The People of the State of New York v. Julsean Thompson (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
The First Department upheld Julsean Thompson’s conviction for first-degree custodial interference but reduced his prison sentence. The court found the original two-to-four-year term was too harsh and cut it to 1 1/3 to 3 years, showing that an appeals court can leave a guilty-plea conviction in place while lowering an excessive sentence.
In the Matter of Eric Camacho v. New York City Housing Authority (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
This case involved a NYCHA tenant’s nephew who challenged the agency’s denial of remaining family member status after the tenant of record died. The First Department reversed the lower court and upheld NYCHA’s decision, finding he did not meet the required 12 months of authorized occupancy before her death. This matters because it confirms that NYCHA succession rights depend on strict eligibility rules, and hardship, rent payments, or later policy changes will not cure that defect.
The Bank of New York Mellon, formerly known as The Bank of New York v. Adam P1otch, LLC (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
The First Department reversed a lower court ruling that had rejected a property owner’s attempt to challenge a foreclosure judgment under New York’s Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act. The court said the request was not too late because a party may still seek that relief after judgment, as long as the foreclosure sale has not happened, and sent the case back for the court to consider the merits and related constitutional issues.
ARENA VANTAGE SPV, LLC v. ACTIONABLE PROCESS LLC, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 30, 2026)
In this commercial lending dispute, the First Department dismissed the lender’s contract claim against the deal agent but let its claims against the guarantors and for bad-faith conduct move forward. The court said the loan agreement did not require the agent to act unless directed by the required lenders, while the guaranties were unconditional, so the lender could sue the guarantors directly.
Donald J. Trump v. Mary L. Trump (Appellate Division, First Department, April 30, 2026)
The First Department reversed a lower court order and allowed Mary Trump to obtain discovery about asset valuations tied to the parties’ 2001 settlement agreement. The court held that those materials are relevant to her defense that she was fraudulently induced into the agreement, reinforcing New York’s broad approach to discovery in contract disputes.
Gordon v. 476 Broadway Realty Corp. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
The First Department ruled that neither side in this co-op apartment dispute was the clear winner. Although the co-op kept possession of the apartment, the shareholder was awarded $100,751 plus interest for years of leak-related conditions, and the court threw out the co-op’s attorneys’ fee award.
The decision matters because it shows that in mixed-result housing cases, a party does not get attorneys’ fees unless it clearly wins the main issues.
Theresa Maddicks, et al. v. 106-108 Convent BCR, LLC, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
The First Department ruled that defendants are entitled to discovery into whether plaintiffs’ lawyers have a conflict based on their earlier work for former owners of the buildings in this rent-regulation class action. But it said it was too early to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel or throw out the case, making clear that courts need a fuller factual record before deciding conflict claims.
Richard Stumacher v. Medical Liability Mutual Insurance Company, et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 30, 2026)
This case arose from claims that a medical malpractice insurer and defense lawyers mishandled settlement discussions, failed to disclose settlement offers, and created conflicts in the insured doctor’s defense. The First Department dismissed only the standalone punitive damages claim against the insurer, but otherwise allowed the punitive damages request and the legal malpractice claims to move forward.
The decision matters because it makes clear that punitive damages in New York are a remedy, not a separate lawsuit claim, and that malpractice claims based on missed settlement opportunities can survive if the alleged harm is plausibly pleaded.
Matter of A. G. v. K. V. (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
The First Department held that Family Court did not have authority to hear a family offense petition between a woman and her adult stepson’s wife because their connection was not a qualifying family or intimate relationship under the statute. It agreed the case had to be dismissed, but changed the order to make the dismissal without prejudice because the lower court never reached the merits.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Reyes Merino (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the First Department reversed summary judgment for Wells Fargo because the bank did not adequately prove it properly mailed the required 90-day pre-foreclosure notices. The court said an affidavit and tracking numbers were not enough, especially where a third-party vendor handled the mailing. The ruling matters because lenders must have clear, reliable proof of notice compliance before they can win foreclosure cases.
The People of the State of New York v. Ameer Cassaberry (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
The First Department upheld Ameer Cassaberry’s guilty-plea conviction for second-degree weapon possession and left in place his 3.5-year prison term and 2.5 years of post-release supervision. But it removed the sentencing surcharges and fees in the interest of justice, showing that the court can still reduce the financial penalties attached to a criminal sentence even when the conviction itself stands.
People of the State of New York v. Yordani Urena (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
The First Department mostly upheld a Bronx defendant’s conviction for second-degree assault and his three-year probation sentence. It rejected his challenge to a probation rule requiring him to avoid harmful habits, unlawful places, and disreputable people, but struck the requirement that he pay mandatory surcharges and fees as a condition of probation. The decision matters because it confirms that probation rules must relate to rehabilitation or lawful behavior, and financial penalties do not automatically qualify.
The People of the State of New York v. Angel Rivas (Appellate Division, First Department, April 28, 2026)
In a weapons-possession case, the First Department struck six probation conditions imposed after Angel Rivas’s guilty plea, including requirements tied to family support, substance testing and treatment, gang restrictions, mental health treatment, violence-prevention programs, and an ignition interlock device. The court found those conditions had no factual support in the record, underscoring that probation terms in New York must be tailored to the defendant and the offense rather than imposed as standard boilerplate.
People of the State of New York v. Mauro Vivar (Appellate Division, First Department, April 30, 2026)
The First Department reversed Mauro Vivar’s conviction, threw out his guilty plea, and sent the case back after finding that his appeal waiver was not properly explained and that police statements obtained during custody should have been suppressed. The ruling matters because it makes clear that judges must personally ensure a defendant understands an appeal waiver, and a guilty plea can be undone when a bad suppression ruling may have influenced the plea.
Sager v. Frontpage Investments, Drexel University (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In Sager v. Frontpage Investments, the plaintiff sought to hold Drexel University responsible after two Drexel students allegedly caused a workplace accident while working at a paid co-op job for a third-party employer. The Second Department dismissed the claims against Drexel, finding that the employer—not the university—controlled the students’ hiring, pay, training, supervision, and daily work. The decision matters because it confirms that a school’s limited academic oversight of an internship or co-op program does not, by itself, make the school liable for a student’s on-the-job negligence.
Dowdy v. Brooklyn Hospital Center (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In this slip-and-fall case over spilled food at a hospital cafeteria entrance, the Second Department largely upheld a jury verdict finding Brooklyn Hospital Center 60% at fault and awarding the plaintiff damages, including future medical costs. The court said the evidence supported the finding that the spill was visible long enough for the hospital to discover it, and it left the fault allocation and damages awards in place. It removed only the part of the judgment requiring the hospital to pay the plaintiff’s lawyer directly, confirming that courts cannot award money directly to a nonparty attorney.
Matter of Baldwin v. Peterkin (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a Family Court ruling that found a father willfully violated a child support order and faced up to 60 days in jail unless he paid $7,500. The court held that the father’s right to counsel was not properly protected because he did not clearly and knowingly waive an attorney before the hearing went forward. This matters because courts must make sure a parent has counsel, or validly gives up that right, before imposing serious child support enforcement penalties like incarceration.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Benson (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department reversed summary judgment for Deutsche Bank because the bank’s own affidavits conflicted on who mailed the required 90-day preforeclosure notices to the borrower. The court held that this inconsistency created a factual dispute over compliance with RPAPL 1304, which matters because lenders must strictly and consistently prove notice was properly sent before they can win foreclosure relief.
Atlantica, LLC v. Hunte (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, The Second Department reversed the foreclosure judgment against Cheryl Hunte and sent the case back for a hearing on whether she was properly served with the lawsuit. The court held that even though the lender had a process server’s affidavit, Hunte’s detailed sworn denial and supporting documents were enough to require a hearing before a default foreclosure could stand.
Karp v. Madison Realty Capital, L.P. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated claims by borrowers who said a commercial lender used a predatory “loan-to-own” strategy, then tried to block the lawsuit through a release in a forbearance agreement. The court held that the borrowers could amend their complaint while the dismissal motion was pending, and that their allegations of coercion and false funding promises were detailed enough to keep the case alive.
John Terehoff v. Rubin Frenkel (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff claimed a doctor’s failure to diagnose preterm labor led to an extremely premature birth that later caused the child’s autism. The Second Department reversed the plaintiff’s judgment, ruled that the expert testimony linking prematurity and low birth weight to autism should not have been allowed, and ordered a new trial. The decision matters because it makes clear that in New York, expert opinions on causation must be backed by generally accepted science, not just studies showing an association.
Johnson v. Cremoux (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a construction worker’s Labor Law claim against homeowners after he lost fingers in a table-saw accident during a home renovation, but it also refused to grant the worker judgment because key facts are still disputed. The court found conflicting evidence about whether the homeowners qualified for the homeowner exemption and whether a blade guard was available, and it also let the contractor add an insurance-based defense, showing these issues must be decided at trial.
Matter of Westchester Plaza Tenants Coalition v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a lower court ruling and voided DHCR’s approval of a landlord’s plan to change swimming pool facilities at rent-stabilized buildings. The court held that the pool could qualify as an essential service because it was being maintained in 1974, and the fact that tenants paid membership fees did not change that. This matters because it confirms that even optional, fee-based amenities may be protected under rent-stabilization rules.
Travers v. Briarcliff Manor Investments, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated the owner’s and general contractor’s contractual indemnification claims against a steel sub-subcontractor after a worker allegedly fell from a ladder at a construction site. The court found there are factual questions about whether the sub-subcontractor was negligent and responsible for worker safety, and it confirmed that a clause requiring indemnification “to the fullest extent permitted by law” can still allow partial indemnification even if other parties may also share fault.
People of State of New York v. Joshua Stewart (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that Joshua Stewart remains a level three sex offender in New York, but it removed the separate “sexually violent offender” label tied to his New Jersey conviction. The court found that while his risk score was properly calculated, New York could not impose that harsher designation when the same conduct would not have led to it under New York law.
Campisi v. Lutheran Medical Center (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department dismissed a medical malpractice claim against Lutheran Medical Center and the attending physician in a suit alleging they failed to timely diagnose and treat a colon perforation during the patient’s 2016 hospital stay. The court found the defense showed the care met accepted standards, and the patient’s expert response was too speculative and unsupported to keep the case alive.
People v. Greenlee (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In People v. Greenlee, the Second Department found that a nine-year prison sentence for first-degree assault, imposed after a guilty plea, was excessive. The court reduced the prison term to seven years, left the five years of postrelease supervision in place, and confirmed that it can lower a lawful sentence when fairness requires it.
Beckett v. Estate of Thomas Beckett (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In a dispute over a deceased father’s 50% interest in Martha’s Vineyard property, his children from a first marriage claimed they were entitled to the share under their parents’ divorce settlement and tried to block its transfer to a child from the second marriage. The Second Department reinstated the complaint after ruling that the trial court should not have dismissed it on its own, but it upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction because the children did not show irreparable harm.
Wesa v. Consolidated Bus Transit, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In this rear-end collision case, the Second Department ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment on liability after showing his car was stopped at a red light when it was hit from behind. The court also dismissed the defendants’ comparative-negligence defenses, finding their brake-failure claim was unsupported and did not justify delaying the motion for discovery.
Kenny v. Hellerman (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
This case involved a party guest who said he was assaulted by an underage attendee at a homeowners’ property and sought to hold the homeowners liable for allegedly providing alcohol. The Second Department dismissed the claim against the homeowners under General Obligations Law § 11-100, finding there was no evidence the underage assailant was actually intoxicated at the time. The decision matters because it makes clear that possible underage drinking alone is not enough to impose social host liability.
In the Matter of Adam Kalish, an attorney and counsel-at-law (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department suspended attorney Adam Kalish for three years after finding that he mishandled his escrow account, allowed unknown third-party funds to move through it, and ended up using other clients’ money when deposits failed. Although the court threw out one disciplinary charge, it upheld two others and said the case is a reminder that lawyers can face serious discipline for careless escrow practices even if clients are later repaid and the misconduct was not intended.
The People v. Andrew Jointe (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that part of Andrew Jointe’s sentence was unlawful after his guilty plea to third-degree rape and attempted sex trafficking of a child. It reduced the postrelease supervision term on the attempted sex trafficking count from 10 years to 5 years, while leaving the rest of the sentence in place. This matters because the court made clear it can correct an illegal sentence even if no one objected to it earlier.
Remede Consulting Group, Inc. v. Pitter (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that an employer was entitled to summary judgment on liability against an employee who used a company credit card for personal expenses, rejecting his claim that he had oral permission to do so. But it overturned the $135,246.77 damages award because the employer did not clearly prove the exact amount owed. This decision shows that clear written company policies can establish liability, but damages still must be supported by precise evidence.
Yong Xu, et al. v. 401 Foster Gasoline, Inc., et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department mostly upheld the trial court in a dispute over the sale of a gas station business, ruling that Yong Xu had no ownership interest in the buyer despite claims of an oral promise that he would keep a one-third stake. The Second Department did, however, reinstate part of Xu’s conversion claim against Xiao Yan Wang and awarded him $60,625.63 for taking more than her share of funds from their joint bank account.
The decision matters because it reinforces that a clear written contract cannot be overridden by side promises, while also confirming that a joint account holder may recover when the other holder withdraws more than their presumed half.
Lustig v. Brown (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated the negligence claims against two defendants in a multi-vehicle accident, holding that they did not prove they were free from fault or that the other driver alone caused the crash. The court said an uncertified police report could not be relied on, and conflicting witness testimony created factual disputes, showing that defendants seeking early dismissal must use admissible evidence and address their own possible negligence.
Jamieson v. Noble Construction Group, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department revived a contractual indemnification claim against Lippolis Electric in a construction fall case where perimeter safety netting allegedly failed, finding Lippolis did not show the worker’s injuries were unrelated to his work for the company. The court otherwise left the lower court’s ruling in place, because factual disputes remained over negligence, supervision, and whether the accident arose from Monolithic’s netting work. The decision matters because it shows that parties seeking or opposing indemnification in construction cases need clear proof about fault and how the accident ties to the subcontractor’s work.
Haimov v. Haimov (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In this trip-and-fall case, the Second Department reversed the trial court and allowed the plaintiff to enter a default judgment on liability after the defendant failed to timely answer the complaint. The court found that the defendant’s attempt to blame the delay on his insurance carrier was not backed by firsthand proof and did not explain all of the delay, underscoring that late answers will not be excused without a clear, credible reason.
The People v. Omarny Williams (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department held that Omarny Williams could not vacate his robbery conviction through a post-judgment motion based on the trial court’s failure to warn him about possible deportation consequences, because that issue was clear from the plea record and should have been raised on direct appeal. But the court let stand the order setting aside his sentence and sent the case back for resentencing, ruling that the sentencing judge wrongly found him ineligible for youthful offender treatment based only on a prior felony plea that had not yet resulted in a sentence.
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Arthur Klamm (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department threw out the foreclosure judgment and dismissed the complaint because the lender served the papers on the homeowner’s former attorney, who was not authorized to accept service. The court also found that the homeowner did not waive his objection to personal jurisdiction because he properly preserved it and raised it on time.
Zubli v. Sakizadeh (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that a Nassau County divorce court should not have enforced a postnuptial agreement without first holding a hearing. Because the agreement appeared heavily one-sided and the husband raised credible claims that he did not understand what he was signing and may have been misled, the court sent the case back for a new determination.
Wimbish v. Crema-Samalya (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department dismissed claims against an insurance adjuster who referred a fire-loss homeowner to a restoration contractor later accused of doing poor work. The court held that the homeowner’s allegations of deceptive practices and fraud were too vague because they did not identify any specific misleading statement or detailed false representation. This matters because it shows that a contractor referral alone is not enough to support consumer-protection or fraud claims without concrete facts.
Mosca v. Lalezarian Properties, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In a slip-and-fall case involving black ice in a parking garage, the Second Department reversed an order that had dismissed the claims against the building’s snow removal contractor, Con-Kel Landscaping. The court held that Con-Kel improperly used a motion to reargue to make a new summary judgment argument based on the plaintiff’s inability to testify at trial. The decision matters because it confirms that reargument is not a second chance to raise legal theories that were not made the first time.
Matter of Integrated Specialty ASC, LLC v. American Transit Insurance Company (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
The Second Department held that a medical provider who won a no-fault arbitration award was entitled to more attorney’s fees than the trial court gave after confirming the award. It raised the fee from $1,000 to $1,360 and sent the case back to determine additional fees, ruling that a court proceeding to confirm a no-fault arbitration award counts as a court appeal for fee purposes.
Castellazzo v. David's New Beginnings, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, April 29, 2026)
In this personal injury case, the plaintiff alleged she was hurt by a negligently performed facial treatment and sued both the spa and the employee who performed it. The Second Department reinstated the claim against the employee, holding that an employee cannot avoid personal liability just because the employer may also be responsible under respondeat superior, which matters because plaintiffs may pursue both the worker and the business for the same alleged negligence.
People v. Rahaman (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
The Third Department ruled that a defendant convicted of attempted murder and related charges is entitled to a new trial because his lawyer failed to object to an anonymous jury that was seated without a proper factual basis. The court found counsel had no strategic reason for staying silent and said this kind of jury error is a fundamental fair-trial problem, showing that even a later postconviction motion can succeed when the interest of justice requires it.
People v. Cobbins (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
The Third Department upheld Eugene Cobbins’s conviction, finding that his statements to police were properly admitted because he knowingly waived his Miranda rights and had not yet gained a formal right to counsel before charges were filed. But it reversed the later resentencing on two grand larceny counts because Cobbins was not present and did not clearly waive that right. This decision matters because it confirms that valid pre-charge police questioning can stand, while also reinforcing that a defendant must be present for resentencing.
Matter of Junarian Walker v. Daniel F. Martuscello III, as Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
The Third Department ruled that an incarcerated man who successfully overturned a 120-day segregated-confinement sanction was entitled to recover attorney’s fees from the state. The court found the sanction was imposed without the findings and factual support required by New York’s HALT Act and related laws, and it rejected the argument that the inmate’s misconduct alone made a fee award unfair. This matters because it confirms that when the state defends an unsupported prison sanction, it may have to pay the prevailing party’s legal fees.
Matter of City of Yonkers et al. v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation et al. (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
The Third Department ruled that the DEC must use a deferential standard, not a “fair and reasonable” test, when reviewing New York City Water Board rates for excess water sold to upstate communities. The court said the fair-rate rule applies only to guaranteed entitlement water, not to optional excess-water sales. The decision matters because it gives the Water Board broad room to set excess-water prices as long as they are not arbitrary or discriminatory.
People v. Dickinson (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
The Third Department reversed an order denying Shannon Dickinson’s postconviction motion because the county judge’s law clerk had previously worked for the District Attorney’s office and may have appeared against Dickinson in the same case. The court said that, even without proof of actual bias, failing to disclose that possible conflict and clearly wall off the law clerk created an appearance of unfairness. The case was sent back for reconsideration by a different judge, underscoring how seriously courts treat judicial ethics and public confidence in impartiality.
Matter of Sierra KK. v. Brett LL. (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
The Third Department ruled that a mother’s sobriety was enough to reopen review of custody and visitation terms, but it left in place a rule barring her partner from contact with the child for now. The court found the restriction still served the child’s emotional well-being, while giving the mother a chance to ask again in six months without having to show a new change in circumstances.
Matter of Nicholas Nunez v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
The Third Department held that even though the DMV eventually turned over the requested FOIL records and metadata, the case still mattered because the driver may be entitled to legal fees. The court sent the fee issue back to the lower court to decide whether the DMV had a reasonable basis for withholding the metadata, underscoring that agencies can still face costs when they disclose records only after litigation begins.
Matter of James Shara v. Jason R. Van Fossen (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
The Third Department ruled that a former school bus driver’s retaliation and civil rights claims over his firing after raising safety concerns may continue against the school district and board, but not against the individual officials he sued. The court said New York’s public-employee whistleblower law does not allow claims against individual employees, and the federal civil rights claim did not include enough specific facts showing each person’s personal role in the alleged wrongdoing.
Rohauer v. Guilderland Central School District et al. (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
In a suit over a student being struck by a teacher, the plaintiff asked to add a negligence claim against the school-related defendants after depositions ended but before the case was trial-ready. The Third Department reinstated that request, holding that amendments should usually be allowed at that stage when the new claim has some support in the evidence and the other side cannot show real surprise or unfair prejudice.
Matter of April V. v. Jonathan U. (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
This case involved a Family Court order of protection that was entered after the respondent did not appear in person, even though his lawyer was present, ready to proceed, and asked that he be allowed to appear virtually. The Third Department reversed the denial of the respondent’s motion to undo that order, vacated the order of protection, and sent the case back because removing his lawyer and proceeding without him violated basic due process.
The decision matters because it confirms that courts cannot cut off a party’s right to be heard by excluding counsel of record or refusing a reasonable way to participate without explanation.
Adams v. Bassett Healthcare Network (Appellate Division, Third Department, April 30, 2026)
In a whistleblower retaliation case brought by a hospital employee, The Third Department held that Bassett Healthcare Network had to turn over two internal RL6 incident reports that it claimed were protected from disclosure. The court found that the hospital did not show those specific reports were actually used in a protected quality-review process or reported to a patient safety organization, making clear that hospitals cannot shield incident reports with general confidentiality claims alone.