Romas v County of Suffolk
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Municipal liability for roadway defects: whether a county may use home-rule legislation to eliminate constructive-notice liability in highway-defect cases, and what a county must prove on summary judgment to dismiss such claims.
The Supreme Court denied the County's motion for summary judgment, holding that although the County showed it lacked prior written notice, it failed to establish that it also lacked constructive notice of the alleged pothole.
Nothing was overturned. The Appellate Division affirmed the order denying summary judgment.
The court held that Suffolk County Charter § C8-2(A)(2)(iii) directly conflicts with Highway Law § 139(2) [permits counties to enact prior written notice laws for highway defects but also allows suit, absent written notice, when the defect existed long enough that it should have been discovered and remedied through reasonable care and diligence], so the County could not 'opt out' of constructive-notice liability under Municipal Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(5) [authorizes local governments to adopt local laws relating to claims against them so long as they are not inconsistent with general state law]. The County also failed to make a prima facie showing that it lacked constructive notice.
Background
William Romas alleged that on March 26, 2018, he was riding his bicycle on County Road 51, a roadway maintained by Suffolk County, when his front wheel struck a pothole or similar roadway defect, causing him to lose control and fall. He later testified that when he returned to the scene he observed cracked pavement and missing pieces of roadway. After serving a notice of claim and appearing for examinations under oath under General Municipal Law § 50-h [pre-suit examination procedure for claims against municipal entities], he sued the County for negligence. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no prior written notice of the defect and that Suffolk County Charter § C8-2(A)(2) eliminated any constructive-notice theory. In opposition, the plaintiff submitted inspection records and an expert affidavit opining that the defect developed over months or years and would have been visible during prior inspections.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court found that Suffolk County established lack of prior written notice but did not establish lack of constructive notice, which remained a viable theory under Highway Law § 139(2). Because the County failed to meet its prima facie burden, the court denied summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Appellate Division Reversal
No reversal occurred. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Suffolk County may not enact a charter provision that supersedes the constructive-notice portion of Highway Law § 139(2), and that a county moving for summary judgment in such a case must show both lack of prior written notice and lack of constructive notice before the burden shifts to the plaintiff.
Legal Significance
This decision confirms that a county cannot use local legislation to contradict a general state law governing highway-defect claims. Suffolk County Charter § C8-2(A)(2)(iii), which purported to supersede the constructive-notice component of Highway Law § 139(2), was held invalid to that extent because it directly conflicted with state law. The ruling also clarifies the summary-judgment burden: when Highway Law § 139(2) applies, a county must affirmatively prove both no prior written notice and no constructive notice; it is not enough merely to show lack of written notice and then force the plaintiff to prove constructive notice in response.
Suffolk County cannot insulate itself from constructive-notice liability for roadway defects by local charter amendment, and counties seeking summary judgment in highway-defect cases must negate both prior written notice and constructive notice to obtain dismissal.