Kociaj v. DeRose (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
The First Department vacated an order barring the plaintiff in a wrongful death and medical malpractice case from using Office of the Chief Medical Examiner evidence at trial after the plaintiff repeatedly tried, but failed, to submit a fully proper records authorization. The court held that exclusion was too harsh under the circumstances and allowed the evidence to be used if the plaintiff provides a corrected authorization within 30 days, underscoring that discovery penalties should be proportional when a party is making genuine efforts to comply.
Parker v. Simmons (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
The First Department ruled that, in a civil case involving sexual assault allegations, the plaintiff could obtain certain law school records about the defendant’s earlier complaint against another student. The court said those records may be relevant to credibility and possible patterns of prior accusations, and it allowed disclosure with safeguards like redacting the other student’s name while still protecting counseling records.
Giselle Hubbard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., doing business as Chase Bank, and Jones Lang LaSalle Americas, Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
In a parking-lot trip-and-fall case, the First Department ruled that Chase was not entitled to an early win on its claim that property manager Jones Lang had to reimburse it under their contract. The court said Chase had not yet shown that it was free from its own negligence, and it also upheld the rejection of Jones Lang’s late bid to throw out the case.
The decision matters because it confirms that a party seeking contractual indemnity must show it was not actively at fault, and that courts will strictly enforce summary judgment filing deadlines.
Courtney Watson v. Roanoke Island Historical Association and William Ivey Long (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
This case asked whether a 2008 encounter in which William Ivey Long allegedly grabbed Courtney Watson’s shoulders and touched his cheeks could revive claims under the Adult Survivors Act based on earlier alleged sexual abuse. The First Department dismissed the claims against Long, finding that the 2008 conduct did not involve touching a sexual or intimate body part and therefore did not qualify as a sex offense under the law. It matters because the ruling makes clear that, to use the Adult Survivors Act, the specific incident being sued over must itself fit the definition of a covered sexual offense.
Angel Cha v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
In this motor vehicle accident case, the First Department ruled that the trial should cover both the plaintiff’s damages and how fault should be divided among the defendants and the third-party driver, not damages alone. The court said that even though the plaintiff had already won summary judgment on liability, there were still factual disputes about the other driver’s role, making a joint trial the fairest and most efficient approach.
Apple Bank for Savings v. Prime Rok Real Estate LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
The First Department ruled that in this real estate and banking dispute, the property owners could not revive counterclaims that had already been decided in an earlier appeal. It also denied Apple Bank’s renewed bid for summary judgment because the bank relied on title-related proof it could have submitted the first time.
The decision matters because it underscores two basic rules: parties generally cannot reargue issues already resolved, and they cannot use a second summary judgment motion to fix gaps in their earlier proof.
Sznycer v. Con Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
In this trip-and-fall case, the First Department held that Con Edison was not entitled to summary judgment because its records and witness testimony did not clearly rule out that its street work created the roadway depression. The Court also found that spoliation sanctions were not justified, but it ruled that the plaintiff can obtain discovery about post-accident repairs because that evidence may help show who created or controlled the condition.
Rojas v. 444-451 Orange Buildings Housing Developmental Fund Corporation (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
In a slip-and-fall case involving an allegedly oily staircase in a residential building, the First Department reinstated the tenant’s lawsuit after finding the building owner had not shown it lacked notice of the condition. The court said a general cleaning schedule was not enough without proof of when the stairs were last inspected or cleaned, and the tenant’s testimony about the slippery area and oil droplets was enough to support her claim.
Kristopher Fuhr et al. v. Lisa Smith et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
The First Department reversed a trial court order that had allowed defendants to seize property based on a counterclaim included in an answer they filed before the complaint even existed. Because that answer was legally invalid, the court held that the counterclaim also had to be dismissed and the seizure order vacated. The decision is a reminder that parties cannot get court-ordered relief based on defective pleadings.
Sofia Quintanar v. New York State Office of the Attorney General et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
This case involved a former government employee who claimed her supervisor sexually assaulted her and later helped block her from getting a campaign job after she rejected him. The First Department reinstated her New York City retaliation claim against the supervisor and the campaign, but left the dismissal of her other claims in place. The ruling matters because it confirms that under the City’s broad human rights law, rejecting sexual advances and then facing interference with a later job opportunity may be enough to state a retaliation claim.
Annabel Sen v. GR Realty Holdings LLC, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
This case arose from a woman’s claim that a lounge chair blew off a high-floor condo terrace and injured her on the street below. The First Department reinstated her claims against the tenants and the building manager, and also revived the apartment owner’s indemnification claim against the tenants, finding factual disputes about who knew about the wind risk and who controlled the terrace furniture. The decision matters because it shows that tenants, managers, and condo entities may all face liability when unsafe terrace conditions and responsibility for preventing them are still unclear.
Heitman Credit Acquisition XXIII, LLC v. Meadow Partners LLC, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
The First Department ruled in a commercial real estate contract dispute that the case should be put on hold while a related, earlier-filed New York County case moves forward. The court otherwise left the lower court’s order in place and did not decide the defendants’ dismissal arguments, underscoring that when two cases overlap, courts may pause one to avoid inconsistent results and streamline the litigation.
The People of the State of New York v. Babacrae Ndiaye (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
The First Department reversed Babacrae Ndiaye’s conviction, vacated his guilty plea to two first-degree assault charges, and sent the case back because the judge did not tell him at the plea hearing that his sentence included five years of postrelease supervision after prison. The decision reinforces that a guilty plea is invalid if the court does not clearly explain every part of the sentence, and that error can be challenged on direct appeal.
The People of the State of New York v. D.D. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
The First Department largely upheld a Bronx defendant’s guilty pleas in two weapon-possession cases, finding that his appeal waiver was valid and blocked review of his suppression challenge, and that one adolescent offender case was properly kept in adult court. But it vacated the sentence on one indictment and sent the case back because the trial court failed to decide on the record whether the defendant qualified for youthful offender treatment, underscoring that courts must make and explain that determination.
The People of the State of New York v. James Martinez (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
In People v. Martinez, the First Department left in place a firearm-possession conviction but removed the mandatory surcharges and fees imposed at sentencing. The court did so in the interest of justice, citing prior precedent and noting that the prosecution did not oppose the request. The decision matters because it shows the First Department can keep a conviction intact while still eliminating financial penalties tied to the sentence.
MEC Property Holdings, LLC v. Chaya Gelfand, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
This case involved a landlord’s suit for unpaid rent under a lease that required a 14-day written rent demand before any lawsuit could be filed. The First Department dismissed the landlord’s complaint because that notice was never served, but it let the tenants’ counterclaims continue because they had not yet proved they were entitled to judgment. The decision matters because it confirms that courts will enforce lease notice requirements strictly, and a landlord can lose a rent case by skipping them.
Daniel Nicolai v. Jennie Daisak, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
The First Department ruled that the scooter rider was not entitled to summary judgment because conflicting accounts of the crash left open questions about fault, including whether the driver acted reasonably when she stopped to avoid a pedestrian. But the court struck the defenses of assumption of risk and failure to wear a helmet, holding that assumption of risk does not apply to an ordinary traffic accident and there was no evidence the rider was unhelmeted.
The People of the State of New York v. Jeremy Grant (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
In a weapons-possession case, the First Department largely upheld Jeremy Grant’s guilty-plea conviction, rejecting his challenge to New York’s gun licensing law and most of his objections to probation because his appeal waiver was valid or the claims lacked merit. The court struck only one probation term—the requirement that he pay mandatory surcharges and fees as a condition of probation—making clear that those payments cannot be enforced that way.
Mikael Amirov et al. v. Turtle Bay Tavern Corp. et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
In this tavern assault case, the First Department reinstated the defendants’ answer after the trial court had thrown it out over discovery disputes about security practices and alcohol service. The court found no bad-faith refusal to cooperate because the key witnesses were former employees outside the defendants’ control, and the plaintiffs already had enough information to subpoena them, reinforcing that severe discovery penalties require clear proof of willful misconduct.
Urban v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
In this child sexual abuse case, the First Department mostly upheld an order requiring the Marist Brothers to turn over internal records, insurer communications, and other investigation-related documents that it claimed were privileged. The court allowed only limited redactions to protect the names of victims of other alleged abusers, while requiring disclosure of the alleged abusers’ names because that information could show notice, pattern, or institutional response.
Pescales v. Pax Ventures LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
This case involved a former employee who said he was fired for helping Egyptian coworkers raise complaints about national origin and religious discrimination, while the employer said the termination was part of cost-cutting. The First Department reinstated his retaliation claim under the New York City Human Rights Law and ordered a trial instruction allowing the jury to draw a negative inference from the employer’s destruction of key business spreadsheets.
The decision matters because it confirms that, under the City law, retaliation need only be one factor in a firing, and employers can face serious consequences for destroying relevant records once litigation is reasonably expected.
Pearson v. Jakubcin (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
In this rear-end collision case, the First Department reversed the trial court’s ruling that had found the driver who hit the plaintiffs automatically liable. The court said the defendant raised real factual disputes by claiming a box truck blocked her view, the plaintiffs’ vehicle may have been disabled or unlit, and the stop happened suddenly, which matters because rear-end crashes do not always justify summary judgment when there is evidence of a possible nonnegligent explanation.
Kingdom Associates, Inc. v. WBC Services Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
The First Department reinstated a subcontractor’s claims against a construction manager after the lower court threw out the case. Kingdom Associates alleged that WBC awarded it a subcontract, accepted more than a month of work and materials, and then denied any agreement existed, and the court held that emails, project communications, and partial performance could be enough to support contract and related payment claims even without a signed contract. The decision matters because it shows that in New York, construction cases based on an unsigned deal may still move forward when the facts suggest the parties intended to be bound.
Terron-Alcantara v. Charlie's Real Estate LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, May 14, 2026)
The First Department ruled for a construction worker who was hurt when an angle grinder without a safety guard kicked back and cut his arm. It reversed the lower court and granted him partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241(6), finding the defective tool was left on the job site and caused the injury. The decision matters because it confirms that owners can be held liable for unsafe equipment on a work site, even if the worker may have been partly at fault for how the tool was used.
Farmer v. Mizuho Securities USA LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
The First Department reinstated a female trader’s gender discrimination and hostile work environment claims against Mizuho, finding that her allegations of smaller market assignments, lower risk limits, and sexist treatment compared with male colleagues were enough to let the case move forward. The court also held the claims were timely because her disputed February 2021 exit could be seen as part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination, highlighting New York’s plaintiff-friendly standard at the early stage of employment bias cases.
Dan Weir v. Pam Thur Weir (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
The First Department ruled that the older child’s support ended at age 21 and that the father’s support for the younger child could be reduced while that child was away at college. But it threw out the credit the father received for college room and board and said the mother’s request for legal fees can be reconsidered after a financial hearing. This matters because divorce agreements that require education costs to be paid in addition to child support do not let a parent subtract those costs from support.
Choi v. Linc LIC L.L.C. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
The First Department ruled for a rent-stabilized tenant who said his landlord used COVID-era rent concessions to overcharge him and improperly added legal fees to his account without a court order. The court held that the concessions functioned as a lower “preferential” rent that had to be used for renewal calculations, found the legal-fee lease clause unenforceable, and sent the case back to calculate damages, including possible treble damages.
Jorgge v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In Jorgge v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, LLC, a worker who fell from a ladder at a supermarket sought sanctions after the store could not produce a written statement from an eyewitness employee. The Second Department ruled that barring that witness from testifying was too harsh because the statement appears to have been lost negligently, not intentionally, and held that the jury should instead be allowed to infer the missing statement would have hurt the store’s case.
In the Matter of Jefferson D. O. M. (Anonymous), also known as Jefferson J. A. M. (Anonymous) (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated and granted a young person’s guardianship petition, appointed his mother as guardian, and approved the findings he needed to seek Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. The court held that conflicting birth certificates alone did not justify dismissal because sworn evidence showed he was under 21 and unmarried, could not reunify with his deceased father, and would face danger if returned to Honduras.
In the Matter of Aaliyah W. (Anonymous), Annalyse W. (Anonymous), and Olivia W. (Anonymous) (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department largely upheld findings that a stepfather neglected one child and derivatively neglected another in an ACS child protective case, based in part on a child’s out-of-court statements that were supported by other evidence. But it threw out the neglect finding as to Olivia W. because that petition had already been dismissed, underscoring that corroborated child statements can support neglect findings, while courts cannot make rulings on claims that are no longer pending.
The People v. Dwayne Hough (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department modified a Nassau County criminal sentence after finding the trial court used the wrong method to collect mandatory fees following Dwayne Hough’s guilty plea to drug sale and assault charges. It struck the part of the judgment directing those fees to be collected by civil judgment, ordered that they be collected under the proper statute instead, and otherwise upheld the sentence, including postrelease supervision.
Brindisi v. ARJ Transportation, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In this personal injury case arising from a rear-end crash, the Second Department reversed the trial court and granted the injured driver summary judgment on liability after finding that his stopped vehicle was hit from behind. The court held that the defendants’ claim that he stopped suddenly was not enough, by itself, to avoid liability, and any fault by the plaintiff can still be considered later when deciding damages.
Fernando Vasquez Quintero v. MBH Capital, LLC, et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department held that a former property owner sued over a construction worker’s fall was entitled to dismissal of the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) claims because it no longer owned the property when the accident happened. But the court allowed the Labor Law § 200 and negligence claims to continue, finding a former owner may still face liability for a dangerous condition that existed before the sale. It also ruled that sanctions cannot be asserted as a standalone counterclaim.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. PF Holding, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a foreclosure judgment against RB East 13, LLC, holding that Deutsche Bank did not properly prove the mortgage default. The lender’s witness relied on loan records that were not identified or submitted, and it also tried to add a new default theory for the first time in reply papers. This matters because it reinforces that foreclosure lenders must support summary judgment motions with admissible evidence and cannot fix gaps in their proof at the last minute.
People v. Perry (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a Queens court order that had suppressed a gun found in a box under a driver’s seat after a traffic stop for running red lights. The court held that signs of intoxication and an open alcohol bottle gave police probable cause to search the car without a warrant, and that the search could include containers under the seat, making the gun admissible.
People v. Moreno (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department reversed Harold Moreno’s conviction, threw out his guilty plea, and suppressed statements he made to law enforcement because prosecutors did not show that his arrest was lawful. The court said an old police I-card alone was not enough; the prosecution had to show that the arresting officers actually acted on communicated probable cause, which matters because it reinforces the proof needed to justify an arrest when a defendant challenges post-arrest statements.
The People v. Ebenezer Lewis (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In People v. Lewis, the Second Department reinstated a 2012 conviction after finding the defendant could not undo his guilty plea based on his lawyer’s alleged failure to warn him about deportation risks. The court said the plea record showed the judge had already warned him that he could be deported, and he chose to plead guilty anyway. This matters because it shows a post-conviction challenge will likely fail when the defendant was clearly told about immigration consequences before entering the plea.
US Bank National Association v. Jones-Boakai (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a mortgage foreclosure case after ruling that the trial court wrongly dismissed it as abandoned, even though the homeowner had answered the complaint and was not in default. The decision matters because it makes clear that this abandonment rule applies only in default situations, and that a lender can later ask the court to undo an improper dismissal and restore the case.
Valitutto v. Staten Island University Hospital (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a medical malpractice case against Staten Island University Hospital and an emergency-room doctor over an alleged failure to recognize signs of cervical spinal cord compression. The court found that the plaintiffs’ expert raised factual disputes about whether the ER evaluation and treatment were inadequate and whether those failures caused harm, and it also said the hospital could still be held responsible for the ER care.
New York Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v. Union Methodist Church of South Ozone Park (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In a dispute over a Queens church property, the Second Department ruled that the New York Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church was entitled to title, possession, and an accounting from the local congregation and its officers. The court found that the local church had long operated as part of the denomination and was bound by church rules that placed the property in trust for the broader church, making the decision important for similar fights over control of church property.
Maddox v. Episcopal Health Services, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a patient's negligence and malpractice claims against a hospital arising from pressure ulcers she developed while being treated for COVID-19. The court held that the hospital was not entitled to dismissal based on pandemic-era EDTPA immunity because it offered only general statements about COVID-19 conditions and did not specifically show how the plaintiff’s pressure-ulcer care was tied to its COVID-19 response. This matters because hospitals cannot rely on broad pandemic-related claims alone to defeat malpractice suits at the outset.
Matter of State of New York v. Ezikiel R. (Anonymous) (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
This case involved New York’s effort to civilly manage an alleged sex offender under Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The Second Department reversed the trial court because, after the case was sent back, the judge improperly retried whether the respondent had sexual sadism disorder even though that issue had already been decided on appeal.
The case now goes back for a ruling only on whether the respondent’s established diagnoses amount to a legal “mental abnormality,” underscoring that trial courts must follow appellate instructions exactly.
Champion Mortgage v. Williams (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
This foreclosure case turned on a basic procedural rule: one of the defendants died before the foreclosure judgment was entered, but no estate representative was formally substituted into the case. The Second Department vacated the foreclosure judgment and dismissed the appeal, holding that because the judgment still sought a deficiency against the deceased defendant, the trial court had no power to issue it.
Dowd v. Tischler (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
Dowd v. Tischler involved a medical malpractice and informed consent lawsuit that the trial court dismissed with prejudice after the plaintiff did not hire new counsel by a court-set deadline. The Second Department reinstated the complaint, holding that the trial court could not throw out the case on its own under these circumstances, which matters because it confirms that courts must follow strict procedural rules before dismissing a case.
Vetiaque v. Kistler Service Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In this car-accident injury case, the Second Department reinstated the plaintiff’s lawsuit after finding there were factual disputes over whether his shoulder, hip, and spine injuries met New York’s serious-injury threshold. The court also said the defendants did not adequately show that the injuries were unrelated to the accident, which matters because defendants seeking early dismissal must address both the severity of the injuries and causation.
Matter of Ruggiero v. Orange County Board of Elections (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 11, 2026)
In a razor-thin Town of Newburgh council race, the Second Department ruled that the trial court could review ballots challenged during the recount, but could not consider the opposing candidate’s unapproved ballot claims or rule on ballots no one had properly put at issue. The court restored several ballots that had been thrown out, left one ballot invalid because the voter’s intent was unclear, and underscored that in election disputes, courts are limited to properly raised challenges and should not reject ballots without clear proof of a problem.
Gorodetskaya v. A/Dale Realty Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In this sidewalk trip-and-fall case, the Second Department reinstated the plaintiff’s lawsuit against the property owner and its president after the trial court had thrown it out. The court found the defendants did not provide enough reliable, specific proof that the sidewalk defect was too minor to support a claim or that the president could not be personally liable, which matters because defendants must affirmatively prove those defenses before a case can be dismissed early.
Sunset Condo II, LLC v. O'Neill (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In a dispute over homeowners’ association rules that limited access to shared community facilities, the Second Department reinstated the condo owners’ lawsuit after the trial court had dismissed it. The court held that the defendants did not back their summary judgment motion with admissible records and could not fix that problem by submitting new evidence in reply. This matters because it reinforces that parties seeking early dismissal must present proper evidence from the start.
NYCTL 1998-2 Trust v. Grace Christian Church (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
This case involved a church’s attempt to undo a tax lien foreclosure on a Brooklyn lot used as a parking lot, based on improper service and a claimed religious-use tax exemption. The Second Department reinstated the foreclosure judgment and sale, holding that the church gave up its jurisdiction objection when its lawyer appeared without properly raising it and that the lot had never actually received tax-exempt status. This matters because property owners must raise service objections on time, and a claimed exemption will not undo a completed foreclosure unless the specific property was formally exempt.
Carla Nolletti, et al. v. Cynthia Joy Nolletti, et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In a dispute over control of a family-owned nursery after the founder’s death, two children sought to block shareholder votes and share transfers until the surviving spouse’s elective-share claim was resolved. The Second Department reversed the lower court, denied the injunction, and dismissed the case, finding the claims were based on speculation that the spouse might later receive shares and support the plaintiffs. This matters because it confirms that courts will not freeze corporate decision-making based on hypothetical future ownership or allow parties to sue over someone else’s possible rights.
Ramjattan v. Auringer (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In this Queens car-crash case, the plaintiff won in the trial court on his request to throw out the defendants’ comparative-negligence defenses after an intersection collision. The Second Department reversed that ruling, holding that the plaintiff’s own affidavit did not clearly show he was free from fault, which matters because plaintiffs must eliminate any real question about their own conduct before those defenses can be dismissed.
Rodriguez v. Weber (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
This case arose from a medical malpractice and informed consent suit over treatment to remove a gallstone from the plaintiff’s bile duct. The Second Department dismissed the claims against the gastroenterologist and his practice, finding that the plaintiff’s expert opinion was too speculative and unsupported to show negligent care or that the treatment caused the alleged injuries. This matters because plaintiffs in malpractice cases must present a well-supported expert opinion tied to the medical record to keep their claims alive.
Munro v. Christsouljah, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In this personal injury case, Bush Truck Leasing tried to undo a default entered after it was served through the Secretary of State and failed to respond. The Second Department reversed the lower court and denied that request, finding the company did not show it lacked timely notice or had a valid excuse for missing the case; the ruling matters because businesses seeking to vacate a default must provide specific proof, not vague claims about office mistakes or insurance delays.
The People v. Alfredo Marrero (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In People v. Marrero, the Second Department upheld Alfredo Marrero’s guilty plea conviction for first-degree criminal contempt but struck the expiration date of the sentencing order of protection. The court found the order may have been too long because it did not credit his jail time served, and it sent the case back for a new calculation while leaving the order in place for now.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Cahn (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In a mortgage foreclosure dispute, the Second Department reversed orders that had let Deutsche Bank voluntarily withdraw its first case against the borrowers without prejudice. The court held that once the bank filed a second foreclosure action on the same debt without first getting court permission, the first case was automatically discontinued by law, so there was nothing left for the trial court to dismiss. This matters because it confirms that lenders must get leave of court before starting a second foreclosure case on the same mortgage debt.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Cahn (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department held that the lender sued too late because the first foreclosure action accelerated the loan in 2015, starting the six-year statute of limitations. The Second Department dismissed the new action as time-barred and ruled that the lender could not rely on CPLR 205-a after voluntarily discontinuing the earlier case, a reminder that lenders may lose the chance to revive older foreclosure claims.
U.S. Bank National Association v. Mohammed Manzurul Islam (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a foreclosure judgment for U.S. Bank and dismissed the case against the borrower as abandoned. The court held that the bank did not take the required step toward a default judgment within one year after the borrower defaulted, and that neither a request for a settlement conference nor a later change in attorneys excused the delay.
York v. York (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In this divorce-related enforcement dispute, the Second Department reversed an order that had blocked the wife’s subpoena seeking records from the husband to help collect on a renewed money judgment. The court held that the husband did not show the subpoena was clearly irrelevant or obviously pointless, reinforcing that post-judgment discovery will usually be allowed unless the party challenging it meets that high standard.
The People v. Claude Dunton (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
In The People v. Claude Dunton, the Second Department ruled that a post-sentencing order of protection lasted too long because the trial court did not subtract the defendant’s jail-time credit when setting its end date. The court left the conviction in place, but vacated the order’s January 3, 2030 expiration date and sent the case back for a new calculation.
Harrison v. 160-01 Jamaica Ave. Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, May 13, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that a trip-and-fall case should not be put on hold just because the plaintiff’s former lawyer was later indicted in an unrelated fraud case. But it also held that the indictment was an unexpected development that justified reopening discovery and vacating the note of issue, even after the case had been marked trial-ready.
Storms v. Geraghty (Appellate Division, Third Department, May 14, 2026)
In a property-line dispute, two neighbors entered Elaine Storms’ land and removed trees and vegetation, leading to claims for trespass, tree-cutting damages, and title to the disputed strip. The Third Department upheld Storms’ ownership claim and the tree-removal award, and it raised punitive damages from $3 each to $25,000 against Geraghty and $10,000 against Howard. The decision matters because it confirms that even when trespass results in only nominal damages, courts may still impose meaningful punitive damages to punish and deter wrongful conduct.
Matter of Siara Q. v. Thomas R. (Appellate Division, Third Department, May 14, 2026)
In this child custody modification case, the Third Department ruled that the mother keeps final authority over the child’s medical care, but reinstated joint legal custody instead of giving her sole legal custody. The court said the father’s unfounded CPS reports and other disputes showed problems that justified limited relief, but not enough to prove the parents could no longer share legal decision-making, which matters because sole legal custody requires stronger evidence than conflict over specific issues.
In the Matter of the Arbitration between New York State Workers' Compensation Board and Jonathan Tisk (Appellate Division, Third Department, May 14, 2026)
This case involved a Workers’ Compensation Board employee who challenged discipline for alleged time theft. The Third Department held that the penalty had to be vacated and reconsidered because the arbitrator relied on an earlier suspension ruling that the parties’ agreement said could not be considered, and it also removed a lower court’s stay on paycheck deductions for restitution.
The decision matters because it shows that courts will usually defer to labor arbitration, but they will step in when an arbitrator breaks a clear limit set by the parties’ contract.
People v. Head (Appellate Division, Third Department, May 14, 2026)
In People v. Head, the Third Department reversed a drug-possession conviction because the indictment cited a felony offense requiring possession of at least one-half ounce, but the facts alleged only one-eighth ounce, which describes a lesser crime. The Third Department dismissed the indictment without prejudice to the prosecution filing proper charges again. The decision matters because it confirms that this kind of charging error is a jurisdictional defect that is not cured by a guilty plea or an appeal waiver.
The People of the State of New York v. Michael Zakrzewski (Appellate Division, Third Department, May 14, 2026)
In a criminal case involving kidnapping, assault, strangulation, contempt, and related charges arising from a domestic violence incident, the Third Department reversed Michael Zakrzewski’s convictions, dismissed two counts with leave to re-present them to a new grand jury, and ordered a new trial. The court said the trial judge wrongly used an anonymous jury without any recorded justification and that two counts improperly combined multiple alleged assaults, making the decision a reminder that anonymous juries need clear support and charges must be structured so jurors agree on the specific act at issue.
Watson v. Roanoke Island Historical Association, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, May 12, 2026)
The First Department dismissed an Adult Survivors Act lawsuit against costume designer William Ivey Long, holding that allegations he grabbed the plaintiff’s shoulders and touched his cheeks in 2008 did not qualify as a revived sex offense. The court said those body parts were not “intimate” under the law based on the facts alleged, so the related emotional-distress claim also could not go forward. The ruling matters because it limits ASA revival claims when the alleged touching involves nonsexual body parts, even if the parties have a history of alleged sexual abuse.