In the Matter of Country-Wide Insurance Company v. National Indemnity Company (Appellate Division, First Department, April 2, 2026)
This case involved a no-fault insurance reimbursement dispute after Country-Wide won an arbitration award against National Indemnity. The First Department reversed, vacated the award, and dismissed the case because National Indemnity’s coverage disclaimer meant the arbitration forum did not have authority to decide the dispute.
The decision matters because it confirms that a good-faith denial of coverage can take a claim out of mandatory insurance arbitration, even if the disclaimer is formally submitted after the initial award under the forum’s rules.
The People of the State of New York v. Fabian Brown (Appellate Division, First Department, April 2, 2026)
In Fabian Brown’s appeal from a guilty plea to second-degree assault, the First Department mostly upheld his three-year probation sentence and the challenged probation terms, including limits on harmful behavior, firearm possession, and warrantless searches. But it struck the condition requiring him to pay surcharges and fees as part of probation, finding that requirement was not tied to rehabilitation or helping him lead a law-abiding life.
Stephanie T. Foster v. John H. Foster (Appellate Division, First Department, April 2, 2026)
In this divorce case, the husband sought to end or sharply reduce temporary spousal support before trial, arguing that his retirement and the length of the marriage justified a cut. The First Department reversed the lower court and denied his motion in full, finding that his retirement was not a new or unexpected change and that he had not shown the payments prevented him from meeting his own reasonable expenses. The decision underscores that temporary support is meant to preserve the status quo until trial and cannot be limited by using post-divorce support guidelines too early.
The People of the State of New York v. Samuel Whatts (Appellate Division, First Department, March 31, 2026)
In People v. Whatts, the First Department said the trial court should have held a hearing on whether police lawfully took the defendant’s wallet, phones, and other property when he was arrested in a murder and robbery case. Because that issue was never properly decided, the First Department sent the case back for that hearing and paused the appeal, underscoring that courts must clearly rule on suppression requests before relying on the evidence.
Pichardo v. The George Units LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, March 31, 2026)
In this apartment-building slip-and-fall case, the First Department reinstated the tenant’s claim that she fell because the stairs had just been mopped and were still wet, but it left in place the dismissal of her lighting and handrail claims. The decision matters because witness testimony about wet, bleach-smelling stairs was enough to require a trial, while unsupported theories about other hazards were not.
350 East Houston Street, LLC v. Travelers Indemnity Company of America (Appellate Division, First Department, April 2, 2026)
This case arose from a Manhattan construction project where excavation and foundation work allegedly damaged a neighboring building, leading to a fight over who had to pay and whether insurance coverage was available. The First Department largely upheld the lower court, including the ruling that the insurer did not have to provide coverage because notice was given late and the claim was settled before the insurer was notified, but it reinstated Copps’s claims against construction manager Noble and ruled Noble’s indemnity rights were only conditional. The decision shows that late notice can wipe out insurance coverage, and that indemnity issues may remain unresolved when there are factual disputes about who controlled the work or may have been negligent.
In the Matter of Barton Mark Perlbinder, Muffy Flouret v. Stephen Perlbinder et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 2, 2026)
The First Department ruled in a dispute over dissolving closely connected property-holding companies and how a court-appointed receiver could sell their assets. It said liquidation by bulk sale was allowed because the petition sought liquidation, but any sale by the receiver must be approved by all parties or confirmed by the court; the rest of the order, including the denial of a tax-efficient breakup plan, was left in place. This matters because it confirms that receiver sales in dissolution cases require oversight and that a party can still appeal when some requested relief was denied.
J.C. et al. v. Ronald London, M.D., et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 2, 2026)
The First Department dismissed this medical malpractice case, holding that all defendant doctors and hospitals were entitled to summary judgment. Although the plaintiffs’ expert raised questions about whether the care may have departed from accepted practice, the court found no adequate expert proof that earlier surgery or different treatment would have changed the plaintiff’s outcome.
The People of the State of New York v. Samy Martinez-Jaquez (Appellate Division, First Department, April 2, 2026)
The First Department reversed this stolen-vehicle conviction after finding that police unlawfully stopped the defendant’s car based on an anonymous report and unverified tracking information. Because officers did not have reliable proof that the tip was trustworthy before the stop, the court suppressed the evidence, statements, and identification that followed, vacated the conviction, and dismissed the indictment.
Joseph Speechio v. Starbucks Corp. et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 2, 2026)
In a construction-site injury case involving a Starbucks project, the First Department upheld a worker’s site-safety claim after he slipped on loose electrical wire left in the work area. The First Department reinstated the owner and contractor’s contract-based indemnification and attorneys’ fees claims against the electrical subcontractor that admitted the wire was its debris, while leaving dismissal of the other claims in place; the decision shows that a subcontractor can still face contract liability for debris it created even if fault-based claims fail.
James Ravelo et al. v. RXR 32 Old Slip Owner, LLC et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, March 31, 2026)
In a construction-accident case involving a worker who fell from a rolling scaffold, the First Department reinstated the defendants’ worker-fault defense and ruled that the property owner and tenant were entitled to full contractual indemnity from the subcontractor, while the general contractor received only conditional indemnity. The court said the worker’s own conduct could still matter on claims outside the Scaffold Law, and that indemnity turns on whether a party was actually free from negligence.
Mangiarcina v. Ridgewood 69, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department ruled for the defendants in a dispute over whether the plaintiff had a life estate in a Queens property or had gained ownership through adverse possession. It held that the 1987 deed could not give her a life estate because she was not a party to that deed, and her occupancy was permissive until at least 2017, which defeated her adverse possession claim. The decision is a reminder that a deed cannot create property rights for a nonparty, and permissive use does not become ownership without 10 years of hostile possession.
Wilber v. Borgen (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
Wilber v. Borgen involved claims that a coronary angiography at Maimonides Medical Center was negligently performed and done without informed consent. The Second Department reinstated the medical malpractice and informed consent claims against the doctor and hospital, holding that at the pleading stage the plaintiff did not need to submit a physician’s affidavit to keep the case alive. It left in place the dismissal of claims against the other defendants because service was improper and one named defendant was not a suable entity.
In the Matter of Lillian Gennarelli, deceased (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that Lillian Gennarelli’s will could not yet be fully admitted to probate because there are factual questions about whether Joan Theodos improperly influenced its preparation. The court agreed there was enough evidence that Gennarelli was mentally competent when she signed the will, but found that Theodos’s role in managing finances, relaying will terms to the lawyer, and benefiting under the will requires a trial.
The People v. Andre Alberto (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
In The People v. Andre Alberto, the Second Department reversed a weapon-possession conviction after finding police lacked a clear, factual basis to chase and detain the defendant. The court ruled that a vague civilian accusation, an unclear struggle, and flight were not enough to justify the pursuit, so the gun recovered afterward had to be suppressed. The decision underscores that police need specific facts suggesting criminal activity before pursuing someone, or key evidence may be thrown out and the case dismissed.
J & T Beach Corp. v. Town of Oyster Bay (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
This case involved a beach bar operator that sued the Town of Oyster Bay for breach of contract after the Town ended its concession license. The Second Department dismissed those contract claims, holding they were barred because the operator had already challenged the same termination in an earlier Article 78 case.
The ruling matters because it reinforces that parties generally cannot bring a second lawsuit over the same dispute just by changing the legal theory or asking for different relief.
Krzystof Bista v. State of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department ruled for a construction worker who fell from an unsecured ladder during a project at Farmingdale State College, reversing the lower court and granting him summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1). The court found that the ladder’s sudden movement and tilt was enough to show a safety-law violation, and the State did not show that the worker alone caused the accident.
Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. v. McFarlane (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department upheld the foreclosure judgment against the borrower, but it ruled that the lender could not collect interest for the period from November 1, 2011, to September 13, 2022 because it gave no good reason for years of delay in moving the case forward. The decision matters because it shows that even when a lender wins a foreclosure case, a court can stop interest from piling up if the lender’s delay unfairly increases the borrower’s debt.
J. L., et al. v. Elaine Sklar, et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated medical malpractice claims arising from labor and delivery care at Maimonides Medical Center, where the plaintiffs alleged that improper induction medication management, failure to respond to excessive contractions, and use of a vacuum delivery instead of an emergency C-section caused injuries to the mother and baby. The court found that the doctor, medical practice, and hospital were not entitled to summary judgment because their experts did not fully address the specific allegations or rule out negligence by hospital staff, so the case will continue.
Hernandez-Morataya v. M&L Equities Auto, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a car wash worker’s personal injury lawsuit after finding that the property-owning affiliate and its principals did not prove they were legally the same as the worker’s employer. The court said shared ownership and a business relationship were not enough; to avoid suit under workers’ compensation exclusivity, the defendants had to show real day-to-day control or full integration between the companies.
The People v. Reynaldo Reyes (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
In People v. Reyes, the Second Department ruled that the defendant did not prove his lawyer had a conflict of interest that affected the defense, so his ineffective-assistance claim failed. But the court vacated the convictions for third-degree robbery and petit larceny, along with the related sentences, because those charges were lesser included offenses of first-degree robbery based on the same conduct. This matters because it shows that speculative conflict claims will not overturn a conviction, while duplicate lesser-offense convictions cannot stand.
The People v. Michael McCutchen (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department upheld Michael McCutchen’s convictions for criminal contempt, resisting arrest, and obstructing governmental administration, finding no speedy trial violation and concluding that the prosecution’s discovery certification remained valid despite minor later disclosures. But it vacated his sentence and sent the case back for resentencing because the trial court did not follow the required process before sentencing him as a second felony offender.
The People v. Chadd Williams (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that Chadd Williams could not be convicted of both first-degree and second-degree criminal contempt for the same conduct because the second-degree charge was a lesser included offense. It vacated and dismissed the second-degree contempt count but otherwise upheld the remaining convictions, underscoring that courts will not reverse on speculative or unpreserved claims about investigative flaws or missing evidence.
New Penn Financial, LLC v. Dancy (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department held that the trial court properly appointed a successor referee but should not have allowed U.S. Bank to be substituted as the plaintiff. The court said there was no proof that U.S. Bank had actually acquired an interest in the case, which matters because parties seeking substitution in foreclosure actions must show clear evidence of a valid transfer.
Matter of Manno v. Werley (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
This child custody dispute involved competing requests by the mother and father to change an earlier Virginia custody order, after Family Court gave the father sole legal and physical custody. The Second Department reversed that ruling and sent the case back for a fast new hearing, finding that later developments made the existing record too outdated to decide what arrangement is now in the child’s best interests. This matters because custody decisions must be based on current facts, not stale ones.
Graham v. City of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a personal injury lawsuit against the City of New York and the NYPD arising from a vehicle accident. The court found that the defendants had not conclusively shown the plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of claim, and the ruling matters because public entities cannot win dismissal at an early stage when key facts about notice remain disputed.
The People ex rel. Larson, on behalf of Kirton v. Spano (Appellate Division, Second Department, March 30, 2026)
In a habeas corpus challenge to Delano Kirton’s pretrial detention, the Second Department ruled that the trial court did not make the required record under New York’s bail statute before keeping him in custody. The court did not order Kirton’s release, but sent the case back for a prompt new bail or detention hearing, underscoring that judges must follow the proper procedure when deciding whether a defendant stays jailed before trial.
Aronov v. Matvienko (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
In this divorce case, the dispute was over whether the plaintiff and a nonparty failed to obey court-approved subpoenas and whether that noncompliance justified contempt. The Second Department reversed the trial court’s order and sent the case back for a hearing, holding that the court had to resolve factual disputes about subpoena compliance before denying contempt or imposing sanctions; the decision matters because it reinforces that courts must hold a proper hearing before making those calls.
The People of the State of New York v. Coria David and Jose Luis Rivera (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a Queens court order that had thrown out guns and other evidence found after police stopped a car linked to a recent armed robbery. The court held that officers had enough reason to stop the vehicle, use forceful safety measures, arrest the occupants after seeing a gun in plain view, and search a fanny pack tied to one defendant.
Romero v. State of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
In Romero v. State of New York, the Second Department reinstated a personal injury claim after the Court of Claims dismissed it for allegedly not stating the accident time with enough detail. The court held that giving the exact date of the motor vehicle accident was enough to let the State investigate, underscoring that these claims do not require perfect precision if the State has enough information to assess liability.
The People, ex rel. Michelle E. Bleecker, on behalf of Owen Ekpo v. Kirk Imperati (Appellate Division, Second Department, March 31, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that a defendant being held before trial in Dutchess County should be released on his own recognizance instead of kept in jail. The court required safeguards aimed at flight risk, including surrendering any passports, agreeing not to get new ones, and waiving opposition to extradition from another country. This matters because it shows habeas corpus can be used to challenge pretrial detention and that courts may prefer targeted release conditions over continued incarceration.
Finn v. Piesco (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
In this post-divorce dispute, the Second Department upheld the trial court’s decision to deny the wife maintenance but vacated a $10,000 attorney’s fee sanction awarded to the husband. The court said the fee amount could not stand without billing records or a hearing showing it was reasonable, which matters because it confirms that while judges have broad leeway on maintenance, sanctions-based fee awards still need solid proof.
Matter of Brandon Zielazny v. Demi Martorano (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department upheld an order giving the mother sole legal and residential custody after finding that the parents’ interstate living arrangement, the child’s school age, and the parents’ poor communication made joint custody unworkable. It did, however, revise the father’s parenting-time schedule, including summer, holiday, and video-call provisions, to better serve the child’s best interests.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Marquez (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a lower court order that had favored Bank of America in a residential foreclosure case against Victor Alfaro Marquez. The court found the bank did not clearly show it complied with New York’s required 90-day pre-foreclosure notice because the notice gave a default timeline that conflicted with the complaint. This matters because even small errors in a foreclosure notice can block summary judgment and delay or derail a foreclosure case.
Matter of Itria Ventures, LLC v. Champion Painting Specialty Services Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
This case involved a judgment creditor’s effort to collect on its judgment by reaching money that Champion Painting allegedly owed to the debtor, SRI Construction. The Second Department reversed the lower court and granted the turnover request, holding that although Itria used the wrong procedural statute, the mistake did not block relief because the record showed Champion owed money to SRI.
The decision matters because it confirms that creditors can collect directly from a third party that owes money to a debtor, and a technical filing error may be corrected when the facts clearly support enforcement.
U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee v. Ralph Thibault (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 2, 2026)
The Third Department reinstated a lender’s bid for a default judgment in a mortgage foreclosure case after the borrower failed to answer the complaint. The court held that the lender only had to show service, the claim, and the default at that stage, and that the borrower could not raise a late RPAPL 1304 notice issue or file a late answer without a reasonable excuse, reinforcing that those defenses can be waived if not timely raised.
Matter of Joshua X. v. Alexandria Y. (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 2, 2026)
The Third Department reinstated a father’s request to modify custody of his younger child, finding Family Court ended the case too early. The father’s proof that his military job had become stable, the mother’s household had significantly changed, and the child was experiencing stress was enough to require a full hearing. The decision matters because it makes clear that, at the dismissal stage, courts must treat the parent’s evidence as true and cannot weigh credibility or decide the child’s best interests before hearing the full case.
Shaughnessey v. Relyea (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 2, 2026)
In a dispute over claims that landlords entered a rental home and removed or sold tenants’ belongings while the tenants were incarcerated, the Third Department held that the original complaint was properly dismissed because it was too vague about when the alleged conduct happened. But the Third Department reversed the denial of leave to amend, finding the revised complaint gave enough notice of the claims and did not unfairly prejudice the defendants, reinforcing New York’s generally liberal approach to allowing amended pleadings.
In the Matter of Anna D. v. David E. (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 2, 2026)
The Third Department reinstated a mother’s family offense petition to the extent it alleged second-degree harassment, finding that repeated unwanted visits, texts, emails, and other contact after she told the father to stop were enough to let the case go forward. It agreed the stalking claim was still too weak, but the decision matters because it confirms that courts must read these petitions generously before dismissing them at the outset.
In the Matter of Kareem E., Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 2, 2026)
The Third Department dismissed the juvenile delinquency charge for second-degree riot arising from a parking-lot fight, but upheld the findings for attempted assault and resisting arrest and left the one-year probation term in place. The court said the petition did not include enough firsthand facts to show that Kareem E. and at least four others were acting violently together, which matters because juvenile petitions must clearly and specifically support each charge from the start.
In the Matter of Kareem E., Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 2, 2026)
The Third Department dismissed a juvenile delinquency charge for second-degree riot because the petition did not include enough firsthand facts showing that Kareem E. and at least four others were acting violently together. It otherwise upheld the finding that he committed attempted assault and resisting arrest, based on officer testimony and body camera footage. This case matters because it shows that juvenile petitions must clearly spell out the facts for each charge, especially riot allegations.
Matter of Emilie Munson et al. v. New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 2, 2026)
The Third Department held that New York’s Division of Criminal Justice Services could withhold its statewide registry of certified police and peace officers in response to a FOIL request. The court found that releasing the database, even with redactions, could be matched with other public records to identify undercover officers or reveal undercover staffing levels. This matters because it confirms that agencies may withhold entire records when disclosure could create a real safety risk that redactions cannot fix.
Matter of Emilie Munson et al. v. New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 2, 2026)
The Third Department ruled that New York’s Division of Criminal Justice Services could withhold its statewide registry of certified police and peace officers in response to a FOIL request. The court found that even a redacted version could be matched with other public records to identify undercover officers or reveal sensitive staffing levels, creating a safety risk. This decision reinforces that agencies may deny access when disclosure could indirectly endanger law enforcement personnel.
People v. Bowden (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 2, 2026)
In People v. Bowden, the case centered on whether the defendant helped supply the gun used in a shooting and whether the prosecution proved he possessed an operable firearm. The Third Department reversed all of his convictions and dismissed the indictment, finding that unclear video and other evidence did not reliably show that he aided the shooter, entered the building, or possessed the same working gun used in the crime. The decision is a reminder that suspicion is not enough. Prosecutors must prove accomplice liability and firearm operability with solid evidence.
The People v. David Coria and Jose Luis Rivera (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 1, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a Queens court order that had thrown out guns, a stun gun, and cocaine found after police stopped a car linked to an earlier armed robbery. The court held that officers had enough reason to stop the car, use forceful safety measures, and arrest the two men once a gun was seen in plain view. This matters because it confirms that in high-risk vehicle stops, police may take strong protective steps and use evidence found afterward if the stop and arrest are legally justified.