Kogan v Ryndin
Categories
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Medical malpractice procedure, specifically whether plaintiffs could vacate their default and revive claims dismissed for failure to provide a certificate of merit.
The Supreme Court, Kings County, granted the plaintiffs' motion under CPLR 5015(a)(1) [permitting a court to relieve a party from an order or judgment based on excusable default] to vacate the prior dismissal order and restore the action to active status.
The Appellate Division reversed the April 26, 2024 order that had vacated the plaintiffs' default and reinstated the action against these defendants.
The plaintiffs failed to show a reasonable excuse for not appearing on the motion return date. Their claims of an inadvertent calendaring error, miscommunication, and inability to obtain an expert report were conclusory and unsupported, so relief from default was unavailable.
Background
In August 2022, Alexander Kogan and his wife commenced a medical malpractice action against several defendants, including Igor Ryndin, Jonathan Michael Mishoe, M. Victor McLaughlin, Jr., Mount Sinai Beth Israel Hospital, and Mount Sinai Health System, Inc. In May 2023, those defendants moved, among other things, to dismiss the complaint against them because the plaintiffs had not filed a certificate of merit under CPLR 3012-a [requiring a certificate of merit in a medical malpractice action]. On July 21, 2023, the Supreme Court granted dismissal against those defendants after the plaintiffs failed to appear on the motion return date. In March 2024, the plaintiffs moved to vacate that default and restore the case.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Kings County, accepted the plaintiffs' request to vacate the July 21, 2023 order and restored the action to active status, effectively undoing the dismissal that had been entered on default.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division held that a party seeking to vacate a default on a motion must show both a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious opposition. Relying on CPLR 2005 [allowing courts to excuse certain defaults resulting from law office failure] and prior case law, the court found the plaintiffs' excuses inadequate. Their references to an inadvertent calendaring error and miscommunication were conclusory, undetailed, and uncorroborated, and counsel's statement that she could not appear because she had not yet obtained an expert report was also insufficient. Because the plaintiffs did not establish a reasonable excuse, the court did not reach whether they had a potentially meritorious opposition to dismissal.
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that New York courts will not routinely excuse defaults based on vague claims of law office failure. To obtain relief under CPLR 5015(a)(1), a litigant must present specific, substantiated facts showing a reasonable excuse; generalized references to scheduling mistakes or internal miscommunication are not enough.
When seeking to reopen a default in New York, especially in a medical malpractice case involving CPLR 3012-a, counsel must provide detailed and supported proof of the reason for the default. Bare assertions of calendaring error or lack of an expert report will not suffice.