Aras v. B-U Realty Corp. (Appellate Division, First Department, August 13, 2026)
In a rent-stabilization dispute, tenants claimed their landlord unlawfully deregulated apartments and overcharged rent. The First Department reversed the tenants’ summary judgment win and sent the case back because the legal standards for proving fraudulent deregulation changed while the appeal was pending. The decision matters because courts must now assess these claims under a broader, updated fraud framework before deciding liability.
Aras v. B-U Realty Corp. (Appellate Division, First Department, August 13, 2026)
This case involves tenants who said their apartments were wrongly taken out of rent stabilization and that they were overcharged rent. The First Department reversed the trial court’s ruling in the tenants’ favor and sent the case back so the lower court can apply updated legal standards. The decision matters because it confirms that courts must use newer, broader rules when deciding whether alleged fraud lets tenants look beyond the usual four-year limit on rent history.
Cross v. Lee (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this personal injury case involving a child’s injuries at a family property, the Second Department reversed an order that had allowed a default judgment against the defendants after they failed to respond to the lawsuit. The court found they had a reasonable excuse because they believed a longtime family attorney was handling the case while they were also dealing with the child’s intensive medical care, and it held that their claim that the pool fence met local code was enough to support a possible defense.
Tomlinson v. City of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this personal injury case, the plaintiff said she was hurt after tripping over wires at a Brooklyn school and later learned that a different contractor, Nu-Vision, may have been responsible. The Second Department ruled that she can add Nu-Vision as a defendant even though the deadline to sue had passed, because the claim involved the same accident and Nu-Vision should have known it was left out only because of a mistake about the proper party.
The decision matters because it shows that New York courts may allow a late amendment when newly uncovered facts identify the right defendant and that defendant had fair notice of the case.
Hillman v. Khedaroo (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this car-accident case, the Second Department reinstated the plaintiffs’ lawsuit after finding that an earlier dismissal based only on another case being pending did not bar them from filing again. The court also allowed a default judgment against defendant Asher Benedikt because he did not timely respond and failed to show a valid excuse or defense.
Sproule v. Gaia Produce, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In an unpaid commissions dispute, the Second Department reversed a lower court order and allowed the worker to amend his complaint to add an individual manager or owner as a defendant. The court said the employee alleged enough facts to show that this person may have acted as his employer in practice, and the ruling matters because it confirms that individuals with real control over pay and working conditions can face liability under New York wage laws.
Rainford v. Village of Montebello (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In Rainford v. Village of Montebello, homeowners claimed that a 2005 Town of Ramapo sewer and storm-drain project damaged their property by cutting a drain pipe, which later caused basement flooding. The Second Department dismissed the trespass and nuisance claims against the Town because they were filed too late, ruling that ongoing flooding did not turn a one-time excavation into a continuing legal wrong.
Liu v. J.H. Electric of New York, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a museum HVAC worker’s common-law negligence claim against an electrical contractor after the worker alleged he was injured when the contractor’s ladder cracked and he fell. The court held that the contractor did not show there were no factual disputes about whether it left a defective ladder on the site and whether that caused the accident, underscoring that contractors can still face negligence liability even if they are not the owner or general contractor.
First Sovereign Equity Group, Inc. v. Town of Smithtown (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
The Second Department dismissed a property owner’s federal due process claim against the Town of Smithtown over charges and a tax lien tied to unsafe-building work at the property. The court held that the owner could not rely on any notice problems affecting the prior owner, and that its own rights were adequately protected because it could have challenged the assessment through an Article 78 proceeding. This matters because it limits civil-rights claims by later purchasers when New York law already provides a way to contest municipal actions.
Matter of Cataldo v. Town of East Hampton (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
The case arose from a beachgoer’s attempt to file a late notice of claim against the Town of East Hampton after suffering a serious spinal injury in the ocean and alleging Town lifeguards failed to warn him of the danger. The Second Department reversed the lower court and denied that request, finding the Town did not receive timely notice of facts showing possible negligence, the delay was not reasonably explained, and the Town showed it would be prejudiced by the late filing. This decision matters because it underscores that knowing an accident happened is not enough; a municipality must also have timely notice of the facts behind the claimed wrongdoing.
Espinal v. 1760-1770, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this sidewalk trip-and-fall case, the plaintiff won on liability in the trial court, but the Second Department reversed and denied that request. The court found that the plaintiff’s own account of where and how the accident happened was too vague and inconsistent, with no meaningful supporting evidence. The decision matters because it shows that a plaintiff cannot win summary judgment in a sidewalk defect case based only on an unclear, uncorroborated version of events.
Federal National Mortgage Association v. Jackson (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that a mortgage foreclosure case filed against a borrower who had already died was void from the start, because the court never had jurisdiction. It allowed a later owner of the property, Echo Ray, LLC, to step into the case, vacated the foreclosure judgment, and dismissed the complaint. This matters because it confirms that a foreclosure against a deceased sole owner cannot be fixed later by substituting an estate representative.
Bergam v. Dinerman (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this divorce appeal, the main disputes were child support arrears, whether an investment account funded with inherited money was marital property, and who should pay certain marital debts. The Second Department reduced the child support arrears from about $142,500 to about $84,351 because the trial court did not explain why it applied child support above the statutory income cap, but otherwise upheld the ruling that the commingled investment account was marital property and that the defendant had to pay $97,000 in credit card debt. The decision is a reminder that inherited funds can lose separate-property status if they are mixed with marital assets, and that appeals can fail if the record is incomplete.
Pascall v. Crystal Ridge Associates, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this personal injury case, the plaintiff repeatedly failed to provide HIPAA-compliant medical record authorizations, including records related to diabetes that the defendants said were important to their causation defense. The Second Department ruled that outright dismissal was too harsh for now, but it strengthened the lower court’s order by directing that the complaint will be dismissed unless the plaintiff supplies the remaining authorizations within 60 days, underscoring that repeated discovery delays can trigger serious sanctions.
Matter of Canario v. City of Newburgh (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
The Second Department dismissed a former City of Newburgh police officer’s challenge to his termination because he did not file the required notice of claim within the City Charter’s three-month deadline. The court held that, for this type of non-tort claim, the deadline was mandatory and courts had no power to allow a late filing. This matters because it underscores that employees challenging municipal discipline must strictly follow local notice rules or risk losing their case.
PNC Bank, National Association v. Kane (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department ruled that PNC Bank had to accept the homeowners’ late answer because it waited 20 days to reject it. The court reversed the lower court’s default ruling against the defendants and denied the bank’s request for a default judgment. The decision matters because it confirms that a party who does not object to a late pleading within 15 days loses the right to rely on that lateness later.
Nieves v. Highland Operating, Ltd. (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
This case involved homebuyers who tried to force the sale of a newly built house after the developer transferred the subdivision to another company and that company refused to honor the original contract price. The Second Department ruled that the buyers could not compel the sale and were limited to getting back their $55,000 deposit plus interest, because the companies were not merged in a way that made full performance available and the buyers did not show they were financially ready to close. This decision matters because it underscores that a successor company is not automatically bound to complete a real estate sale, and buyers may be limited to contract damages instead of the home itself.
Salik v. Atlantis Operating, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this wrongful death case against a health center, the Second Department reinstated the claims after a trial court dismissed them for missing a filing deadline. The court said dismissal was too harsh because the plaintiff was still actively seeking needed discovery, the defendant’s own delays helped cause the missed deadline, and there was no real sign the case had been abandoned.
Rose v. County of Nassau (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that Nassau County, not the homeowners, owns the fenced-in strip of county land next to their property, rejecting the homeowners’ adverse possession claim. The court found they knew by at least 2014 that the land was not theirs and did not show the required reasonable belief of ownership or enough proof to add a prior owner’s use to their own. This matters because it highlights how hard it is to win adverse possession in New York once someone knows the land belongs to another owner.
Murray v. NETZ 642 E. 96th Street, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this landlord-tenant case, a tenant who won a default judgment over alleged unlivable apartment conditions faced a challenge from the owner, which argued it was never properly served. The Second Department reinstated the complaint against the LLC and ordered a hearing on service, ruling that the landlord’s denial of proper service created a factual dispute but did not justify immediate dismissal.
Bonilla v. New York City Transit Authority (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
This case arose from a crash in which the plaintiff claimed a New York City Transit Authority bus hit his stopped or parked vehicle, and the lower court had ruled in his favor on liability. The Second Department reversed, finding that bus video, photos, and driver testimony raised factual disputes about how the collision happened and whether the plaintiff may share fault. This matters because even in rear-end collision cases, a plaintiff is not automatically entitled to judgment when the evidence tells competing stories.
Underhill Venture, LLC v. Sarang (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In a dispute tied to a home sale contract, the Second Department held that the plaintiff could recover $6,135.54 in reasonable costs for preparing and uploading electronic appellate records and briefs. The court did not allow recovery of a separate $300 fee to cancel a notice of pendency, making clear that digital appellate filing costs may be taxable, but other expenses need a specific legal basis.
Underhill Venture, LLC v. Sarang (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this real estate contract dispute, the key issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff could recover the cost of preparing digital appellate records and briefs, along with a fee paid to cancel a notice of pendency. The Second Department reinstated the $6,135.54 in digital filing-related expenses but refused to allow recovery of the separate $300 cancellation fee, making clear that appellate cost awards generally include allowable disbursements and that required electronic filing work can qualify as a recoverable expense.
ANS 1 Corp. v. Yosef (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In a dispute over a real estate sale that allegedly closed without a claimed 50% shareholder’s consent, the Second Department ruled that the seller’s law firm could not be sued for fraud or civil conspiracy because the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that they themselves relied on any false statement. The Second Department otherwise affirmed the dismissal of the third-party claims against another defendant and also dismissed part of the appeal because key filings were missing from the record.
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Bornstein (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department dismissed the claim against a trust defendant that never answered, finding HSBC did not meaningfully pursue a default judgment within the required one-year period. The ruling matters because it reminds lenders that filing and then withdrawing a motion, followed by long inactivity, can cause a foreclosure claim to be treated as abandoned.
Ardent Harmony Fund, Inc. v. Fuschetto Home Improvements, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In a dispute over payments made by alleged judgment debtors to a home-improvement contractor, The Second Department reinstated claims that the transfers may have been fraudulent and that the contractor may have been unjustly enriched. The court found the contractor did not provide enough admissible proof that it gave fair value for the money it received, underscoring that defendants need real evidence—not just assertions—to defeat these claims early.
Mt. Beacon Properties, LLC v. City of Poughkeepsie (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
In a dispute over a tax lien sale and tax deed transfer, Mt. Beacon Properties won a judgment restoring its ownership of the property and then tried to add a new claim for money damages based on alleged due process violations. The Second Department reversed the lower court’s order allowing that amendment, finding it was unfair to the City because no discovery had been done on damages and no damages evidence had been presented. This decision matters because it confirms that parties generally cannot add new damages claims after judgment when the issue was not developed during the case.
MTGLQ Investors, L.P. v. Cong. Chemdath Tora v.' Chesed A Religious Corporation (Appellate Division, Second Department, August 12, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a foreclosure judgment for MTGLQ Investors against a religious corporation because the lender did not adequately show that it held the note when the case began or that the borrower had actually defaulted. The decision matters because it underscores that foreclosure plaintiffs must back up their claims with clear records on both standing and default before they can win summary judgment or force a sale.