Pearson v. Jakubcin
Categories
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Motor vehicle negligence and whether plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on liability in a rear-end collision.
The trial court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on the issue of liability against defendant Zuzana Jakubcin.
The appellate court reversed the order granting plaintiffs summary judgment on liability and denied the motion.
Although plaintiffs made a prima facie showing based on a rear-end collision, Jakubcin raised a triable issue of fact by offering a nonnegligent explanation: a box truck obstructed her view, plaintiffs' vehicle was slow-moving or disabled and stopped abruptly only seconds ahead, plaintiffs' vehicle allegedly had no lights or hazard lights on, and Jakubcin testified she could not safely change lanes. The court also held that she could invoke the emergency doctrine in opposition to summary judgment even though it was not pleaded as an affirmative defense.
Background
This action arose from a collision on Interstate 95 in which defendant-appellant Zuzana Jakubcin rear-ended plaintiffs' vehicle. Plaintiffs sought summary judgment on liability. Jakubcin testified that she had been traveling in the center lane behind a box truck for about 10 miles at approximately 60 miles per hour. When the box truck moved into the right lane, she first saw plaintiffs' vehicle in front of her. She stated that plaintiffs' vehicle was slow-moving or disabled and abruptly stopped in the center lane only seconds ahead, that the truck had blocked her view, and that traffic in the adjacent lanes prevented a safe lane change.
Lower Court Decision
Supreme Court, Bronx County, granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, finding plaintiffs entitled to judgment based on the rear-end collision.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously reversed, without costs, and denied plaintiffs' motion. It held that while plaintiffs established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment because their vehicle was rear-ended, Jakubcin's testimony and the evidence concerning plaintiffs' disabled, unlit vehicle created triable issues of fact as to whether she had a nonnegligent explanation and faced a sudden emergency.
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that a rear-end collision creates a prima facie case of negligence, but summary judgment is not warranted where the rear driver presents evidence of a sudden stop, obstructed visibility, a disabled or unlit lead vehicle, or other facts supporting a nonnegligent explanation. It also confirms that the emergency doctrine may be raised in opposition to a summary judgment motion even if it was not pleaded as an affirmative defense.
Even in a rear-end collision case, plaintiffs do not automatically obtain summary judgment on liability if the defendant presents evidence that the lead vehicle was disabled or stopped unexpectedly, visibility was obstructed, and the defendant had no safe avenue to avoid the impact.