Ambrose v. City University Construction Fund (Appellate Division, First Department, August 20, 2026)
In a construction injury case, an electrician hurt his knee after stepping backward from a job-site elevator onto an unfinished floor where a ramp had been removed, leaving a 6-to-12 inch gap. The First Department dismissed his Labor Law § 240(1) claim and the related indemnification claims against his employer, but allowed his Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims to continue because factual questions remain about who controlled the elevator access and missing ramp.
The decision matters because it makes clear that a small height difference on a construction site is not, by itself, the kind of elevation hazard covered by New York’s scaffold law, even though ordinary negligence claims may still survive.
Bienvenido Robert Polanco Salas v. 711-715 E 231st Street, LLC, et al.; 711-715 E 231st Street, LLC, et al. v. Roytblat Law Group, PLLC, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, August 20, 2026)
In an allegedly staged Bronx trip-and-fall case, property owners sued the injured plaintiff’s lawyers and others, claiming they helped pursue a fake lawsuit and damaged the property. The First Department dismissed those claims against the lawyers, finding the owners did not plead specific facts showing the lawyers knowingly deceived the court or the defendants, or that the owners actually relied on any false statements.
Matter of Hernandez v. New York City Employees' Retirement System (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
A New York City sanitation supervisor challenged NYCERS’s denial of accidental disability retirement benefits after two 2018 workplace falls. The Second Department reinstated the denial, finding that one fall involved an ordinary risk of his job and the other could reasonably be viewed as his own misstep, so neither counted as a qualifying “accident.” This matters because it confirms that public employees must show a truly unexpected event to get accidental disability benefits, and courts will usually defer to the retirement system if its decision has a rational basis.
Kornbluh v. NYSARC, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a homeowner’s claims over a nearby cell tower, finding that his suit was not too late. The court said the case is about alleged harm from the tower’s construction and use—not a challenge to a local permit—so the shorter four-month deadline did not apply. This matters because similar nuisance and negligence claims may get the benefit of the ordinary time limits for tort cases.
Sougstad v. OLP Hauppauge, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
In this construction injury case, an ironworker was hurt when a crane-hoisted steel beam swung, dropped, and pulled him forward during unloading. The Second Department ruled that the worker was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim against the site owner and general contractor, while leaving the rest of the lower court’s ruling in place. The decision matters because it confirms that New York’s elevation-safety law can apply when a hoisted object swings or drops, not just when an object falls directly onto a worker.
U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Bandhu (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the key issue was whether a company that acquired the property after the lawsuit began could be bound by the foreclosure judgment without being formally served. The Second Department reversed, vacated the foreclosure judgment as to Visachu Miller, LLC, and dismissed the case against it because the lender never served the company, and its awareness of the mortgage was not enough. The decision matters because it confirms that lenders must properly serve later-added property owners before their rights can be cut off.
Pen v. City of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a trip-and-fall lawsuit against the City of New York, finding the City did not show it lacked prior written notice of the alleged boardwalk defect or that any repairs were completed before the accident. The ruling matters because it confirms that boardwalks are treated like sidewalks under the City’s notice law, and the City needs clear proof to get the case dismissed early.
Jeffrey L. Kinzler, etc., et al. v. Ascend Learning, Inc., et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The case involved a fight over whether a consulting agreement’s arbitration clause required all claims to go to arbitration. The Second Department reinstated the plaintiffs’ quantum meruit and constructive fraud claims, holding that the clause covered only “legal claims,” not equitable claims like those two, while leaving the rest of the order in place. The decision matters because it shows that arbitration clauses will be enforced exactly as written, and narrow wording can leave some claims in court.
Matter of Adames v. Digangi (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
This case involved a child custody dispute filed in both Florida and New York, and the Family Court dismissed the father’s New York petition after finding that the Florida case was filed first. The Second Department reinstated the petition, holding that the Family Court had to first pause the case and formally communicate with the Florida court under New York’s interstate custody rules. This decision matters because New York courts cannot step aside in multi-state custody cases without following those required procedures.
SRP 2014-18, LLC v. Figaro (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department reversed a lower court order that had denied the lender summary judgment based on questions about whether the foreign LLC had authority to sue in New York. The court held that the borrower did not show the LLC was doing regular, continuous business in New York, which matters because defendants must make that showing before they can block a foreign LLC from pursuing a case here.
206 Route 59 Holdings, LLC v. Boyiatzis Holdings Co., LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
This case involved a failed commercial property sale and a dispute over whether the tenant properly exercised its right of first refusal before the sellers sold the property to the tenant instead of the plaintiffs. The Second Department reversed the lower court’s ruling for the plaintiffs, finding there were still factual questions about whether the tenant acted on time and whether the sellers gave proper notice. The decision matters because it shows contract claims cannot be decided early when key facts about timing and notice are still disputed.
In the Matter of Eugene P. Gold, deceased (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a Surrogate’s Court order that had thrown out a son’s claim over whether a will’s no-contest clause was violated in a family probate fight. The court said there were still factual questions about whether the executor wrongfully withheld corporate shares left to him, and it emphasized that no-contest clauses must be read narrowly.
Kerner v. City of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
In a sidewalk trip-and-fall case, Michele Kerner claimed she was injured by a metal grate and sued the City and DOT, which argued that a private utility—not the City—was responsible. The Second Department reinstated the complaint, finding that the City’s proof on grate ownership was too conclusory and lacked factual support. The decision matters because it underscores that defendants seeking dismissal must back up responsibility arguments with specific, admissible evidence.
Kogan v. Ryndin (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department reversed an order that had reopened a medical malpractice case after it was dismissed when the plaintiffs failed to appear and had not filed the required certificate of merit. The court held that the plaintiffs’ explanations—such as a claimed calendaring mistake, miscommunication, and delay in getting an expert report—were too vague and unsupported to excuse the default. This matters because it shows that New York courts require specific proof, not general excuses, when a party asks to revive a dismissed case.
Glixon v. Highland Care Center, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department dismissed a wrongful-death and negligence suit against Highland Care Center over a resident’s COVID-19 infection and death, finding the nursing home was protected by New York’s COVID-era EDTPA immunity. The court said the facility showed it provided care in good faith under pandemic-related rules, and the plaintiff did not allege specific facts showing gross negligence. This matters because it confirms that COVID-era claims against health care facilities can be thrown out early when immunity applies and the allegations are too general.
Suarez v. Rankin (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
In this car accident case, the issue was whether the plaintiff should get extra time to properly serve the defendant after missing the deadline. The Second Department reversed the lower court, dismissed the claims against the defendant, and denied more time because the plaintiff did not show diligent efforts, waited about two years to ask for relief, and did not show a potentially valid claim. This matters because it underscores that courts will not automatically forgive defective or late service, especially after long unexplained delays.
Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. v. Universal Development, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
This case involved a dispute over whether Bank of New York Mellon could enforce a mortgage that was lost or never recorded and still claim a first-priority interest in the property. The Second Department ruled for the bank, finding the notarized mortgage was presumed valid, the bank had standing because it possessed the note when the case began, and one of the later owners was not protected as a good-faith purchaser because she did not pay for her interest. This matters because it confirms that in New York, a lender can still enforce a missing or unrecorded mortgage if it can prove the mortgage was properly signed and that it held the note.
Guerrero v. Port Royal Distribution, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a ruling that had found Port Royal Distribution liable in a rear-end crash, holding that the plaintiffs did not prove Port Royal actually owned the vehicle involved. The court did uphold Port Royal’s request to amend its answer to correct its earlier ownership admission, which matters because once that amendment was allowed, the plaintiffs could no longer rely on the original admission and still had to prove ownership to impose liability.
The People v. Paul Lee (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a criminally negligent homicide charge against a driver accused of causing a fatal crash while speeding through a residential Queens neighborhood. The court said the grand jury had enough evidence at this early stage because the driver was allegedly traveling about 81 mph in a 30 mph zone, near a playground and caution sign, and had said he was showing a friend how the car “drives.” This matters because it confirms that extreme speeding, combined with the surrounding circumstances, can be enough to support a homicide charge before trial.
The People v. Paul Lee (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a criminally negligent homicide charge against Paul Lee arising from a fatal Queens crash. It held that grand jury evidence that Lee was driving about 81 mph in a 30 mph residential zone, near a playground and while “showing” a passenger how the car drives, was enough at this stage to support the charge. This matters because it shows that extreme speeding, combined with dangerous surrounding facts, can be enough to keep a homicide count alive before trial.
Melia v. Greentree Condominium II at Howard Beach (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
This case arose from a slip-and-fall on ice outside a condominium garage, where the ice was allegedly caused by water from a burst pipe in the unit above. The Second Department kept the claims against the condominium association in place and reinstated the association’s claims against the upstairs unit owner, finding that neither party showed enough proof to get out of the case at this stage. The decision matters because it underscores that in property injury cases, owners and associations need specific evidence about fault, notice, and inspections—not broad denials.
Laubis v. County of Nassau (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
In this sidewalk trip-and-fall case, the Second Department held that Nassau County, the Town of Hempstead, and the abutting funeral home owners were not liable for the plaintiff’s injuries from a raised sidewalk in East Meadow. The court found the County had no prior written notice of the defect, and there was no evidence that any defendant created the condition or had a legal duty for the sidewalk, highlighting the importance of proving notice or a recognized exception in municipal sidewalk cases.
Personal Service Insurance Company v. Rothauser (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
This case involved an insurer’s bid for a ruling that it did not have to defend or cover claims from a car accident because the vehicle had allegedly been removed from the policy before the crash. The Second Department reinstated the case against Kenneth Smith, who had answered the complaint, but otherwise left in place the dismissal as to the nonappearing defendants and upheld the denial of the insurer’s renewal request. The decision matters because it confirms that New York’s abandonment rule for default judgments applies only to parties who default, and that appellate arguments must be properly preserved.
Rivera v. Waterview Towers, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a trip-and-fall lawsuit against Waterview Towers, holding that the plaintiff’s 2022 refiled case was timely even though the original action had been dismissed after counsel refused to proceed to trial on one day. The court found that this single incident was not enough to show neglect to prosecute, and the earlier dismissal was not a decision on the merits, so New York’s six-month savings rule allowed the case to go forward.
Suprina v. Goodman (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated claims against an attorney and his law firm over alleged mishandling of escrow funds, finding the plaintiff had adequately pleaded breach of an oral escrow agreement and breach of fiduciary duty. The decision matters because it confirms that oral escrow agreements can be enforceable in New York, and that attorneys acting as escrow agents may owe duties even to people who are not their clients.
Flouret v. Sagland, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that undeveloped Suffolk County property owned entirely by a trust and an LLC does not qualify as “heirs property” under New York’s Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act. It reversed the lower court’s decision and sent the case back to decide the partition dispute under the usual rules. This matters because the court made clear that the law’s special protections apply to human family co-owners, not to property held only through legal entities.
Flouret v. Sagland, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that a Suffolk County property owned only by a trust and an LLC was not “heirs property” under New York’s special partition statute. It reversed the lower court’s contrary ruling and sent the case back for a decision under ordinary partition law. The decision matters because it makes clear that these extra protections apply to qualifying individual family owners, not to legal entities even if family members are behind them.
Allstate Insurance Company v. Blenda Y. Cabrera, et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that Allstate does not have to defend or pay claims for a driver who crashed a car after the named insured had died, because she was not the estate’s legal representative and did not have proper permission or custody under the policy. The court also held that minor misspellings in the driver’s name did not invalidate service, making the decision important for insurers handling post-death coverage disputes and default judgment requests.
The People v. Sharaya Hutchins (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 19, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that two probation conditions imposed after Sharaya Hutchins’s guilty plea to criminal possession of a firearm were improper because they were not tied to her circumstances or the offense. It struck the family-support and anti-gang conditions, but upheld the substance-testing, treatment, and search conditions based on her admitted marijuana use and the firearm charge. This decision matters because it reinforces that probation terms must be individualized and supported by the record.
In the Matter of L.M., S.M., and Another, Children Under Eighteen Years of Age (Appellate Division, First Department, August 20, 2026)
The First Department held that Family Court could not place a mother who was not accused of neglect under broad ACS supervision and household monitoring after the children were left in her care. It also upheld the denial of ACS’s request to extend that supervision, making clear that Family Court Act § 1054 allows only narrow, child-focused conditions, not ongoing monitoring of an innocent parent.
Salas v. 711-715 E 231st Street, LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, August 20, 2026)
In a case arising from an allegedly staged trip-and-fall claim, property owners sued the injured plaintiff’s lawyers for attorney deceit, fraud, conspiracy, and related claims. The First Department dismissed those claims, finding the owners did not plead specific facts showing the lawyers knowingly deceived anyone, or that the owners relied on any misrepresentation and suffered recoverable damages. This matters because it underscores how hard it is to sue opposing counsel over allegedly fraudulent litigation without detailed, concrete allegations.