosakranse (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 9, 2026)
In this post-divorce child support dispute, the Third Department largely upheld a lower court’s ruling that reduced the husband’s support obligation based on his permanent disability and awarded him counsel fees, while limiting the wife’s claims under the parties’ bankruptcy settlement. But the court ruled that he still had to reimburse the children’s DNA-testing and related medical costs under the divorce agreement, and it sent the case back for clarification on any support overpayment credits because New York generally disfavors taking those credits from future child support.
Matter of Cynthia Lurry-Carter v. New York State and Local Retirement System et al. (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 9, 2026)
This case involved a widow’s effort to have her late husband’s New York public retirement choice changed so she could receive survivor benefits. The Third Department overturned the Comptroller’s denial, holding that the agency wrongly treated the law’s 60-day extension language as a strict cutoff, and sent the matter back to decide whether there was reasonable cause to allow the late filing.
The decision matters because it confirms that, in some retirement cases, late option changes may still be considered even after the usual deadline.
The People of the State of New York v. Troy D. Cassell Jr. (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 9, 2026)
The Third Department reversed Troy Cassell Jr.’s convictions for drug-impaired driving, driving with a child passenger, driving with a suspended license, and child endangerment, and ordered a new trial. Although the court found the evidence strong enough to support the verdict, it held that the trial judge improperly used a numbers-only jury without explaining why or showing that juror names were given to the defense. This decision matters because it underscores that courts must follow required jury-selection rules and resolve key evidence-suppression issues before trial.
Romas v. County of Suffolk (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 8, 2026)
In a bicycle accident case involving an alleged pothole on a Suffolk County road, the Second Department ruled that the County could not avoid liability simply by relying on a local charter provision that tried to eliminate constructive notice claims. The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment because the County showed it lacked prior written notice, but did not prove it also lacked constructive notice. This matters because counties cannot use local laws to override state highway-defect rules, and they must address both types of notice to win dismissal early.