Graves v. Sava Serbian Orthodox Church (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
In Graves v. Sava Serbian Orthodox Church, the First Department held that a worker who fell about 11 feet through an uncovered opening was entitled to partial summary judgment under New York’s Scaffold Law. The Court also ruled that the contractor must fully indemnify the church, both under the contract and common law, because the contractor was responsible for site safety and there was no evidence the church was actively negligent.
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. MPEG LA, L.L.C. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 4, 2026)
The First Department reinstated Samsung’s breach of contract claim over royalties collected after a 2024 amendment that cut terminated licensors’ shares and shifted more money to remaining licensors. The court held that the amendment likely was not validly approved because the contract required two separate 80% votes, and terminated licensors like Samsung still counted toward one of those thresholds if they had received royalties in the prior 12 months. This matters because it shows that changes to royalty-allocation rules must strictly comply with the contract’s voting requirements.
Pamela Gale v. Alton Abramowitz et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
The First Department reinstated a legal malpractice suit against divorce counsel, finding the client plausibly alleged that her lawyers failed to submit key tax documents, which led to a reduced profit-distribution award and forced her to spend more on new lawyers and experts to obtain the full amount. The decision matters because it confirms that a malpractice claim can go forward when a client seeks to recover the added costs of fixing an attorney’s alleged mistake, even if related fee issues arose in the earlier case.
Fuat Krifca et al. v. Bronx-Lebanon Special Care Center, Inc., et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
In this roofing accident case, the First Department largely upheld summary judgment for the injured worker after roofing materials being hoisted to the roof fell on him. The court found the load was not adequately secured, which was enough to establish liability under New York’s Scaffold Law. It also ruled that the hospital owner could seek conditional indemnification from Allied because the owner was not negligent, underscoring both the broad reach of falling-load liability and a fault-free owner’s ability to shift the loss.
Suazo v. 501 Madison-Sutton LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
In this construction accident dispute, The First Department ruled that Superior Acoustics could not be held automatically responsible for covering the owner’s and general contractor’s losses after a worker fell from a ladder, because key facts about negligence and the ladder’s condition are still disputed. The court said GC Contractors may still recover from Superior under their contract, but only if GC is later found not negligent. It also held that Superior could not shift liability to Atlantic Interiors because their indemnity agreement was signed after the accident and did not clearly apply retroactively.
Board of Managers of the 432 Park Condominium et al. v. 56th and Park (NY) Owner, LLC et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
This case asked whether the 432 Park Condominium’s governing documents required the board to cover board member Harry Macklowe’s defense costs in a fiduciary-duty suit brought by the board itself. The First Department said no, dismissed his indemnification-related counterclaims, and ruled that the condo documents did not clearly require indemnification in an internal dispute like this. This matters because New York courts will not read indemnification clauses to cover fights between an organization and its own insiders unless the documents say that plainly.
Roberto Valencia et al. v. Sol Goldman Investments LLC et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
In this construction-site elevator injury case, The First Department largely let the claims against elevator company KONE move forward, finding factual disputes over whether KONE serviced the elevator and knew about recurring problems based on its own records. The First Department dismissed the contract-based indemnity and insurance claims against KONE, however, because there was no contract between KONE and the third-party plaintiffs, underscoring that prior incident records can block early dismissal but contract claims require an actual agreement.
Jun Lim Chang v. 37 Plaza LLC and Ransd Design, Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
The First Department largely upheld rulings against Ransd Design in a construction accident case involving a worker who fell through a second-floor opening while trying to fix a stalled forklift. The court said Ransd could be treated as the general contractor, let the worker’s Labor Law and negligence-based claims continue, and rejected Ransd’s effort to shift liability to H Point. The court also dismissed H Point’s indemnification claim against Ransd, underscoring that a party cannot avoid liability with a later contradictory affidavit and cannot win indemnification if it may have been at fault itself.
The People of the State of New York v. Christopher Macias (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
In this sexual assault appeal, the First Department vacated two first-degree rape convictions and dismissed those counts because they were lesser included offenses of the predatory sexual assault charges as presented to the jury. The court otherwise upheld the convictions and sentence, making the decision a reminder that overlapping convictions cannot stand when one offense is part of the other, and that appellate challenges often fail if they were not properly raised at trial.
Lapinski v. MIP One Wall Street Acquisition LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
The First Department reinstated a garbage truck driver’s Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims and granted him summary judgment on liability under § 240(1) after he was struck by a falling pallet while helping remove construction debris at an active job site. The court held that debris-removal and carting work was part of the construction project, making him a protected worker, and the decision highlights that owners and contractors may be liable when workers face falling-object risks without proper safety equipment.
HNA Holdings 422 Fulton (GP) LP et al. v. TSCE 2007 422 Fulton GP, L.L.C. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 4, 2026)
This case asked whether real estate equity partners who failed to make required capital contributions still had the right to approve major project decisions under the partnership agreement. The First Department said no, ruling that the agreement’s default provision clearly stripped them of all approval rights, dismissed their breach of contract claim, and reinstated the managing partner’s counterclaims. This matters because it shows courts will enforce broad default penalties as written, so any consent rights that should survive a default must be spelled out clearly.
Robinson v. DeSouza (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
In this car accident case, a taxi passenger won a ruling that she was not at fault, but The First Department reversed the lower court’s finding that the City defendants were liable as a matter of law. The court said conflicting accounts about which vehicle improperly merged mean liability must be decided at trial, making the decision an important reminder that an innocent passenger is not automatically entitled to judgment against another driver.
Kenya Torres v. Anthony L. Occhino et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 2, 2026)
The First Department ruled that the plaintiff was not comparatively at fault in a crash where the defendant turned left out of a parking lot and struck her car, which had the right-of-way. The court dismissed the defense claiming she shared blame, finding the defendant’s account was not credible and confirming that not having a proper driver’s license, by itself, does not show negligence.
Aquiles Gomez v. Eddy Fremont et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 4, 2026)
The First Department reversed a lower court order that had required a deceased defendant’s former law firm to step in and substitute a legal representative. The court held that a lawyer’s authority ends when the client dies, so any substitution must follow the proper statutory process. This matters because it confirms courts cannot force former counsel to keep acting after a client’s death.
Estate of Margaret Kainer et al. v. Christie's Inc. et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, June 4, 2026)
The First Department ruled that a lawsuit against Christie’s over a Degas painting allegedly looted by the Nazis can move forward in New York, ending a nearly 10-year stay that had paused the case while European courts considered heirship issues. The court left in place the lower court’s refusal to reopen an earlier ruling based on new evidence, but said the long, open-ended delay had become unfair and conflicted with policies favoring prompt resolution of Holocaust-era art claims and confidence in New York’s art market.
Fahey v. Worship House & Outreach Ministries, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
In this construction accident case, a demolition worker injured by a malfunctioning power saw sued the City and others after an emergency demolition project in Brooklyn. The Second Department reinstated the worker’s Labor Law § 241(6) claim against the City, finding the City was not automatically protected by governmental immunity because its alleged role in supervising the demolition was more like that of a private party, and the contract raised factual questions about how much control it had. The court otherwise left intact the dismissal of the worker’s Labor Law § 240(1) claim, which did not involve an elevation-related hazard.
Clendeninn v. Young (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a $32,000 judgment for a Fire Island seasonal tenant who sought a refund of prepaid rent, holding that he had not shown that COVID-19 restrictions made the lease impossible to perform or defeated its basic purpose. The decision matters because it confirms that pandemic-related lease claims require concrete proof, and that courts should not automatically accept a party’s factual statements based only on technical filing errors.
Jianjun Qiao v. John Yong Tang, et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
In a dispute over escrow funds allegedly held by an attorney and his law firm, The Second Department allowed the plaintiff’s contract, good-faith, and conversion claims to continue against the attorney and firm, but dismissed several other claims, including the conversion claim against the attorney’s wife. The decision matters because it shows that escrow-related claims may survive if the complaint clearly identifies the funds and alleges a demand for their return that was refused, while unsupported or time-barred claims will not.
Kyle Ann Soto v. Lorenzo Mastropieri (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a pedestrian’s injury case after finding that the driver who struck her while turning left was not entitled to dismissal. It also granted the plaintiff summary judgment on liability and struck the driver’s late deposition corrections because he admitted he never saw her before impact.
The decision underscores that a driver can be held at fault for failing to see what was plainly there, and that courts will strictly enforce deadlines for changing deposition testimony.
Matter of Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Company v. Roberto Antonio Escobar Alas (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that Allstate could stop arbitration of an uninsured motorist claim arising from an alleged hit-and-run because the insured did not report the accident to police or another required authority within the time required by the policy and had no valid excuse. The decision shows that New York courts will strictly enforce prompt-reporting rules in hit-and-run cases, and missing that deadline can lead to loss of coverage.
People v. Newman (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
In People v. Newman, the Second Department upheld the defendant’s conviction for attempted second-degree assault but shortened the order of protection from January 3, 2033, to January 2, 2032. The court found that the original end date was longer than the law allows and said the issue could still be raised on appeal because the sentencing court never clearly stated the order’s length at the plea or sentencing.
Beaton v. Tomco Mechanical Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
In a workplace injury case arising from conditions at Riker’s Island, the Second Department dismissed the Labor Law § 200 claim against Tamco Mechanical, finding the contractor showed it did not create the alleged hazard and had no notice of it before the accident. The decision matters because it confirms that a contractor can win dismissal when there is no proof it caused or knew about a dangerous condition, and a plaintiff cannot avoid that result with hearsay alone or a late-disclosed witness.
Chaya v. Maimonides Medical Center (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
In this medical malpractice case over the treatment of an extremely premature newborn, The Second Department narrowed the claims against Maimonides Medical Center. It dismissed claims involving the baby’s initial intubation, first surfactant treatment, oxygen-desaturation workup, and informed consent, but allowed claims over a delayed second surfactant dose and delayed blood transfusion to continue. The decision matters because it shows that malpractice claims need detailed expert support, and claims that are not opposed can be dismissed.
Hodges v. 37-11 30th Street, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
In this construction-site injury case, the trial court refused to consider the property owners’ and contractor’s summary judgment motion because they left out a required word count certification. The Second Department reversed and sent the case back for a decision on the merits, holding that the missing certification was only a technical defect that did not prejudice anyone. This matters because it confirms that courts should not reject major motions over harmless filing errors alone.
Santos Antunez v. Carmine Denoia (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a renovation worker’s claims against a homeowner after the worker was injured when his foot slipped into a hole in a bathroom floor during demolition. The court said the homeowner did not show that there were no factual disputes about whether the hole was dangerous, whether he should have known about it, or whether fixing it was part of the worker’s job. This matters because even a visible hazard may still support a claim, and property owners need clear proof to have these cases dismissed before trial.
Layout, Inc. v. Heavy Metal Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a sub-subcontractor’s claims against a property owner and surety in a dispute over unpaid survey work and mechanic’s lien bonds tied to two Brooklyn construction projects. The court found the owner and surety did not clearly show that no lien fund existed when the liens were filed, but it also ruled the subcontractor was not entitled to judgment because key payment facts are still disputed. This matters because mechanic’s lien claims in layered construction deals depend on clear proof of what money was still owed through the contract chain.
Singh v. BSC, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
In this personal injury case, the defendants sought records from the plaintiff’s other car accidents because she claimed her right knee was injured and worsened by the apartment falls. The Second Department ruled that the request should not have been denied outright and directed the plaintiff to provide authorizations so the trial court can review the records privately before deciding what, if anything, must be disclosed. This matters because it confirms that claiming an injury can open the door to related prior or later medical records, while still protecting private information that may be unrelated.
Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines Company v. Via Trivio Corporation (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
This case involved an insurer seeking a deli owner’s blood alcohol test results and club purchase records in a fire-damage subrogation lawsuit. The Second Department reversed the lower court’s order requiring Crown Deli to provide authorizations signed by its nonparty owner. The decision matters because it makes clear that records belonging to a nonparty must be obtained through a subpoena, not by forcing a party to secure the nonparty’s consent.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Rodriguez (Appellate Division, Second Department, June 3, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a lower court order that had granted the lender summary judgment in a mortgage foreclosure case against Tomas Rodriguez. The court held that the lender did not adequately prove it properly sent the required 90-day preforeclosure notices because its evidence relied on a third-party mailing vendor without showing that vendor’s mailing practices or how its records were reliably used.
The decision matters because it underscores that foreclosure plaintiffs must strictly prove compliance with RPAPL 1304, especially when outside vendors handle the mailings.
In the Matter of Lisa Theopheles v. County of Rensselaer et al. (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department reversed a lower court ruling in favor of Rensselaer County and found that a county employee’s claim of out-of-title work was wrongly denied. The court said the official civil service job description for her grade covered supervising support investigations, not the entire child support unit, and it could not be expanded by an unsigned, unapproved reclassification form.
The People of the State of New York v. Braeden Roberts (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department reversed Braeden Roberts’s conviction after ruling that a state trooper went too far during a traffic stop by searching inside Roberts’s jacket without a lawful basis. The court said the pill found in a small container could still be used, but the gun, Roberts’s later statements, and evidence found through search warrants had to be suppressed, so his guilty plea and conviction were vacated. The decision highlights that police may investigate suspicious circumstances during a stop, but they cannot turn a limited frisk into a full search without clear legal justification.
People of the State of New York v. Jamell Russ (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department ruled that prosecutors met New York’s speedy-trial deadline, but it still reversed Jamell Russ’s convictions because the police vehicle search was not shown to be a valid inventory search. The court suppressed the heroin and guns found in the car, holding that the State failed to prove clear, standardized search procedures and that the search looked more like an evidence hunt than a routine inventory.
The People of the State of New York v. Kaywon L. Pittman (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department reversed a weapons conviction after police asked a handcuffed defendant what was inside a fanny pack in his backpack and then searched the bag without a warrant. The court held that the question was likely to produce an incriminating response, so the statement and the gun had to be suppressed, vacating the guilty plea and sending the case back. This decision matters because it underscores that police cannot rely on a “spontaneous” statement or a search incident to arrest when a secured bag is no longer within the defendant’s reach.
In the Matter of Karissa W., An Incapacitated Person (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department reversed a lower court order that had narrowed a longtime guardian’s authority over an incapacitated person’s finances and reduced the guardian’s requested commissions and legal fees. The court said those changes were made without a proper request, enough notice, or record support, and it sent the case back for further proceedings. This matters because courts cannot reshape an existing guardianship or cut compensation on their own without following the required process and using the least restrictive arrangement.
Stegman v. City of Glens Falls, New York and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
This case arose after a bicyclist was injured when his front wheel caught in a gap next to a National Grid utility grate on a Glens Falls street. The Third Department reinstated the claims against National Grid, finding there are factual disputes about whether the gap was dangerous, whether the company should have known about it, and whether it was too minor or obvious to support liability.
The decision matters because it shows defendants may not win early dismissal in roadway hazard cases when photos, expert opinions, and other evidence suggest a condition may have posed a real risk to lawful bicycle traffic.
Matter of Andrew O. v. Jessica P. (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department largely upheld an order giving the mother final say on major decisions about the child when the parents cannot agree, finding their ongoing disputes over education and medical issues made shared decision-making unworkable. But it sent the case back for a closer look at the father’s request for more parenting time, holding that the record was too incomplete to deny expanded access without further review.
In the Matter of the Estate of John E. Kosier, Deceased (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department ruled that the decedent’s wife could not automatically receive authority to administer his estate just because she was the surviving spouse. It found that the daughter raised enough evidence of possible dishonesty, mishandling of estate property, and serious family conflict to require a hearing, underscoring that statutory priority can be overcome when there are real questions about a person’s fitness to serve.
Matter of Justine N. v. Michelle P. et al.; Matter of Michelle P. v. Mark O. and Justine N. (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department upheld an order giving a grandmother sole legal custody of three children after finding the mother had been separated from them for years and had largely given up their care. But it reversed the part of the order that left the mother’s visitation to be worked out with the grandmother, ruling that the court must set a clear schedule when the adults cannot cooperate.
Matter of Thalia Moses v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision et al. (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department reinstated Thalia Moses’s challenge to DOCCS’s indefinite suspension of her prison visitation rights, ruling that the agency had not shown her administrative appeal was late. The court said the 60-day appeal period starts when the decision is actually sent to the visitor, not when it is signed, and that a postage meter date alone is not enough proof of mailing.
In the Matter of the James M. McDonald III Trust (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department ruled that a trust beneficiary may continue to challenge JP Morgan Chase’s handling of a trust that remained heavily invested in J.C. Penney stock, even though an earlier accounting barred claims tied to the period before July 1972. It found the trustee had not shown, as a matter of law, that its slow sale of the stock over many years was prudent, so it revived the later-period objection, reversed the settlement of the account, and said the fee award was premature. This matters because trustees must be able to show a documented, trust-specific investment strategy and ongoing review, not just rely on general industry practice.
The People of the State of New York v. Harold Jackson (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
In this criminal appeal, Harold Jackson challenged his convictions for first-degree rape and first-degree criminal sexual act on evidence, double jeopardy, and speedy trial grounds. The Third Department found the evidence was strong enough and said double jeopardy did not bar a retrial, but it sent the case back for a hearing on the speedy trial issue because prosecutors admitted they were not actually ready when they filed an earlier readiness notice. This matters because a paper filing alone is not enough; the prosecution must truly be ready for trial.
Matter of Shirley XX. v. Molly YY. (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department upheld an order granting a maternal grandmother visitation with her grandchild, finding that her long caregiving role gave her the right to seek visitation and that continued contact was in the child’s best interests despite the mother’s objection. It modified the order to require six months of therapeutic contact before in-person visits begin because the relationship had become strained. This decision highlights that a parent’s objection does not automatically block grandparent visitation when the grandparent has played a major role in the child’s life.
Matter of Asprea v. McGinty (Appellate Division, Third Department, June 4, 2026)
The Third Department annulled the denial of a man’s concealed-carry pistol permit application and sent the case back for further review. The court said the licensing officer lacked a rational basis to deny the permit because the applicant disclosed his own arrest history, his references only answered based on what they knew, and the officer also relied on the wrong legal standard and an incomplete investigation.