The People ex rel. Liles, on behalf of Blanc v Richards
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Brief Summary
Criminal procedure and pretrial detention. The court interpreted CPL 30.30(2)(a) [requires release on bail or recognizance when a felony defendant committed to the custody of the sheriff is not ready for trial within 90 days from the commencement of that commitment] to decide how to calculate the 90-day readiness period when a defendant is jailed, released on bail, and later returned to custody after bail is exonerated.
The Supreme Court, Queens County denied Steven Blanc's motion to dismiss under CPL 30.30(1)(a) [requires dismissal of a felony indictment when the People are not ready for trial within six months, subject to exclusions] and later denied his oral application for release under CPL 30.30(2)(a), finding the People had not exceeded the 90-day in-custody limit.
Nothing was overturned. The Appellate Division dismissed the writ of habeas corpus and left the Supreme Court's ruling in place.
The court held, as a matter of first impression in the department, that CPL 30.30(2)(a) counts only the actual periods during which the defendant is incarcerated on the relevant charges. Time spent out on bail does not count toward the 90-day release rule, but release also does not reset the clock. Blanc had accrued only 80 in-custody days before the People filed their certificate of compliance and statement of readiness.
Background
Blanc was arraigned on August 20, 2024, on Queens felony weapons charges and was committed to the custody of the sheriff after bail was set. He remained jailed for 20 days until September 9, 2024, when his then-girlfriend posted a partially secured surety bond and he was released. On October 10, 2024, the surety withdrew, bail was exonerated and reset, and Blanc was recommitted to custody on October 11, 2024, because he could not post bail. The People filed their certificate of compliance and statement of readiness on December 11, 2024. By that date, Blanc had spent a total of 80 days in custody on the case. Blanc later argued that the entire period from his initial commitment on August 20 through December 11 should count under CPL 30.30(2)(a), including the 31 days he was free on bail, and that he therefore should have been released.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court determined that only 117 days were chargeable to the People for purposes of the felony speedy-trial dismissal rule under CPL 30.30(1)(a) and denied dismissal of the indictment. It also denied Blanc's subsequent request for release under CPL 30.30(2)(a), rejecting his argument that the People exceeded the 90-day limit for detained defendants.
Appellate Division Reversal
There was no reversal. The Appellate Division dismissed the writ and held that the 90-day calculation under CPL 30.30(2)(a) includes only actual in-custody time. The court also rejected the People's alternative position that the 90-day period resets each time a defendant is released and later recommitted. Instead, the correct approach is to aggregate all periods of incarceration on the relevant charges. Using that method, only 80 days were chargeable to the People here, so Blanc was not unlawfully detained.
Legal Significance
This decision establishes, for the Second Department, that CPL 30.30(2)(a) is a custody-based protection aimed at limiting prolonged pretrial incarceration, not a continuous calendar running from the first commitment regardless of later release. Time at liberty on bail is excluded from the 90-day release calculation, but prior in-custody days remain counted if the defendant is later returned to custody. The ruling relies on the statute's plain language, its legislative purpose of preventing undue pretrial detention, and persuasive authority from the Fourth Department.
Under CPL 30.30(2)(a), only the days a defendant is actually jailed on the case count toward the 90-day deadline for the People to be ready for trial; days spent out on bail do not count, and release does not erase earlier in-custody time.