Hodges v 37-11 30th Street, LLC
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
This case arises from a construction-site personal injury action and addresses whether a court may deny a summary judgment motion solely because the moving papers omitted a required word count certification.
The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied the defendants third-party plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because their motion papers did not include a word count certification.
The Appellate Division reversed the order denying summary judgment and the related third-party relief, and sent the matter back for a determination on the merits.
The omission of the word count certification was a nonprejudicial technical defect, and no substantial right of any party was affected. The lower court therefore should have overlooked the defect rather than deny the motion outright.
Background
Pierre Hodges sued after allegedly suffering personal injuries at a construction site owned by 37-11 30th Street, LLC, 37-11 30th Street Holdings, LLC, and Slate Property Group, LLC, where SD Builders and Construction, LLC served as general contractor. Those defendants, referred to by the appellate court as the appellants, then commenced a third-party action against the plaintiff's employer, PPEE Construction, Inc. (PPEE), asserting claims for contractual defense and indemnification, breach of contract, and failure to procure insurance. The appellants moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint and for summary judgment on their third-party causes of action. The plaintiff and PPEE opposed the motion.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied the motion without reaching its substantive merits because the appellants failed to include a word count certification with their motion papers.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the order, awarded one bill of costs, and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new determination on the merits of the appellants' motion. The appellate court expressly declined to address the substantive merits and took no position on how the motion should ultimately be decided.
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that New York courts should not deny dispositive motion practice based solely on a technical filing defect when no substantial right of any party has been prejudiced. An omitted word count certification, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis to refuse consideration of a summary judgment motion.
A nonprejudicial procedural defect such as a missing word count certification should generally be overlooked, and courts should decide summary judgment motions on their merits rather than reject them on a purely technical ground.