Attorneys and Parties

Plaintiff-Appellant Jarryd Cox
Attorneys: Zachary M. Beriloff

Defendant-Respondent Dublin Deck, Inc.
Attorneys: Laurie Beatus

Defendant-Respondent Leeward 5, Inc.
Defendant-Respondent Cove 5, LLC
Attorneys: Sean R. Hutchinson, Catherine R. Everett

Brief Summary

Issue

Premises liability involving an alleged parking lot hazard, specifically whether a tenant owed a duty to maintain a common parking area and whether a railroad tie used as a wheel stop was an open and obvious condition that was not inherently dangerous.

Lower Court Held

The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted summary judgment to Dublin Deck, Inc., and separately to Cove 5, LLC, and Leeward 5, Inc., dismissing the complaint against them, and denied Dublin's second summary judgment motion as academic.

What Was Overturned

The Appellate Division reversed the grant of summary judgment to Cove 5, LLC, and Leeward 5, Inc., and denied their motion. It otherwise affirmed, including the dismissal of the claims against Dublin Deck, Inc. The appeal from the denial, as academic, of Dublin's second motion was dismissed because the plaintiff was not aggrieved under CPLR 5511 [appeal may be taken only by a party aggrieved by the order].

Why

Dublin Deck, Inc., established that it did not own, occupy, control, or specially use the common parking area and had no lease obligation to maintain or illuminate it, and the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue that Dublin assumed such a duty by its conduct. By contrast, Cove 5, LLC, and Leeward 5, Inc., failed to meet their initial summary judgment burden because they did not establish that the railroad tie was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous, that the lighting was adequate, or that they did not create the condition and lacked actual or constructive notice of it.

Background

The plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell late at night over a railroad tie being used as a wheel stop in an exterior parking lot owned by Cove 5, LLC, and shared by tenants including Dublin Deck, Inc., and Leeward 5, Inc. He sued for personal injuries, claiming the parking lot condition was hazardous. Dublin argued it had no duty regarding the common parking area. Cove and Leeward argued the railroad tie was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous.

Lower Court Decision

The lower court granted Dublin's first motion for summary judgment, finding the complaint should be dismissed as against it, and also granted the motion by Cove 5, LLC, and Leeward 5, Inc., dismissing the complaint as against them. It denied Dublin's second motion as academic.

Appellate Division Reversal

The Appellate Division modified the order by deleting the provision granting summary judgment to Cove 5, LLC, and Leeward 5, Inc., and substituted a provision denying that motion. The court held Dublin was properly awarded summary judgment because it lacked the requisite ownership, occupancy, control, or special use of the parking lot and had no maintenance duty under the lease. However, Cove and Leeward failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the railroad tie was open and obvious and not inherently dangerous, especially given the plaintiff's testimony that it was dark and the lot was full. They also failed to show adequate lighting or lack of creation or notice of the condition.

Legal Significance

This decision reinforces that premises liability turns first on duty, and that liability for a dangerous property condition generally depends on ownership, occupancy, control, or special use. It also emphasizes that defendants moving for summary judgment on an open-and-obvious theory must still make a prima facie showing that the condition was not inherently dangerous and that factual issues such as nighttime lighting and notice are resolved before judgment as a matter of law.

🔑 Key Takeaway

A tenant without control or maintenance responsibility for a common area may obtain summary judgment, but owners or responsible parties cannot win dismissal merely by labeling a parking lot obstacle open and obvious when darkness, visibility, hazard, and notice remain fact questions.