Lustig v Brown
Categories
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Personal injury and motor vehicle negligence; whether defendants seeking summary judgment established that they were not at fault in causing a multi-vehicle accident.
The Supreme Court, Kings County, granted summary judgment to Lucy M. Mark and Hilbert Tunstall dismissing the complaint against them on the ground that they were not at fault in the happening of the accident.
The Appellate Division reversed the order insofar as appealed from and denied the branch of Mark and Tunstall's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them.
Mark and Tunstall failed to make a prima facie showing that Tunstall was free from fault and that Brown was the sole proximate cause. The uncertified police accident report was inadmissible, and the deposition testimony contained conflicting accounts that raised credibility issues and factual disputes, including issues under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a) [requiring a driver to remain within a single lane as nearly as practicable and not move from that lane until it can be done safely].
Background
The plaintiff alleged that she was injured in May 2017 when the vehicle she was driving was involved in an accident with a vehicle owned and operated by Volvie Brown and another vehicle owned by Lucy M. Mark and operated by Hilbert Tunstall. She claimed that Brown and Tunstall were negligent in operating their vehicles. Mark and Tunstall moved for summary judgment, relying on deposition testimony from the plaintiff, Brown, Tunstall, and a nonparty eyewitness, along with an uncertified police accident report.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Kings County, granted the branch of Mark and Tunstall's motion for summary judgment that sought dismissal of the complaint against them based on their asserted lack of fault in the accident.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division held that the uncertified police accident report should not have been considered because it was not in admissible form and it was unclear who supplied the information in the report to the officer. The court further held that, viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that Tunstall was free from fault or that Brown's conduct was the sole proximate cause. Because the record contained conflicting versions of how the accident occurred and raised credibility issues and factual disputes, summary judgment was improper. The court therefore reversed and denied that branch of the motion without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers.
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that a defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence case must affirmatively prove freedom from fault. It also underscores that uncertified police accident reports, especially where the source of the information is unclear, are inadmissible on summary judgment. Where testimony presents conflicting accounts and supports more than one possible proximate cause, summary judgment must be denied.
In New York motor vehicle cases, defendants cannot win summary judgment merely by pointing to another driver's possible negligence; they must eliminate triable issues as to their own fault with admissible evidence, and conflicting testimony or inadmissible police reports will defeat the motion.