Cross v Lee
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Personal injury and civil procedure, specifically whether defendants were entitled to vacate their default in appearing and answering under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) 5015(a)(1) [authorizes relief from an order or judgment upon a showing of excusable default].
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, denied the separate motions of April Lee and Anastazia Lee to vacate a prior order that had granted the plaintiff leave to enter a default judgment against them.
The Appellate Division reversed the October 2, 2024 order, vacated the March 27, 2024 default order, granted both defendants' CPLR 5015(a)(1) motions, and extended their time to answer by 30 days after service of the appellate decision and order.
The appellate court held that, under the particular circumstances, the defendants established a reasonable excuse for their default by showing they relied on a longtime family attorney who led them to believe he was handling the case, while they were simultaneously consumed with providing intensive care for the injured child. They also asserted a potentially meritorious defense by alleging the pool fence complied with the Town of Brookhaven Code.
Background
The plaintiff commenced this action on July 26, 2023, on behalf of his infant daughter, seeking damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained at a Brookhaven property owned by her grandmother, April Lee, and occupied by her mother, Anastazia Lee. The defendants did not appear or answer. The plaintiff was then appointed guardian ad litem for the infant, and the court later granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants and scheduled an inquest on damages. The defendants later moved to vacate that default, explaining that after receiving notice of the lawsuit they contacted their longtime family attorney, who was already representing the mother in a child support matter against the plaintiff, and that he repeatedly gave them the impression he was handling this case. They also showed that during this period they were caring for the infant after a severe brain injury, including intensive care, breathing assistance, out-of-state hyperbaric and stem cell treatments, and fundraising for her medical care.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, denied the separate motions of April Lee and Anastazia Lee under CPLR 5015(a)(1), leaving in place the March 27, 2024 order that granted the plaintiff leave to enter a default judgment against them.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed on the law and in the exercise of discretion. It found that the defendants' reliance on their family attorney's representations did not amount to willful default or mere neglect under these facts, and that their caregiving responsibilities provided a reasonable explanation for why they were not more proactive. The court also found that the defendants presented a potentially meritorious defense by asserting that the swimming pool was enclosed by a fence compliant with the applicable town code. The court therefore granted the motions to vacate the default order and extended the defendants' time to serve an answer.
Legal Significance
The decision underscores that courts may grant relief under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) 5015(a)(1) even after a default order has been entered where defendants provide a detailed, credible explanation showing excusable default rather than willful inaction. It also illustrates that reliance on attorney assurances, when supported by evidence such as text messages and surrounding circumstances, can constitute a reasonable excuse, especially when extraordinary family and medical burdens help explain the defendants' conduct. The decision further reflects the liberal preference for resolving cases on the merits when a potentially meritorious defense is shown.
A default may be vacated when defendants show both a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense; longstanding reliance on an attorney who appeared to be handling the matter, combined with exceptional caregiving demands, can satisfy that standard.