Carrero-Santiago v. Asphalt Green, Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, August 27, 2026)
The First Department dismissed a school aide’s injury suit after she was hit by a basketball during recess at a Bronx school. The court held that the recess program contractor and coach did not owe her a legal duty under the school contract, and that she also accepted the obvious risk of standing close to an active basketball game.
Joseph Lafferty et al. v. Edward K. Avila, MD et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, August 27, 2026)
The First Department reinstated claims against a neurologist and hospital arising from a fatal crash after the doctor allegedly put the wrong last-seizure date on a DMV form, which helped a patient get his license back. The court said that, at this stage, the alleged mistake looked like an administrative recording error rather than medical treatment or judgment, so ordinary negligence rules applied and the claims were filed on time.
Astraea NYNY LLC v. Ganley (Appellate Division, First Department, August 27, 2026)
The First Department reversed an order blocking a Delaware lawsuit tied to an alleged separate 2020 settlement agreement, even though the parties were already involved in a New York loan-default judgment. The court said antisuit injunctions are reserved for exceptional cases, and because the Delaware claims sought different relief and did not try to undo the New York judgment, issues like preclusion and forum selection should be decided by the Delaware court.
Travelers Casualty & Surety Company v. Vale Canada Limited (Appellate Division, First Department, August 27, 2026)
The First Department largely upheld rulings that denied Vale Canada insurance coverage for environmental cleanup claims tied to pollution at multiple mining sites. Although the court said the trial judge should have considered Ontario law, that did not change the result because the pollution came from gradual acid rock drainage over time, not a sudden event that could avoid the policies’ pollution exclusions.
This matters because it confirms that long-developing contamination will usually fall within pollution exclusions, even when foreign law is raised, and courts will not decide late-notice issues before they are ripe.
U.S. Bank Trust National Association v. Jimenez (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated the bank’s foreclosure claims and ruled that it had standing to sue because it attached the mortgage note, endorsed in blank, to the summons and complaint when the case was filed. The court held that this was enough to show the bank possessed the note at the start of the case, and the borrowers did not raise a real factual dispute.
Culp v. Silverline Services, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In a dispute over a merchant cash advance-style receivables agreement, the Second Department let the borrower’s fraud and bad-faith claims go forward but lifted the lower court’s order blocking enforcement of the contract. The court said the complaint was detailed enough to survive dismissal, but the borrower did not provide solid proof of likely success or irreparable harm, underscoring that getting an injunction requires evidence—not just allegations.
Mendoza v. Sterling Properties, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In a Brooklyn real estate dispute, Jose Mendoza claimed he had a right to buy the property and tried to enforce that claim against Kearny Bank, which later received an assigned mortgage on it. The Second Department dismissed the claims against the bank, finding that Mendoza’s notice of pendency was filed against the wrong parcel and did not give the bank legal notice, and that his claims of actual notice were too vague. This matters because it shows that in property cases, a filing must be indexed to the correct property or later lenders may not be bound by it.
U.S. Bank National Association v. Jones (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, The Second Department dismissed the complaint against Black Plaza Management, LLC as abandoned because U.S. Bank did not seek a default judgment within one year after Black Plaza failed to respond, and it did not offer a valid reason for the delay. The decision matters because it shows New York courts will strictly enforce that deadline in foreclosure cases, even when the underlying claim may otherwise have merit.
Knutsen v. JMK Building Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In Knutsen v. JMK Building Corp., trust beneficiaries sought to collect an alleged unpaid loan based on a lost promissory note, and the trial court had awarded them summary judgment for $450,000 plus interest. The Second Department reversed and denied summary judgment, holding that proof the note was lost was not enough because the plaintiffs did not clearly establish the note’s terms or that it was still enforceable. This decision matters because it underscores that, in New York, lost-note claims require strong proof before a court will award judgment without a trial.
Noh Soon Park v. Food Bazaar Supermarket, et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In this personal injury case, a shopper or worker claimed he was hurt when a pallet being pulled by a chain and forklift struck him at Food Bazaar. The Second Department reversed the trial court’s orders that barred the plaintiff from offering evidence and threw out the case, finding the defendants had not properly shown willful discovery misconduct or made the required good-faith effort to resolve the dispute first.
Sczesnik v. MB Landau, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In a class action over alleged rent overcharges and improper deregulation of apartments in a J-51 building, the Second Department largely upheld the lower court’s ruling against the tenants’ request for summary judgment because they did not show the landlords knowingly took part in a fraudulent deregulation scheme. The Second Department did, however, dismiss the landlords’ counterclaim for attorneys’ fees, finding no contract, statute, or court rule that allowed fees in this type of rent overcharge case.
Avanza Group, LLC v. Bugz Innovations, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In this breach-of-contract dispute, the trial court threw out Avanza Group’s case with prejudice after the plaintiff missed a deadline to file a note of issue before an inquest, even though the defendants’ answer had already been struck for discovery failures. The Second Department reinstated the case, holding that the court could not dismiss it for failure to prosecute without first giving the specific written 90-day notice required by CPLR 3216, and that no extraordinary circumstances justified dismissing it on its own. This matters because it confirms that courts must follow strict procedural steps before ending a case for delay.
Hersko v. Hersko (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In a family dispute over a $700,000 loan and an alleged promise to transfer a Brooklyn condo, the Second Department dismissed the breach of contract claim because the agreement was oral and not enforceable under New York’s statute of frauds. But it allowed the plaintiff’s constructive trust claim to continue. The decision is a reminder that long-term repayment deals and real estate transfers usually must be in writing, though equitable claims may still survive if timely.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. AG2 Equities, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
This case involved a Brooklyn mortgage foreclosure and whether Deutsche Bank properly proved the amount allegedly owed. The Second Department reversed the foreclosure sale judgment, finding that the bank relied on a loan servicer affidavit based on records it did not submit, so the proof was not admissible. The decision matters because it underscores that lenders must provide the actual business records supporting their numbers before a court will approve a foreclosure sale.
Blank v. Petrosyants (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
This case stems from claims that money invested in a catering business was misused and that investors were misled about how the business would be run. The Second Department ruled that the legal malpractice claim against the attorney was properly dismissed, and it also dismissed Emilya Blank’s contract claim because she could not show damages, but it allowed the remaining fraud, promissory estoppel, and contract claims against the Petrosyants defendants to go forward. The decision matters because it reinforces that malpractice claims require proof of an actual attorney-client relationship, contract claims require actual loss, and defendants seeking early dismissal must first eliminate real factual disputes.
Matter of Nassau Health Care Corporation v. Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., A.F.S.C.M.E., Local 1000, A.F.L.-C.I.O., by its Local 830 (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In a dispute over a hospital employee’s firing, the Second Department reinstated an arbitration award that found misconduct but reduced the penalty from termination to about a 15-month unpaid suspension and reinstatement. The court said the arbitrator acted within the collective bargaining agreement by excluding older allegations barred by the contract’s one-year time limit, underscoring how difficult it is to overturn a labor arbitration award without a clear legal or public-policy conflict.
The People v. Ricardo Gayle (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In People v. Ricardo Gayle, the Second Department ruled that one probation condition imposed after a guilty plea to first-degree sexual abuse was improper, while another could stand. It struck the requirement that Gayle support dependents and meet family responsibilities, but upheld a search condition because it was tied to the facts of the offense. The decision underscores that probation terms must be tailored to the defendant’s conduct or rehabilitation, not imposed as boilerplate.
Katsoris v. Bodnar & Milone, LLP (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a client’s legal malpractice claim and most of his breach of fiduciary duty claim against his former law firm over its handling of his divorce case, while leaving in place the dismissal of his punitive damages demand. The court said an earlier dismissal for poor pleading did not automatically bar a new, better-supported complaint, and it also confirmed that a fiduciary duty claim can stand alongside malpractice when it includes separate allegations such as excessive legal fees.
Banc of America Leasing & Capital, LLC v. Wooter Apparel, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a $102,677.28 judgment for Banc of America Leasing in a contract dispute with Wooter Apparel over missed payments under an assigned software-related payment plan. The court held that Banc of America was not entitled to summary judgment because it did not first show that a valid, enforceable contract existed between the parties. This matters because even an assignee seeking payment must prove the underlying contract was valid before it can win on a breach of contract claim.
Holley v. Universal Contracting & Consulting Group, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In this breach of contract case, the Second Department reinstated the plaintiff’s challenge to discovery rulings after the plaintiff’s lawyer missed a court appearance because the court’s online system failed to update the case caption after the executor was substituted in. The court set aside the orders that treated the defendants’ request for a remote deposition as unopposed and sent the matter back for a fresh decision, underscoring that a documented, nonwillful system error can excuse a default when the party also shows a potentially valid position.
Matter of Bodner v. Town of Pleasant Valley Town Board (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
The Second Department upheld the Town of Pleasant Valley Town Board’s denial of an area variance and related approval for a shared driveway serving three proposed homes because the driveway did not meet the town’s sight-distance rule. The court said the Town Board properly weighed the required factors and had a rational basis to find the variance was substantial and could harm neighborhood character and local conditions. This decision matters because it reinforces that courts will usually defer to local zoning decisions when the board follows the law and supports its ruling with the record.
Finelli v. Fulton Commons Care Center, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated wrongful death and gross negligence claims against a nursing home over a resident’s alleged COVID-19 infection and death. It held the facility did not show, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, that it qualified for immunity under New York’s former COVID-era Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act. This matters because nursing homes cannot avoid these cases just by citing the statute; they must show the law’s specific requirements were actually met.
Partial v. Movahedian (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In a dispute over an alleged real estate investment, the plaintiff claimed the defendant misused investment funds and sued for fraud and misrepresentation, but the defendant argued that a signed release barred the case. The Second Department reinstated the complaint, finding that the release did not clearly and unambiguously cover those claims. The decision is a reminder that in New York, a release must plainly and specifically waive the claims at issue before a court will dismiss a case.
The People v. Noble Sessoms (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
In a weapons possession case, the Second Department largely upheld Noble Sessoms’s conviction after police found a loaded gun in his vehicle and rejected his challenges to the search and his guilty plea. The court did, however, reduce his postrelease supervision from 5 years to 2½ years because the original sentence did not match the plea agreement, underscoring that unpreserved appeal arguments usually fail but plea-bargain sentencing errors can still be corrected.
Feldsherova v. Lee (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
The Second Department held that a father who lost his job and later found lower-paying work was entitled to a hearing on his request to suspend or reduce child support. The court found he had shown enough evidence of an involuntary income drop and a good-faith job search, making this decision important because courts cannot reject child support modification requests without a hearing when key facts are disputed.
Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Poliseno (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
The Second Department reversed the default judgment and order of reference in this mortgage foreclosure case because the lender’s affidavit did not properly show the servicer’s authority or support the loan records it relied on. It otherwise upheld the substitution of the new plaintiff and rejected the borrower’s efforts to challenge jurisdiction or file a late answer, finding she waived the jurisdiction defense by appearing in the case without raising it. This decision shows that foreclosure plaintiffs need strict proof to win on default, and borrowers can lose key defenses if they do not raise them on time.
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2013-TT2 v. Elshiekh (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 26, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated this mortgage foreclosure case after finding it was not time-barred, because the lender’s 2012 attempt to accelerate the loan was ineffective when it failed to give the required default notice. But the court still refused to grant the lender summary judgment, holding that conflicting amounts in its 90-day pre-foreclosure notices and complaint raised questions about whether it strictly complied with New York’s notice rules.
In the Matter of Debbra L. v. Jenna L. et al. (Appellate Division, Third Department, August 27, 2026)
The Third Department reinstated a grandmother’s visitation petitions after Family Court denied all contact with her three grandchildren based largely on one troubling email exchange with the oldest child. It granted visitation for the two older children, ordered immediate unsupervised contact with the oldest child, and sent the youngest child’s case back for a new best-interests review before a different judge. The decision matters because it says courts must look at each child separately and cannot cut off grandparent visitation based mainly on parental conflict or a single lapse in judgment.