Clendeninn v Young
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Residential seasonal leasing dispute arising from COVID-19 restrictions and whether a tenant could recover prepaid rent under theories of unjust enrichment, frustration of purpose, and impossibility of performance.
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted the plaintiff summary judgment against the appealing defendants, dismissed their fourth and fifth affirmative defenses and counterclaim, and entered judgment for the plaintiff in the principal sum of $32,000.
The Appellate Division reversed the judgment, denied the branches of the plaintiff's motion seeking summary judgment on the complaint against the appealing defendants, and denied dismissal of the defendants' fourth and fifth affirmative defenses and counterclaim.
The plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that the COVID-19 pandemic and Governor Cuomo's executive orders made performance of the lease impossible or frustrated the lease's purpose, and also failed to establish that S.W. Young Contracting and Steven W. Young were proper parties. The appellate court also held that the trial court improvidently deemed the plaintiff's statement of material facts admitted based solely on noncompliance with 22 NYCRR 202.8-g [rule governing statements of material facts on summary judgment motions].
Background
In December 2019, Neil Clendeninn entered into a lease with S.W. Young Property Management for rental premises on Fire Island for the term April 15, 2020 through October 31, 2020. The lease was signed by Steven W. Young on behalf of the landlord. In May 2021, Clendeninn sued Steven W. Young, S.W. Young Property Management, S.W. Young Contracting, and another defendant, alleging that governmental restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic prevented him from taking possession as anticipated and seeking return of advance lease payments under theories including unjust enrichment, frustration of purpose, and impossibility of performance. The answering defendants asserted, among other things, affirmative defenses that S.W. Young Contracting and Steven W. Young were not proper parties, and they asserted a counterclaim for breach of the lease.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against Dawn H. Young, as administrator of the estate of Steven W. Young, S.W. Young Property Management, and S.W. Young Contracting, and dismissed their fourth and fifth affirmative defenses and counterclaim. Judgment was then entered in favor of the plaintiff for $32,000.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and modified the underlying order. It held that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in deeming the plaintiff's factual assertions admitted due to the defendants' failure to submit a paragraph-by-paragraph response under 22 NYCRR 202.8-g [rule governing statements of material facts on summary judgment motions]. The court further held that the plaintiff did not meet his initial burden for summary judgment because he failed to show that the pandemic and Executive Order (A. Cuomo) Nos. 202 and 202.8 [COVID-19 executive orders imposing emergency restrictions] rendered lease performance objectively impossible or completely frustrated the contract's purpose, and failed to show that S.W. Young Contracting and Steven W. Young were proper parties. Under Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., because the movant failed to meet his prima facie burden, the motion should have been denied regardless of the opposition papers.
Legal Significance
This decision reinforces that pandemic-related restrictions do not automatically establish impossibility or frustration of purpose in lease disputes. A party seeking summary judgment must prove that governmental action made performance objectively impossible or destroyed the contract's fundamental purpose. The case also emphasizes that technical noncompliance with 22 NYCRR 202.8-g does not require automatic acceptance of an opponent's factual assertions where doing so would be an improvident exercise of discretion.
A tenant seeking return of prepaid rent based on COVID-19 restrictions must provide concrete proof that the restrictions actually made performance impossible or wholly frustrated the lease's purpose, and must also establish that each defendant is a proper party before obtaining summary judgment.