Narvaez v 12 West 31st Street Corp.
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Construction-site injury litigation involving a worker who slipped on wet, freshly painted fire-escape stairs while welding and asserted claims under New York Labor Law, chiefly Labor Law § 240(1) [Scaffold Law requiring safety devices to protect workers from elevation-related risks].
The trial court dismissed the complaint, later refused to vacate that dismissal under CPLR 5015(a)(1) [rule permitting relief from an order or judgment based on excusable default], and also denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim.
The Appellate Division vacated the dismissal only as to the Labor Law § 240(1) claim and reversed the order denying plaintiff partial summary judgment, granting plaintiff summary judgment on that claim. The dismissal of the other claims remained in place.
The court found that plaintiff showed a reasonable excuse for failing to timely oppose defendants' summary judgment motion because the default resulted from a one-time law office failure, and he moved promptly enough to show no intent to abandon the action. The court also held that the Labor Law § 240(1) claim had merit because plaintiff was working on an elevated fire escape, was exposed to an elevation-related risk, and defendants failed to provide an adequate safety device.
Background
Plaintiff testified that he was welding a handrail between the 10th and 11th floors on a fire escape when he slipped on several wet, freshly painted steps and fell. He asserted claims under Labor Law § 240(1), Labor Law § 241(6) [requires owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and comply with specific Industrial Code rules], Labor Law § 200 [codifies the duty to provide workers a safe place to work], and common-law negligence. After the complaint was dismissed, plaintiff moved to vacate the dismissal and separately sought partial summary judgment on the § 240(1) claim.
Lower Court Decision
Supreme Court, New York County, dismissed the complaint by order entered November 1, 2024. It then denied plaintiff's motion under CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate that dismissal by order entered June 6, 2025, and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim by order entered on or about November 6, 2024.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division modified the June 6, 2025 order to vacate the November 1, 2024 dismissal only insofar as it dismissed the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, and otherwise affirmed. It reversed the November 6, 2024 order denying plaintiff partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to plaintiff on the § 240(1) claim. The direct appeal from the November 1, 2024 dismissal order was dismissed as academic. The court held that plaintiff abandoned his Labor Law §§ 241(6) and 200 and common-law negligence claims by failing to address them in his motion to vacate.
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that a single, isolated law office failure can constitute a reasonable excuse under CPLR 5015(a)(1) when the movant acts without undue delay and shows no intent to abandon the case. It also underscores that a fire escape can qualify as an elevated work surface under Labor Law § 240(1), requiring adequate protective devices where the worker is exposed to an elevation-related risk. The absence of such protection can support not only vacatur of a default dismissal but also summary judgment for the injured worker.
When a construction worker falls from or on an elevated work surface such as a fire escape while performing assigned work, Labor Law § 240(1) may apply if no adequate safety device was provided. A prompt motion supported by a credible one-time law office error can restore that claim even after dismissal, but claims not argued may be treated as abandoned.