Keith Lilly v. The State of New York and Edward Gibbs (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
The First Department largely let an employee’s lawsuit move forward after he claimed he was fired by a state assembly member days after reporting a diabetes-related hospitalization and asking for time off. The court dismissed only the claims that tried to hold that same individual liable for aiding and abetting discrimination, because he was the only alleged wrongdoer.
Matter of Elizabeth Christian v. The Department of Education of the City of New York, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 28, 2026)
The First Department ruled that a New York City teacher gained tenure by estoppel because her approved leave of absence paused, rather than completed, her probationary period. Since the Department of Education let her continue working past the properly calculated end of that period, it could not terminate her without first providing the hearing required for tenured teachers.
Ochoa v. C.I. Lobster Corp. doing business as City Island Lobster House et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
The First Department reinstated a personal injury lawsuit after a trial court struck the plaintiff’s complaint over missed discovery deadlines. It found that the harsh sanction was not justified because the case had been mistakenly marked as closed by the court, and there was no clear proof that the plaintiff deliberately failed to comply. This matters because it reinforces that courts should reserve case-ending sanctions for truly willful misconduct and favor resolving cases on the merits.
Thomas Gantt v. The City of New York et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
The First Department ruled that neither the bus defendants nor the truck defendants were entitled to win this Bronx collision case without a trial, after a bus crossed a double yellow line to pass a truck that was trying to parallel park. The court reinstated the claims against the truck defendants, kept the claims against the bus defendants alive, and sent the case back to decide whether the plaintiffs meet New York’s serious-injury requirement; the decision matters because video and witness testimony showed a jury could find both drivers shared fault.
Ziobro v. Milan House Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
A renovation worker said he was injured after slipping on spilled debris while carrying demolition bags up basement stairs. The First Department reinstated his Labor Law § 241(6) claim under rules covering passageways and work areas, but left in place dismissal of his Labor Law § 200, negligence, and other code-based claims.
The decision matters because it says a stairway can be both a route of access and an active work area, and defendants cannot automatically avoid liability by arguing that debris was simply part of the job.
Ella McNeill v. Andrew Gewirtz, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 28, 2026)
The First Department ruled that a medical malpractice plaintiff could amend her claims after the case was placed on the trial calendar to add eye injuries identified by her expert after cataract-related surgery. The court found the defendants had not shown real unfairness or prejudice, which matters because it confirms that New York courts may allow late amendments when they simply align the pleadings with the proof.
The People of the State of New York v. Sean Santiful (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
In a case involving a guilty plea for third-degree assault after the defendant bit an EMT’s finger, the First Department upheld the conviction and three-year probation sentence but removed several probation rules. The court said those conditions, including limits on associations, work requirements, drug and alcohol testing, gang-related restrictions, and payment of fees as a probation condition, were not tied to the facts of the case or the defendant’s rehabilitation.
Bermeo v. Master Plumbing and Heating, Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
In Bermeo v. Master Plumbing and Heating, Inc., the First Department held that a worker hit by an unsecured sprinkler pipe leaning behind a door could recover against the property owners under New York’s Scaffold Law. The court also let negligence-related claims against the plumbing contractor continue and gave the owners conditional indemnification rights against the contractors. The decision matters because it confirms that even a pipe falling from a leaning position can qualify as an elevation-related hazard, and that owners may shift liability to contractors if the accident arose from their work or materials.
Arizzo v. Ethicon, Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
The First Department reinstated a sales employee’s discrimination and sexual-harassment claims against Ethicon, a New Jersey company, after she alleged the company sent her to work at a New York City hospital and failed to stop known harassment there. The court held that an employer does not need a physical presence in New York to be sued under New York’s anti-discrimination laws if the alleged misconduct had a real impact in the state.
William Sen Thilly, et al. v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 28, 2026)
This case arose after a parent was denied access to a baby in the NICU at New York Presbyterian Hospital, and the family claimed that denial breached a contract and violated the New York City Human Rights Law. The First Department largely upheld dismissal of the case, but allowed the family 60 days to amend their complaint to try to state a disability-based public accommodation claim, underscoring that contract claims need specific facts and that hospitals may still face discrimination claims if properly pleaded.
Wilkins Lebron v. Bronx Heights Beulah Associates, LP (Appellate Division, First Department, May 28, 2026)
The First Department reversed a Bronx trial court and allowed Prestige Management to amend its answer in a personal injury case to add a defense based on shared insurance coverage. The court said delay alone was not enough to block the amendment, especially because the other side showed no unfair surprise or prejudice, and the ruling underscores New York’s broad policy of letting parties add potentially valid defenses.
Rosario v. C.C. Controlled Combustion Co., Inc., et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
The First Department ruled that Controlled Combustion was not liable for a worker’s injury during an oil tank installation because it did not direct how the job was done. The court found the accident resulted from the worker’s employer’s chosen method of moving a heavy tank piece, not from an unsafe property condition, and it also threw out related indemnity and contribution claims.
Dwayne Francis, et al. v. NYSARC Inc. doing business as NYSARC Westchester County Chapter, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 28, 2026)
The First Department held that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment in a chain-reaction rear-end crash after finding that the NYSARC driver hit another car, which then struck the plaintiffs’ stopped vehicle. The court said the defense failed to offer a valid non-negligent explanation, and the decision underscores that rear-most drivers in multi-car rear-end collisions will usually be held liable unless they can show they kept a safe distance and faced a true unavoidable emergency.
Katiraeifar v. New York-Presbyterian, The University Hospital of Columbia and Cornell (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
The First Department dismissed a medical malpractice case against New York-Presbyterian arising from a patient transfer, where the plaintiff claimed the hospital’s use of an Ambu bag and monitoring caused hypoxia, brain injury, and death. The court held that the hospital’s expert showed the transfer met accepted medical standards and did not cause the patient’s injuries, while the plaintiff’s experts offered only unsupported conclusions. This decision shows that in New York malpractice cases, plaintiffs must use detailed expert proof to directly challenge both the care provided and causation.
Hubshman v. 1010 Tenants Corp. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
This case asked whether a Manhattan co-op could strip a penthouse shareholder of long-standing exclusive roof-garden rights by adopting a new proprietary lease without her consent. The First Department reinstated her claims for breach of the proprietary lease and attorneys’ fees, holding that she adequately alleged the co-op changed those rights while the old lease was still in effect, but it left intact the dismissal of her separate settlement-agreement claim. The decision matters because it reinforces that a co-op cannot override a shareholder’s specific lease protections through a later lease form or general bylaw provision.
Marinel Lotrean et al. v. 3M Company formerly known as Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 26, 2026)
This case involved claims that exposure to automotive and industrial solvent products at an autobody shop caused the plaintiff’s myelodysplastic syndrome. The First Department reversed the trial court, granted summary judgment to DuPont, Rust-Oleum, and Zep, and dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs did not show that the specific products at issue contained benzene in amounts or under exposure conditions that could support their experts’ opinions. This matters because it underscores that, in New York toxic exposure cases, expert proof must be closely tied to the actual product and the claimed exposure.
Matter of New York Concrete Corp./JPL Industries JV v. Contract Dispute Resolution Board of the City of New York (Appellate Division, First Department, May 28, 2026)
The First Department reinstated the City contract board’s denial of a contractor’s $280,000 claim in a dispute over whether a soil sampling item was paid once as a single deliverable or separately for each sample. The court found the board’s reading of the contract was reasonable and said the case matters because courts will usually defer to that kind of agency decision, especially when a bidder failed to ask about any ambiguity before bidding.
U & Me Homes, LLC v. County of Suffolk (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
This case asked whether a deed restriction that barred homebuilding on environmentally sensitive land still bound a later buyer. The Second Department reversed the lower court’s ruling that the restriction was void, holding that the sale history showed it was meant to stay with the property and was not wiped out by the County’s later tax-deed ownership and redemption.
The decision matters because it confirms that environmental deed restrictions can remain enforceable against later owners even without explicit wording, though the buyer may still pursue a fact-specific claim that the restriction should not be enforced under RPAPL 1951.
M.V.B. Collision, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a collision shop’s breach of contract claim against State Farm over payment for vehicle repairs. The court held that State Farm did not conclusively show it paid the prevailing market labor rate or that its estimate fully covered the needed repairs, so dismissal was improper. The decision matters because insurers seeking early dismissal must clearly prove they complied with both the policy and New York repair-payment rules.
Matter of Alatriste v. New York City Department of Probation (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
This case involved a man’s effort to force a judge to issue a certificate of relief from disabilities, which can lessen some consequences of a criminal conviction. The Second Department held that because the petition named a Supreme Court justice, it had to be filed in the Appellate Division, not Supreme Court; after treating the case as properly filed there, it still denied relief because the petitioner had no clear legal right to compel the judge’s decision.
The ruling matters because it clarifies the correct court for these challenges and underscores that mandamus cannot be used to force a judge to make a discretionary ruling.
County of Nassau v. NY Youth Sports Network, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
This case involved a dispute over a Nassau County recreational property lease, where the County sought to block NY Youth Sports Network from using the property and the trial court went further by declaring the lease terminated for unpaid rent and ordering the tenant to leave. The Second Department reversed, holding that the lower court improperly granted final, eviction-like relief without a proper motion or notice, and that a preliminary injunction cannot be used to change the status quo unless extraordinary circumstances are shown.
Matter of Gur-Arie v. Zucker (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that Medicaid must cover a replacement Convaid Cruiser stroller for a severely disabled adult with quadriplegic cerebral palsy. It found the Department of Health’s denial was not supported by the evidence, because the record showed the stroller had real therapeutic and functional benefits, not just caregiver convenience. This matters because it confirms that medically necessary equipment can qualify for coverage when treating providers show it will improve a patient’s health and daily functioning.
Peconic Land Trust, Inc. v. 341 Town Lane, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
In this land-use dispute, Peconic Land Trust claimed property owners violated a conservation easement by cutting and trying to remove vegetation from protected agricultural land in Amagansett. The Second Department agreed the Trust was entitled to a preliminary injunction, but narrowed it by striking the lower court’s broad ban on all vegetation work and limiting it to conduct that would actually violate the easement. This matters because it shows courts will enforce conservation easements, but they will not block lawful property maintenance or farming activity more than necessary.
Sidoruk v. Ben Oil Company, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
This case arose after a fuel oil company mistakenly delivered oil to a home that had already been converted to natural gas, causing oil to spill into the basement through an abandoned fill pipe. The Second Department ruled that the homeowners were not entitled to judgment yet because there is a factual dispute over whether leaving that pipe in place helped cause the spill, but it dismissed the company’s defenses based on assumption of risk and failure to limit the damage.
The decision matters because it shows that oil spill claims can impose strict liability on the delivery company, while also leaving room to argue that a property owner’s own inaction contributed to the loss.
Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc. v. Yellowstone Capital West, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
This case involved claims that merchant cash advance companies and their lawyer used false confession-of-judgment filings and a bank-account freeze to pressure a treatment center into signing a settlement release. The Second Department reinstated the claims seeking to undo the confessed judgments, obtain declaratory relief, pursue abuse of process, and assert attorney deceit, while leaving other claims dismissed. It matters because a release may not end a case at the outset when the borrower plausibly alleges it was obtained through fraud or duress.
BP3 Capital, LLC v. 5120 Realty Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
In this commercial foreclosure case, the key dispute was whether the person who signed the mortgage and loan papers for the property owner had authority to bind the corporation. The Second Department reversed the foreclosure judgment, finding there were factual questions about that authority because the lender appears to have relied mainly on the signer’s own statements and documents without making a reasonable inquiry. It also allowed the corporation to amend its answer, underscoring that lenders should verify corporate authority before closing a loan.
The People v. Kelechi Symns (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a robbery indictment against a defendant accused of helping two armed accomplices carry out a robbery, finding the grand jury had enough evidence to let the case go forward. The court said his alleged actions before, during, and after the crime—including driving the others and later trying to keep the victim from reporting it—could support a finding that he intentionally aided the robbery, which matters because it confirms that a person can be charged as an accomplice even without personally taking the property.
In the Matter of Nuria D. Z. P. (Anonymous) (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
This case involved a child seeking the state-court findings needed to apply for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. The Second Department reversed the Family Court and granted those findings, ruling that reunification with the mother was not possible because of abandonment and that returning the child to El Salvador would not be in her best interest. This matters because it confirms that appellate courts can step in and grant SIJS-related findings when the record clearly supports them.
Matter of Maslava v. Oppedisano (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
The Second Department upheld an order giving the mother primary residential custody after finding that the father’s poor judgment and unstable home environment were harming the children, but it removed a rule that barred all other people from being in the father’s home during parenting time. The decision shows that courts will change custody when circumstances have changed and the children’s welfare requires it, but limits on a parent’s time with the children must be backed by specific evidence.
The People of the State of New York v. Swahili Johnson (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
In People v. Swahili Johnson, the Second Department upheld a Kings County defendant’s guilty plea and ruled that his waiver of the right to appeal was valid, which blocked his challenge to the length of his sentence. But the court struck a probation condition requiring him to pay a mandatory surcharge and fees, holding that probation terms must support rehabilitation or lawful behavior.
Castro v. Castro (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
In a dispute over ownership of a Queens property, the Second Department vacated a default judgment that had declared the plaintiff a 50% owner. The court found that the defendant was not properly served before the default was entered because the plaintiff posted and mailed the papers without making enough efforts to serve him personally, including at a known work address. The decision shows that if service is defective, a default judgment can be undone even years later.
Madeo v. Singh (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
In this car accident case, the defendant defaulted, but the key issue was whether the plaintiff still had to prove she suffered a legally qualifying serious injury before recovering damages. The Second Department held that she did, found her inquest evidence was not enough, dismissed the complaint, and wiped out the $500,000 judgment. This matters because a default may establish fault, but it does not automatically prove serious injury or damages.
Abdelrazek v. 12-15 Broadway Astoria, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
The Second Department held that tenants in a Queens apartment building may pursue a class action alleging building-wide rent overcharges based on incorrect initial rent registrations. It certified a class of tenants from January 26, 2017 through the filing of the complaint and refused to dismiss the case as untimely, finding the pleadings alleged enough signs of fraud to look beyond the usual four-year period. This matters because it confirms that tenants can bring these claims in court, not just before DHCR, and that class treatment may be appropriate when the same rent-setting practice affects an entire building.
In the Matter of Shoshannah Chouake, Deceased (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that a contested will should not have been admitted to probate without a trial on the claim of undue influence. The court found unresolved factual questions because the main beneficiary was also the decedent’s attorney, held her power of attorney, and was involved in preparing the will while she was terminally ill, underscoring that close relationships like these can require closer scrutiny in probate cases.
In the Matter of the Claim of Jennifer L. Price v. Premium Brands OPCO, LLC et al. (Appellate Division, Third Department, May 28, 2026)
This workers’ compensation appeal asked whether the Board could reject a worker’s request for review because of small mistakes on form RB-89, even though the request was actually filed and served on time. The Third Department said no, reversed the Board’s denial, and sent the case back, holding that technical form errors alone are not enough to block review and that the Board must give the filer a chance to fix them if no one was harmed.
DeCaro v. Somerset Industries, Inc. (Appellate Division, Third Department, May 28, 2026)
This case stems from a bakery accident in which a 23-month-old child injured her hand in a fondant sheeter, and the manufacturer sought to hold the child’s mother responsible on a negligent entrustment theory. The Third Department ruled that the manufacturer was not entitled to summary judgment because factual questions remain about whether the mother actually entrusted the machine to the child and whether the injury was clearly foreseeable, underscoring that a parent cannot be held liable on this theory based on poor supervision alone.
Cain v. North Country Community College et al. (Appellate Division, Third Department, May 28, 2026)
The Third Department dismissed an employment discrimination suit brought by an adjunct instructor who taught for North Country Community College on campus and in a prison education program. The court held that, although her complaint was enough to get past an early dismissal motion, the evidence did not support her claims of discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or constructive discharge, and defendants showed legitimate reasons for the actions she challenged. The decision matters because it shows that a plausible joint-employer theory is not enough by itself; a plaintiff still needs concrete proof to survive summary judgment.
Matter of Julien v. Arthur; Matter of Arthur v. Julien (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 27, 2026)
The Second Department upheld a Family Court order giving the mother sole legal and residential custody, while allowing the father parental access, based on evidence that she was the child’s main caregiver and that the father had engaged in troubling conduct, including failing to return the child as ordered. The court also imposed a $250 sanction on the self-represented father for citing a fake case apparently generated by AI, making clear that even pro se litigants must verify legal authorities before filing them.