The People v. Claude Dunton
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Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Criminal law issue concerning the permissible duration of a post-sentencing order of protection and whether jail-time credit must be deducted when calculating its expiration date.
The Supreme Court, Queens County, accepted the defendant's guilty plea to attempted robbery in the third degree, imposed sentence, and issued an order of protection set to remain in effect until January 3, 2030.
The Appellate Division vacated only so much of the order of protection as set its expiration date through January 3, 2030, while otherwise affirming the judgment of conviction.
The duration exceeded the maximum permitted under CPL 530.13(4) [sets the maximum time limit for a criminal order of protection] because the sentencing court failed to account for the defendant's jail-time credit. The issue was reviewable despite no objection because the court did not announce the duration of the order of protection at the plea or sentencing proceedings, leaving the defendant with no practical opportunity to object.
Background
Claude Dunton pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in the third degree in Supreme Court, Queens County. At sentencing, the court also issued an order of protection. On appeal, Dunton challenged the length of that order, arguing that the expiration date was unlawfully extended because it did not credit him for time already spent in jail.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Queens County, rendered judgment on January 3, 2019, convicting the defendant upon his guilty plea of attempted robbery in the third degree, imposing sentence, and issuing an order of protection that was to remain in effect until and including January 3, 2030.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division held that the challenge to the duration of the order of protection was not barred by lack of preservation because the sentencing court never announced that duration at the plea or sentencing proceedings. Accepting the People's concession, the court ruled that the expiration date exceeded the statutory maximum because it failed to account for jail-time credit. The court therefore vacated only the portion of the order of protection setting the January 3, 2030 expiration date and remitted the matter for a new determination of duration, while keeping the order of protection in effect pending that determination and affirming the judgment in all other respects.
Legal Significance
This decision reinforces that a defendant may challenge the duration of a criminal order of protection on appeal even without a contemporaneous objection where the sentencing court did not announce the order's duration in open court. It also confirms that, under CPL 530.13(4) [sets the maximum time limit for a criminal order of protection], jail-time credit must be considered when calculating the lawful expiration date.
A sentencing court cannot set an order of protection for longer than the statute allows, and any calculation of its duration must subtract the defendant's jail-time credit. If the court never states the duration at plea or sentencing, the defendant's failure to object does not forfeit appellate review.