Beach v. Touradji Capital Management, LP (Appellate Division, First Department, September 3, 2026)
In a long-running hedge fund pay dispute, the First Department reinstated a jury verdict that rejected the employer’s counterclaims for fiduciary misconduct, unfair competition, trade secret misuse, and defamation, and it left in place the damages award against Gary Beach. The court said the trial judge should not have set aside that verdict because the evidence supported the jury’s findings, underscoring that resolved claims cannot be retried simply because related issues remain undecided.
The People of the State of New York v. Corey Key (Appellate Division, First Department, September 3, 2026)
The First Department reversed a lower court’s decision to keep a 17-year-old gun possession case in the Youth Part and ordered it transferred to Family Court under New York’s Raise the Age law. The court said that, although the trial judge did not legally abuse discretion, the law’s strong preference for Family Court and the defendant’s mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating facts. This matters because it shows the First Department can independently send adolescent offender cases to Family Court when the goals of Raise the Age favor rehabilitation over criminal prosecution.
The People of the State of New York v. Corey Key (Appellate Division, First Department, September 3, 2026)
The First Department ruled that a 17-year-old’s gun case should be transferred from the Youth Part to Family Court under New York’s Raise the Age law. Although the teen had a loaded gun and a prior gun-related youthful offender case, the court found those facts did not outweigh the strong presumption favoring Family Court and the significant evidence of hardship and rehabilitation, reinforcing that “extraordinary circumstances” to keep a case in criminal court should be rare.
6930 Jefferies LLC v. Mountain State Energy Holdings LLC et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, September 3, 2026)
In a dispute over a proposed investment in an energy company, the First Department dismissed claims that Mountain State and its affiliate wrongfully blocked the transaction and left in place the dismissal of a fraud claim. The court said the dispute was really a contract fight, not a separate tort, and that the agreement’s broad liability shield protected the affiliate, reinforcing that negotiated limits on liability will be enforced in failed deal cases.
In the Matter of 57th & 6th Ground LLC v. Carnegie House Tenants Corporation et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, September 3, 2026)
The First Department threw out an arbitration award that had sharply increased ground rent for a Manhattan co-op and retail property, and sent the dispute to a new arbitration panel. The court found that the neutral umpire’s undisclosed contacts with the landlord’s lawyer in another paid matter created an appearance of bias, which was made worse by questionable procedural rulings. This decision matters because it confirms that in New York, an arbitration award can be vacated for apparent partiality even without proof of actual bias.
Kept Realty, LLC v. Meir Miller, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that neither the landlord nor the tenant was entitled to summary judgment in a dispute over whether the tenant properly renewed a commercial lease for another 10 years. The court said the lease language about whether the tenant was disqualified by a default was unclear, and there was also a factual dispute over whether the tenant gave timely written renewal notice. This matters because lease renewal rights can turn on strict notice rules and clear lease terms, and ambiguity can force the parties to prove their case at trial.
Cox v. Cove 5, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department held that a restaurant tenant was not liable after a man allegedly tripped over a railroad tie used as a wheel stop in a shared parking lot, because the tenant did not own, control, or have a duty to maintain that area. But the court let the claims against the property owner and another defendant go forward, finding unresolved questions about whether the wheel stop was dangerous, whether the lighting was adequate, and whether they knew or should have known about the condition.
Matter of Caceres v. NYC Health and Hospitals (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated the petitioners’ effort to pursue a medical malpractice claim against NYC Health and Hospitals by allowing a late notice of claim over alleged birth-related injuries. The court found that the infant’s serious medical condition reasonably explained the delay and that the hospital was not substantially harmed because the relevant treatment was already well documented in its records.
Mohamad v. Csompo (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a medical malpractice claim arising from an obstetrical delivery, where the plaintiff alleged the doctor mishandled complications and used improper fundal pressure during childbirth. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because their expert assumed a key disputed fact—that no fundal pressure was used—and failed to address conflicting evidence, underscoring that defense experts must confront the actual record before a case can be dismissed.
Giuseppe Digangi v. New York City School Construction Authority, et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
Giuseppe Digangi, a construction worker, claimed he was injured when he slipped on an icy step while getting out of a skidsteer at a school construction site. The Second Department ruled that his Labor Law § 240(1) claim was properly dismissed and cut back much of his Labor Law § 241(6) claim, but allowed his negligence, Labor Law § 200, and lighting-based § 241(6) claims to continue. The decision matters because it confirms that routine short falls from equipment are not covered by the scaffold law, and that only specific, applicable safety rules—not OSHA standards—can support a § 241(6) claim.
Matter of Fried v. Lopez (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated the dismissal of a landlord’s holdover case against rent-stabilized tenants, holding that the 2019 Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act applied even though the case had already been filed. Because the landlord had not yet obtained a possession judgment, he could not pursue multiple apartments for personal or family use under the older, broader law.
Tenezaca v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a medical malpractice case against New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, finding that the plaintiff’s late notice of claim should be treated as timely. The court held that the hospital’s own records gave it enough notice of the alleged malpractice, the delay did not substantially prejudice its defense, and the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse, which matters because it shows late filing may be forgiven when a public hospital already has the key facts in its records.
Lopez-Martinez v. Leroux (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In Lopez-Martinez v. Leroux, the Second Department ruled that the lower court wrongly treated a prior dismissal for failure to substitute a representative for a deceased plaintiff as ending the entire case. The court sent the matter back for the trial court to decide the surviving plaintiff’s request to lift the stay and move forward, emphasizing that this type of dismissal usually affects only the deceased party’s claims, not a co-plaintiff’s separate claims.
Federal National Mortgage Association v. Gooch (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In Federal National Mortgage Association v. Gooch, the Second Department held that a mortgage foreclosure case filed against a borrower who had already died was void from the start. The court vacated the prior foreclosure orders and dismissed the complaint, making clear that a lender must sue the deceased owner’s estate representative, and that later adding heirs or family members cannot fix that defect.
Matter of Ceasar v. New York City Employees' Retirement System (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In Matter of Ceasar v. New York City Employees' Retirement System, the Second Department held that a worker who partly succeeded in challenging the denial of accidental disability retirement benefits could not recover attorneys’ fees from NYCERS. The court reversed the fee award because Article 78 cases do not allow attorneys’ fees unless a statute, agreement, or court rule permits them, and any sanctions-based theory failed because the required notice and findings were missing.
HSBC Bank USA, National Association v. Wharton (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In this foreclosure case, the Second Department held that HSBC’s claim against Joy Wharton was properly dismissed because the bank waited more than seven years after her default to seek a default judgment and did not offer a valid excuse. But the Second Department reinstated the claims against the other defendants, finding that Property 1501, LLC only had standing to challenge the claim tied to the interest it acquired from Joy, not claims against unrelated parties.
Vaynman v. 3 Kings Point Realty, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In a dispute over a failed Kings Point home sale, the Second Department ruled that most of the defendants’ tort counterclaims were not pleaded with enough detail. It dismissed the appeal from the denial of reargument, allowed the abuse of process counterclaim to go forward, and threw out the defamation, tortious interference, and indemnification counterclaims.
The decision is a reminder that New York courts require specific facts to support these kinds of claims, especially in real estate litigation.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Fischman (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department reversed a foreclosure judgment because the lender’s pre-foreclosure notice used outdated statutory language. The lender filed the case after the law changed, so the notice did not strictly comply with RPAPL 1304. The decision matters because it underscores that lenders must use the notice language required when the case is filed, or their foreclosure claims may fail.
Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Miller (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a mortgage foreclosure case that the trial court had dismissed as abandoned after the lender did not seek a default judgment within one year of the borrower’s default. The court held that the lender’s timely request for a judicial intervention and a required foreclosure settlement conference counted as a step toward judgment, so the case could move forward and the property’s new owner could be substituted as a defendant.
Pitt v. Rosenblatt (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In this rear-end collision case, the plaintiff challenged a defense verdict after the jury found that the truck driver did not have a sudden medical emergency but was still not negligent. The Second Department ordered a new trial on liability, holding that those findings could not logically stand together because the defendants’ only excuse for the crash was the claimed medical emergency.
This decision matters because it reinforces that a driver who rear-ends a stopped vehicle is generally presumed negligent, and a jury cannot reject the only non-negligence defense yet still return a no-negligence verdict.
Simon v. Plainview Avenue Associates (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a shopper’s injury claim against Home Depot after he allegedly tripped over a forklift parked in a store aisle while loading a long board into his cart. The court held that Home Depot did not show, as a matter of law, that the forklift was an obvious and non-dangerous condition, which matters because even a visible obstacle can still create liability if its placement makes a customer’s task unsafe.
Breslin Brookhaven, LLC v. Rose (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department held that a dispute over financing and member conduct in an LLC real estate venture had to be sent to arbitration under the operating agreement, reversing the lower court and staying the lawsuit. The court found the agreement’s broad arbitration clause covered the claims, could be enforced by Rose’s assignee, and was not waived by the defendants’ participation in a separate earlier case.
Suffolk County Public Administrator v. Davin's Funeral Home, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
This case asked whether a personal injury suit against Suffolk County and the Town of Brookhaven was filed too late after an earlier, timely case based on the same 2016 accident had been dismissed without prejudice. The Second Department reinstated the claims, holding that the estate refiled and served the new action within the six-month window allowed by CPLR 205(a), measured from the prior case’s actual termination in April 2023 rather than the date of the dismissal order. This matters because it confirms that a refiled case can still be timely if a prior case ended for procedural reasons and the new action is brought within six months of when the first case truly ended.
Board of Education of the Lawrence Union Free School District v. Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department held that a school district and related petitioners could not challenge Cedarhurst’s approval of a 98-unit apartment project under SEQRA because they did not show a concrete environmental harm unique to them. The court otherwise left the result intact, but clarified that the declaratory judgment claims should be resolved by a declaration in the respondents’ favor rather than simply dismissed. This matters because it underscores that SEQRA challengers need a specific, non-economic injury to get into court.
Matter of Starna v. New York City Fire Department (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In a challenge to the New York City Fire Department’s denial of a firefighter’s religious exemption from the COVID-19 vaccine mandate, the Second Department left intact the firefighter’s reinstatement but reversed a nearly $29,000 award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The court said that winning an Article 78 case against a government agency does not automatically allow recovery of legal fees; there must be a contract, statute, or court rule that specifically permits it.
Boutureira v. Grotas (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a patient’s medical malpractice and informed consent claims arising from a 2019 surgery for Peyronie’s disease, finding that the defendants had not shown the surgery was appropriate at that stage of the disease or that the patient was adequately informed of the risks and alternatives. The ruling matters because it underscores that doctors cannot win summary judgment with a general expert opinion or a signed consent form when key factual disputes remain.
Velasquez v. Kelly (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In this personal injury case arising from a worker’s fall from a ladder at a homeowner’s property, the dispute centered on whether the homeowner could be sanctioned for not producing pre-accident surveillance video. The Second Department ruled that his answer could not be struck because he showed the additional footage did not exist and there was no proof he willfully violated discovery rules, though it left in place the denial of his request to renew.
The decision matters because it confirms that courts should not impose harsh discovery sanctions for failing to produce material that does not exist.
11-36 31st Avenue Lender, LLC v. RM Newman, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In this commercial foreclosure case, the lender tried to recover more than $1.2 million from Ronni Newman after the foreclosure sale by seeking a deficiency judgment. The Second Department reversed that award because the lender served the motion only through the e-filing system, which did not meet the service requirements of RPAPL 1371(2). This matters because New York lenders must strictly follow the statute’s notice rules after a foreclosure sale, and e-filing alone can cost them the ability to recover the shortfall.
Scopinich v. Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Medical Center, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In a nursing home malpractice and wrongful death case, The Second Department dismissed the claims against Brookhaven Health Care Facility, LLC and granted summary judgment in its favor. The court found that Brookhaven’s expert evidence showed no negligent care, no causal link to the decedent’s injuries, and no regulatory violations, while the plaintiff’s expert response was too speculative and unsupported to keep the case alive.
Druzhinsky v. Trump Village Section 4, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a lower court ruling in a dispute over a cooperative apartment foreclosure auction, holding that the winning bidder breached the sale terms by failing to submit a complete board application within the required five days. Because the bidder was in default, the court dismissed his contract claim, ruled that the cooperative could pursue attorneys’ fees, and sent the case back to determine the amount owed.
Lewis v. New York City Transit Authority (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
The Second Department sharply limited discovery in a wrongful-death case arising from a fatal bus accident, reversing orders that had required the transit defendants to turn over broad personnel, training, policy, and work-hours records and to produce four more employees for depositions. The court held that because the defendants admitted the driver was acting within the scope of his job, discovery aimed at negligent hiring, retention, or training was not available, and the plaintiff had not shown the broader document requests or extra witnesses were actually necessary.
The People ex rel. Liles, on behalf of Blanc v. Richards (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 2, 2026)
In a pretrial detention dispute, the Second Department held that New York’s 90-day rule for felony defendants applies only to the days a defendant is actually in jail on the case, not the time spent out on bail. The Second Department dismissed Blanc’s habeas petition because the prosecution was ready within 80 in-custody days, and it also made clear that a release from custody does not restart the clock.