People of the State of New York v. Wesley Cooper (Appellate Division, First Department, July 23, 2026)
The First Department reversed Wesley Cooper’s drug convictions and ordered a new trial because the trial judge refused to let him explain his complaints about his lawyer before denying any request for new counsel. The decision matters because it makes clear that, even if a complaint comes late in the case, a court must at least hear the defendant out before deciding whether the concern is serious.
Denemark v. New Chapter Capital, Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, July 23, 2026)
This case involved a litigation funding deal in a divorce case that was framed as a purchase of future proceeds, but in practice gave the funder strong repayment protections like a lien, escrow, and guaranty. The First Department ruled that the agreement was really a loan, found its 18.96% annual charge exceeded New York’s 16% usury limit, and declared it void and unenforceable. This matters because it shows courts will look past contract labels and closely scrutinize divorce-related funding arrangements.
Jorge A. Najera-Ordonez et al. v. 260 Partners L.P. et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, July 23, 2026)
The First Department ruled that tenants were entitled to judgment on liability for eight apartments that were taken out of rent stabilization after the Roberts decision, finding strong evidence that the landlord knowingly kept deregulating units while receiving J-51 tax benefits. For 23 apartments deregulated before Roberts, the court said a trial is still needed, and the decision matters because it confirms that courts must now look at the full circumstances under the 2024 rent-law amendments when deciding fraud claims.
Louis v. Sood (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
This case asked whether passengers injured in a 2018 crash could add Uber-related companies to their lawsuit after the filing deadline passed, based on later testimony that the driver may have been working for Uber. The Second Department dismissed the claims against the Uber entities, finding the plaintiffs did not show Uber had timely notice of the case or that Uber was left out because of a mistake about the proper parties.
Sheppard v. County of Suffolk (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In a proposed class action challenging Suffolk County traffic and parking fees as an unlawful tax, the Second Department reinstated the plaintiffs’ complaint after the trial court dismissed it as duplicative of another case. The court held that dismissal on that ground was improper because the other action had already been dismissed by the time the motion was decided, confirming that this rule applies only when a truly parallel case is still pending.
Selman v. South Shore University Hospital (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In a lawsuit over injuries allegedly suffered during a patient’s COVID-19 hospitalization, the Second Department allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint to add a gross-negligence claim and ruled that the hospital’s motion to dismiss the original complaint should have been denied as moot. The court said the defendants did not properly oppose the amendment request in the trial court and could not raise new objections for the first time on appeal. This matters because it confirms that courts will usually permit amendments unless the other side shows real prejudice, and that motions aimed at an old complaint generally fall away once an amended one is allowed.
Aduware v. Willie (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In this rear-end crash case, the plaintiff said his stopped vehicle was hit from behind and sought an early ruling that the defendants were liable. The Second Department reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on liability and let the comparative-negligence defense stand, finding evidence that the plaintiff may have been merging into the truck’s lane and may share fault.
Guerrero v. Van Sinderen Plaza Housing Development Fund Corporation (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a slip-and-fall lawsuit by a woman who said she fell on water in a covered walkway at a Brooklyn construction site, finding the owners, related entities, and construction manager were not entitled to summary judgment. The court said there were factual questions about whether construction activity created the wet condition and whether the defendants knew the walkway regularly collected water, which matters because routine awareness of a recurring hazard can keep a premises liability case alive.
Hochhauser v. Urban Office Architecture, PLLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that a broad contract clause in a home renovation and architectural services dispute, which said the owner and architect waived the right to sue each other, was void because it blocked all court and noncourt ways to resolve claims. The court reinstated the plaintiff’s contract, negligence, malpractice, and related claims against the architect and its principal, while leaving other dismissals in place, making clear that New York will not enforce no-suit clauses that completely shut off every forum for dispute resolution.
Michel v. Prospect Park Operating, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
The Second Department dismissed all claims in a wrongful death and personal injury suit against a nursing home arising from care provided before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. It held that the facility was immune under New York’s former EDTPA for care given on or after March 7, 2020, and that the plaintiff’s allegations of gross negligence and reckless conduct were too conclusory; for the earlier period, the facility’s evidence also showed no negligence.
U.S. Bank, National Association v. Zientek (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the lender tried a second time to win summary judgment after an earlier appeal found it had not proven that the required 90-day pre-foreclosure notices were sent. The Second Department vacated the new summary judgment and order of reference, holding that the lender could not fix its earlier proof problem with a repeat motion when the evidence could have been submitted the first time. This matters because it reinforces that parties generally do not get a second chance on summary judgment without genuinely new evidence or a strong reason for the earlier omission.
Maylou v. Mittal (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
The Second Department partly narrowed a wage-and-hour class action brought by medical assistants and other office staff, allowing class claims for alleged unlawful wage deductions, unpaid overtime, and spread-of-hours pay, but only for the period from September 4, 2014 through December 31, 2021. It denied class certification for claims based on missing wage notices and wage statements because those claims seek statutory penalties that cannot be pursued on a class basis under the governing law.
This decision matters because it shows that workers must have evidence supporting the full time period they want certified, and that some New York wage-notice claims are not available as class actions.
Bandele v. Rasier-NY, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In a rear-end crash case involving an Uber-affiliated driver, the Second Department reinstated the plaintiff’s claim that the Uber entities could be held responsible, finding unresolved questions about whether the driver was truly an independent contractor or an employee. The Second Department also ruled for the plaintiff on liability against the driver and vehicle owners because the plaintiff was stopped at a red light when he was hit, and the driver’s unsupported brake-failure claim was not enough to avoid fault.
Matter of Metropolitan Group Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Newkirk (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that MetLife could not permanently stop arbitration of Tiffany Newkirk’s uninsured motorist claim after the other driver’s policy was shown to have been properly canceled from the start under Pennsylvania law because of material misstatements. The court denied MetLife’s request for a permanent stay, rejected adding the other insurer and driver as parties, and sent the request for a temporary stay back to the trial court. This matters because it confirms that when the at-fault driver’s policy is validly rescinded, the injured person may pursue uninsured motorist benefits under her own policy.
Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department held that although Bank of America could renew its motion after a change in the law, it still was not entitled to summary judgment. The court reinstated the borrowers’ challenge because there was a factual dispute over whether the bank’s 90-day pre-foreclosure notice used outdated language and did not strictly comply with RPAPL 1304. This matters because lenders must use the exact notice language in effect when a foreclosure case is filed.
Madison Gold, LLC v. GFE NY, LLC, doing business as Global Fund Experts (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In this commercial finance dispute, Madison Gold claimed that payments owed under a funding agreement were diverted to related companies and individuals. The Second Department let the claims continue against one affiliate on an alter ego theory and against another for unjust enrichment, but dismissed the fiduciary duty, conversion, accounting, and part of the constructive trust claims. This matters because it shows that New York courts may allow well-pleaded allegations of control and diverted funds to proceed, while rejecting extra claims that simply duplicate a contract case.
P.E. Smith Associates, Inc. v. Bandoian; Bandoian v. Smith (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In a dispute over home renovation extra charges and credits, The Second Department ruled that the contractor was not entitled to recover additional payment because the homeowners’ undisputed $146,000 credit was greater than the claimed extras. The Second Department reversed the contractor’s award, reinstated the homeowners’ contract claim, and entered a $40,000 judgment for the homeowners. The decision shows that verbal change orders may still be enforceable, but contractors must properly account for credits and owner-paid costs before claiming more money.
Mrkulic v. Peters (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In this legal malpractice case, the dispute turned on whether the plaintiff could revive a default judgment after the trial court had already vacated it and accepted the defendants’ late answer. The Second Department reversed the plaintiff’s $255,405.86 judgment, denied leave to reargue, and reinstated the earlier order that let the defendants proceed with their defense. The decision matters because it reinforces that a motion to reargue is not a second chance to relitigate issues unless the court truly overlooked key facts or law.
Matter of Feng Xia Wang v. Yong Zhao (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
The Second Department largely upheld a Family Court order finding that a husband committed harassment, menacing, and third-degree assault in a family offense case, and it left the order of protection in place. But it removed the separate finding of attempted third-degree assault because a court cannot impose both a completed assault finding and a lesser attempt finding based on the same conduct.
AB International Investments, LLC v. GFE NY, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, July 22, 2026)
In a dispute over alleged diversion of funds under a business-financing agreement, the Second Department let the plaintiff pursue claims that White Road was GFE’s alter ego and that East Hudson was unjustly enriched. But the Second Department dismissed the fiduciary duty, conversion, accounting, and constructive trust claims against East Hudson because they were either not properly supported or merely repeated the contract claim. This matters because it shows New York courts will overlook minor filing defects, but they will still trim duplicative or weak non-contract claims early in the case.
Carrier Corporation, Elliott Company, and Carrier Corporation, as Indemnitor of The Travelers Indemnity Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, et al., and Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this insurance coverage dispute over asbestos lawsuits, Carrier and related companies sought reimbursement from Fireman's Fund under excess liability policies for defense costs and indemnity payments. The Fourth Department upheld key coverage rulings, including that subclinical asbestos injuries can trigger coverage and that defense costs for dismissed claims can count toward exhausting underlying limits. But it erased about $6.6 million tied to pre-2017 payments because the insureds did not make a definite claim within the policy’s 12-month deadline, showing that missing notice and timing rules can defeat recovery.
The People of the State of New York v. Charles Major (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reversed Charles Major’s second-degree manslaughter conviction from a fatal shootout, finding the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense or that he could have safely retreated. The court left in place his two weapon-possession convictions and upheld the denial of his suppression motions, showing that a homicide conviction can fail when self-defense is not disproved even if related gun charges still stand.
The People of the State of New York v. William Coleman (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reversed most of William Coleman’s convictions in a Niagara Falls murder and robbery case and ordered a new trial. The court said the jury should have received instructions on how to evaluate indirect evidence because no witness identified Coleman, the robbers were masked, and phone records did not place him at the crime scenes. The ruling shows that even if the evidence is legally enough to support a conviction, the case can still be overturned if the jury was not properly instructed.
Tingue v. Spencer, Gomez, et al. (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department mostly upheld a trial court ruling in a dispute over an alleged real estate purchase agreement, finding that the deal could not be enforced because it did not meet the legal writing requirements for property sales. It also left in place the dismissal of the buyer’s claims and the eviction-related relief for the property owner, but it threw out a $50,000 award for property damage and attorney’s fees because those losses were not properly proven.
Dickey v. Prevost (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department increased the share of a $200,000 contingency fee awarded to a discharged personal injury law firm, ruling that Maxwell Murphy should receive two-thirds of the fee, less disbursements already paid, because it handled most of the substantial work over more than three years before successor counsel finalized the settlement. The decision matters because it shows that when clients choose quantum meruit for former counsel, courts may award a significant share of the contingency fee based on the real value of that firm’s contribution, not just hours worked.
People v. Bentley (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department upheld a defendant’s weapon and drug possession convictions after ruling that police lawfully stopped the car because it lacked the required registration sticker on the windshield. The court rejected the defendant’s other appeal arguments, but it shortened the orders of protection because they lasted longer than New York law allows.
Matter of Solar Advocate Development, LLC v. Assessor for Town of East Bloomfield, et al. (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department dismissed a solar developer’s challenge to Ontario County’s denial of a property tax exemption for its solar project. The court held that the County’s long-standing local law opting out of the exemption was still valid even without proof it was filed with NYSERDA, because the statute does not make that filing a condition for the law to take effect. This matters because it confirms that filing errors alone will not undo local opt-out laws unless the Legislature clearly says they should.
Letersky v. Militello Farms, Inc. and Russo Development, Inc. (Appeal No. 2) (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
This case stems from a construction-site injury suit in which the worker claimed Russo Development was liable under New York’s Scaffold Law. The Fourth Department reinstated that claim after the trial court had thrown it out, meaning Russo remains in the case and the worker can continue pursuing that theory of liability.
People v. Asbury (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In People v. Asbury, the Fourth Department reversed a weapon-possession conviction after finding that police did not have enough reliable information to arrest the defendant based on another officer’s report and a civilian identification. The Fourth Department suppressed the gun and the defendant’s statements, vacated his guilty plea, and dismissed the indictment. The decision matters because it makes clear that when police act on secondhand information, prosecutors must still show that the original source was reliable.
Matter of WKP, LLC, Oakridge MFR Holdings, LLC, and RDNW LLC v. Town of Lancaster and Town of Lancaster Town Board (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department ruled in a zoning fight over a Town of Lancaster decision denying a property rezoning from light commercial to multifamily residential and mixed-use. It threw out the owners’ claims seeking to force the Town Board to hold another vote and also found their challenge to the denial as arbitrary and capricious was filed too late. The decision matters because it makes clear that while landowners can challenge a rezoning denial, they cannot use the courts to compel a town board to redo a legislative vote.
Matter of NY Farmington I, LLC, NY Farmington II, LLC, and NY Farmington III, LLC v. Assessor for Town of Farmington, Board of Assessment Review for Town of Farmington, and Town of Farmington (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department held that the Town of Farmington’s 2016 opt-out from New York’s solar property tax exemption remained valid even though the town did not file the law with NYSERDA until 2021. It reversed the lower court as to the town tax exemption, ruling that late NYSERDA filing does not undo an opt-out unless the statute clearly makes that filing a requirement, which matters because it strengthens municipalities’ ability to deny RPTL 487 tax breaks for solar projects.
People of the State of New York v. Windsor Coleman (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department upheld most of Windsor Coleman’s convictions for assaulting two correction officers, but reduced one assault count to obstructing governmental administration because the evidence did not show that officer suffered a legally recognized physical injury. The court left the other assault conviction in place and rejected Coleman’s challenges to the prosecution’s discovery compliance, standby counsel, and second felony offender status, showing that assault charges still require real proof of injury even when other procedural arguments fail.
People v. Valion (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In People v. Valion, the Fourth Department left the defendant’s guilty-plea convictions in place but vacated his sentence and sent the case back for resentencing. The court said the trial judge failed to state the sentence for each count in open court, as New York law requires, and a written disposition could not fix that error.
People v. Evans (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department threw out one predatory sexual assault against a child conviction in People v. Evans because prosecutors did not prove the alleged course of conduct lasted at least three months, as the statute requires. It otherwise upheld the remaining convictions and resentencing, rejecting the defendant’s speedy-trial and evidentiary arguments. This matters because it shows courts will strictly enforce the time-period element of child sex offense charges, even when the rest of the case stands.
The People of the State of New York v. Andee Wright (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reversed a second-degree murder conviction and ordered a new trial in a case involving the death of a newborn, holding that hospital staff should not have testified at trial about the defendant’s treatment-related statements and medical observations. The court said those communications were protected by New York’s physician-patient privilege, and while emergency disclosure to police may be allowed in a crisis, that does not make the same information admissible years later at trial.
People v. Goree (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In People v. Goree, the Fourth Department largely upheld a defendant’s convictions for predatory sexual assault and first-degree sexual abuse, rejecting challenges to the evidence, jury instructions, and most claims about trial counsel. But the Fourth Department dismissed the separate first-degree rape count because it merged into the predatory sexual assault conviction, reinforcing that a defendant cannot be convicted of both for the same conduct.
The People of the State of New York v. Chezere Purrier (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this criminal case, the Fourth Department ruled that police unlawfully turned a routine traffic stop into a handcuffed detention without enough justification. The Fourth Department threw out the gun and the defendant’s statements, vacated his guilty plea, and dismissed the indictment because an unmarked pill bottle alone did not justify that level of restraint. This matters because it reinforces that officers need specific facts to escalate a traffic stop and must clearly prove the basis for relying on information from another officer.
In the Matter of Michael Simmons and Marcia Simmons Crim, as Co-Trustees of the Eugene and Pearl Simmons Irrevocable Income Only Trust also known as "The Trust"; Mark Simmons, Co-Trustee (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
This case involved a family trust dispute in which two co-trustees sought to remove a third, Mark Simmons, for alleged misconduct. The Fourth Department vacated the order removing him and sent the case back, holding that the court could not remove a trustee without a hearing when the facts were disputed. The decision matters because it confirms that a trustee cannot be removed based on contested accusations alone.
Matter of Adriane M. Hectus Towle v. William J. Seth; Matter of William J. Seth v. Adriane M. Hectus Towle (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
This family law appeal involved a mother's request to relocate with the children and gain primary physical custody, along with claims that the father violated custody and protection orders and committed a family offense. The Fourth Department vacated the relocation and custody ruling because Family Court did not make the required findings about the children’s best interests, dismissed one violation petition for lack of proof, and reversed the family offense finding, while leaving other violation findings in place. The decision matters because it underscores that courts must explain why a relocation or custody change serves the children’s interests and that allegations alone are not enough to prove violations or a family offense.
George Bushley v. New York State Thruway Authority (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reinstated a driver’s claim against the New York State Thruway Authority after a state snowplow struck his stopped car while making an illegal right turn on red from the left lane. The court ruled the snowplow was not actively doing highway work at the time, so the usual negligence rules applied rather than the tougher reckless-disregard standard. This matters because it clarifies that on-duty snowplows do not get special liability protection when they are simply traveling between work areas on roads they are not assigned to service.
The People of the State of New York v. Neyshaliz M. V. (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reversed a 17-year-old defendant’s youthful offender adjudication, vacated her guilty plea, and sent the case back after ruling that her gun-possession case should not have been kept out of Family Court under New York’s Raise the Age law. The court said that simply showing a handgun to another person did not, by itself, prove she displayed it in a way that furthered the possession charges. This matters because it reinforces that adolescent cases are generally meant for Family Court unless prosecutors can show more than mere possession and display.
The People of the State of New York v. Neyshaliz M. V. (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department ruled that a 17-year-old charged with weapon possession should not have been kept out of Family Court based only on evidence that she showed the gun to her ex-boyfriend. It reversed the youthful offender adjudication, threw out her guilty plea, and sent the case back, holding that prosecutors must prove the display actually advanced the possession offense, not just revealed the gun.
Robert Bieber v. Town of Hamburg (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
This case arose from a heated personal and political dispute in which a Town of Hamburg employee called Robert Bieber a pedophile during an argument. The Fourth Department dismissed Bieber’s defamation claim, finding the remarks were angry insults and rhetorical hyperbole, not statements of fact, which matters because it reinforces that context can make even harsh accusations nonactionable under New York defamation law.
Ralph A. Torrillo, Sr., individually and as executor of the Estate of Josephine A. Torrillo, deceased v. Richard C. Cherny, M.D., Hematology-Oncology Associates of Central New York, P.C., and Santo M. DiFino, M.D. (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this medical malpractice and wrongful death case, the Fourth Department ruled that Hematology-Oncology Associates of Central New York cannot be held liable for Dr. DiFino’s alleged malpractice. The rest of the lower court’s order remained in place, so the other claims may continue. The decision matters because it narrows when a medical practice can be held responsible for a physician’s alleged negligence.
Whelan v. Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In Whelan v. Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority, a police lieutenant sued after slipping on ice on stairs at a public housing property, claiming the authority failed to keep the area safe. The Fourth Department dismissed the complaint, finding no proof that the housing authority knew or should have known about the specific icy condition before the fall. The decision matters because it confirms that police officers suing under General Municipal Law § 205-e must still prove ordinary negligence, including notice of the hazard, and freezing weather alone is not enough.
Lavine v. LaFayette Central School District and Board of Education of the LaFayette Central School District (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In a dispute over retiree health benefits, the Fourth Department held that a former school superintendent was not entitled to reimbursement for Medicare Part B premiums because her contract covered only health, dental, and vision plans offered through the school district. The Fourth Department reinstated the declaratory judgment claim only so the court could formally declare that the district has no duty to pay those Medicare premiums, underscoring that clear contract language controls and courts must state the parties’ rights in declaratory judgment cases.
Koff v. Lawson (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reinstated a pedestrian injury case after a trial court had thrown it out in favor of the driver. The court said the driver did not prove she was free from fault, because the evidence left factual questions about whether she could have seen the intoxicated pedestrian crossing outside a crosswalk in time to avoid the crash. This matters because a driver cannot win early just by pointing to the pedestrian’s risky conduct if the facts still suggest the collision may have been avoidable.
The People of the State of New York v. Raheim Stephens (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department ruled that prosecutors did not show they had properly turned over key evidence, including witness statements, a 911 call, and a booking video, before claiming they were ready for trial in Raheim Stephens’s criminal case. It sent the case back to the trial court to recalculate speedy-trial time using that improper filing against the prosecution, which could affect whether the indictment must be dismissed. This matters because it reinforces that prosecutors must make real, documented efforts to provide required discovery before they can validly declare trial readiness.
LG 55 Doe v. Joseph A. Grasso (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this Child Victims Act case, a jury awarded the plaintiff damages after finding that a former school principal and priest had sexually abused him. The Fourth Department left most of the verdict in place, including punitive damages, but threw out the awards for past and future medical expenses because the proof supported only $37,776 in past costs and did not show future costs with enough certainty.
The decision matters because it shows that even in cases with substantial verdicts, medical expense damages must be backed by solid evidence and cannot rest on speculation.
People v. Williams (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department largely upheld Robert Williams’s convictions for animal cruelty and property damage, but reduced one aggravated animal cruelty count because the prosecution did not prove the dog suffered the kind of serious, long-lasting injury required for that higher charge. The court also rejected Williams’s speedy trial argument, holding that prosecutors satisfied their discovery duties by disclosing the materials and making them available on request.
Matter of Adriane M. Hectus Towle v. William J. Seth (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this family offense case, Family Court found that the respondent committed a family offense and issued an order of protection. The Fourth Department reversed that ruling and dismissed the petition, relying on the same reasoning used in a related companion appeal. The decision matters because it shows that an order of protection can be thrown out on appeal if the legal basis for the family offense finding is not strong enough.
Kevin Letersky v. Militello Farms, Inc. and Russo Development, Inc. (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this construction-site injury case, a worker said he slipped on mud and fell into an open excavation while marking fuel lines during an overnight emergency water-line repair. The Fourth Department let most claims against the contractor, Russo Development, move forward, including claims based on the uncovered hole, but dismissed the mud-based safety claim and kept the property owner, Militello Farms, out of the case. The decision matters because it draws a clear line between ordinary muddy worksite conditions and an unguarded excavation, which can still lead to liability.
The Buffalo City Cemetery v. Netherlands Insurance Company (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
This case asked whether an insurer had to defend and potentially cover a cemetery after families sued over the disinterment and reburial of remains without notice. The Fourth Department let the cemetery’s main coverage claims go forward because the policy language could reasonably be read to cover emotional-distress allegations, but it dismissed the cemetery’s claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.
The decision matters because it confirms that an insurer’s coverage denial creates a real dispute for the courts to decide, even if the insurer is still offering a temporary “courtesy” defense.
The People of the State of New York v. Emmanuel Jenkins (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this criminal appeal, the Fourth Department ruled that the evidence did not support Emmanuel Jenkins’s convictions for attempted first-degree rape and first-degree robbery arising from an attack on a civilian employee in a correctional facility kitchen. The Fourth Department dismissed those two counts but left intact the convictions for second-degree assault and weapon possession. The decision matters because it emphasizes that prosecutors must prove the specific intent for attempted rape and for robbery, and a brief taking of property to stop its use is not enough by itself.
People v. McGuire (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In People v. McGuire, the Fourth Department ruled that police could not rely only on a patrol-car DMV database entry to justify a traffic stop after the defense specifically questioned whether that information was reliable. The Fourth Department suppressed the gun, drugs, and other evidence found after the stop and dismissed the indictment, signaling that prosecutors may need to prove the underlying suspension or the database’s accuracy when that kind of challenge is raised.
Fegley v. The Raymond Corporation and Abel Womack, Inc. (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this warehouse equipment injury case, the plaintiffs claimed an electric reach truck was defectively designed because it lacked a rear guard or door and had a faulty steering system. The Fourth Department reinstated the claims based on the missing rear guard or door, finding the defendants did not prove the buyer knew that safety feature was available and chose not to purchase it, and it left the steering defect claims in place because that argument was raised too late.
Vince's Pizza Plus, Inc. v. Dion DeFedericis (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In a dispute growing out of a former pizzeria manager’s wage lawsuit, Vince’s Pizza later sued him for allegedly taking company money and breaching duties to the business. The Fourth Department reinstated the employer’s case, holding that New York does not require those claims to be brought as counterclaims in the earlier wage action and that the new lawsuit was still timely under the state’s savings statute.
The People of the State of New York v. Russell W. Malcomb (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this criminal case, the Fourth Department held that the trial court could increase Russell Malcomb’s sentence after he willfully failed to appear for sentencing and violated a condition of his plea deal. But the Fourth Department also found the longer prison term was too harsh and reduced it to a determinate three-year sentence.
Matter of WKP, LLC, Oakridge Mfr Holdings, LLC, and RDNW LLC v. Town of Lancaster, Town of Lancaster Town Board (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
This case involved a dispute over how the Town of Lancaster handled a rezoning application, including a trial court order requiring the Town Board to hold a new vote. The Fourth Department reversed that order and threw out the revote requirement, relying on the same reasoning it used in a related companion case.
In the Matter of Ty' Shawn B., Formerly Known as Marcellous (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
This case asked whether Erie County could prove a mother derivatively neglected her newborn based only on an earlier neglect finding involving her older children. The Fourth Department reversed summary judgment for the county, holding that the earlier order was too vague because it did not explain the underlying conduct or show that any ongoing risk still existed.
The decision matters because it makes clear that a prior neglect ruling alone is not enough; agencies must provide specific facts showing why the later-born child is also at risk.
People v. Ocasio (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In People v. Ocasio, the Fourth Department sent the case back after finding that the trial court let the defendant represent himself during a suppression dispute over wiretap evidence without making sure he truly understood the risks of giving up a lawyer. The decision matters because it reinforces that courts must conduct a careful on-the-record inquiry before allowing self-representation, or later rulings may not stand.
The People of the State of New York v. Darius Kadenhead (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reversed a lower court order that had suppressed a handgun found when police arrested Darius Kadenhead in the hallway of his apartment building during a homicide investigation. The court said the encounter was an arrest from the start, but it was lawful because police had enough evidence to establish probable cause and a shared hallway is not treated as part of the home, so the gun can be used in the case.
The People of the State of New York v. Darius Kadenhead (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reversed a trial court order suppressing a handgun in a homicide case, finding police had probable cause to arrest Darius Kadenhead based on surveillance footage and other evidence linking him to the victim. The court also held that arresting him in the common hallway outside his apartment was not the same as arresting him inside his home, reinforcing that hallway arrests in multi-unit buildings generally do not violate the rule against warrantless home arrests.
Newton v. Vancheri (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department partly dismissed claims in a personal injury case arising from a crash caused by a stolen car. It threw out the owner-liability claim because the complaint itself said the car was stolen, but it allowed the claim based on leaving the car unattended to continue because the two-day gap between the theft and the crash did not, by itself, end the causation issue. This matters because in New York, alleging a vehicle was stolen can defeat a consent-based claim, while negligent security or unattended-vehicle claims may still survive.
Viola v. SUNY Upstate University Hospital, Upstate Community Hospital, and State of New York (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department allowed a psychiatric inpatient to file a late negligence claim against SUNY Upstate and the State after she alleged hospital staff and security officers injured her elbow while restraining her. The court said she did not have to fully prove her case at this stage, only show it may be valid, and it found that the State already had notice of the incident, had time to investigate, and was not harmed by the short delay.
The People of the State of New York v. Ryan Stencel (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reinstated a criminally negligent homicide indictment against Ryan Stencel after a lower court had thrown it out over marijuana-related blood-test evidence presented to the grand jury. The court said that even if the evidence was later ruled irrelevant for trial, that alone did not make the grand jury process defective, which matters because dismissal is reserved for cases involving serious prosecutorial misconduct.
Brennan v. Kandon, LLC and Col-Jac, LLC (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In this restaurant slip-and-fall case, the Fourth Department reinstated the plaintiff’s negligent maintenance claim but left intact the dismissal of her failure-to-warn claim. The court held that the defendants did not show they had not created the wet floor themselves, which matters because property owners can still face trial if there is evidence their own cleaning may have caused the hazard.
Matter of James Allard, Steuben County Sheriff v. County of Steuben et al. (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department ruled that Steuben County validly repealed a local law requiring the county to defend and indemnify its sheriff, reversing a lower court decision that had struck the repeal down. The court said the repeal was a legislative act, so claims that lawmakers acted out of bad faith were not enough to invalidate it. This matters because it confirms that courts give broad deference to local laws unless there is a clear constitutional or procedural problem.
Matter of Hauck v. Heineman and Klenk (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department ruled that a landlord who had already ended a month-to-month tenancy could not evict the tenants through a nonpayment case. It vacated the eviction order and $14,300 judgment and dismissed the petition without prejudice, holding that the landlord needed to bring a holdover case instead. This matters because it underscores that New York landlords must use the correct type of eviction proceeding and clearly plead the right facts.
The People of the State of New York v. Louie Harris [Louis Harris-Hornsby] (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
This case asked whether felony charges had to be thrown out because the prosecution’s discovery problems supposedly made its speedy-trial filing invalid. The Fourth Department reinstated the dismissed counts, finding that even if those filings were defective, fewer than 181 days of delay counted against the prosecution, so the speedy-trial deadline was not violated.
Matter of Kerry K. v. State of New York (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reversed an order releasing a man from civil confinement after an annual review under New York’s sex offender management law. It held that the trial court looked too narrowly at antisocial personality disorder and failed to properly address expert evidence of paraphilic disorder and psychopathic traits, so it sent the case back for a new hearing. The decision matters because it makes clear that courts must consider the full diagnostic picture, and that antisocial personality disorder alone is not enough but may support continued confinement when combined with psychopathy evidence.
People v. Hurst (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department largely upheld James Hurst’s first-degree burglary convictions, but it threw out his second-degree assault conviction, ordered a new trial on that count, and reduced his burglary sentences from 20 years to 15 years. The court said prosecutors should not have been allowed to use the victim’s identification at trial because they failed to give the required notice and the victim’s brief prior contact with Hurst was not enough to make the identification automatically reliable.
The People of the State of New York v. Wesley Cooper (Appellate Division, First Department, July 23, 2026)
The First Department reversed Wesley Cooper’s drug convictions and ordered a new trial because the trial judge refused to let him explain his complaints about his lawyer before denying any request for new counsel. The court said that even when a request comes at the last minute, a judge must give the defendant a fair chance to explain serious concerns about assigned counsel. This matters because it reinforces that courts cannot simply cut off substitute-counsel requests without at least making a basic inquiry.
Matter of Sunoco, Inc. (R&M) Combined Affiliates, Now Known as Sunoco (R&M), LLC, et al. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of the State of New York et al. (Appellate Division, Third Department, July 23, 2026)
The case involved Sunoco’s effort to obtain a New York tax refund by treating certain crude oil “buy/sell” deals as sales that counted in its tax allocation formula. The Third Department upheld the Tax Appeals Tribunal’s decision that these deals were really reciprocal inventory exchanges, not true sales receipts, so Sunoco was not entitled to the refund. The ruling matters because it confirms that New York can look past contract labels and exclude transaction amounts that do not reflect a company’s real in-state business activity.
The People of the State of New York v. Steven C. Forshey (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department upheld Steven Forshey’s conviction for attempted burglary after his guilty plea, finding that his waiver of the right to appeal was valid and that most of his arguments were not properly preserved for review. The court also declined to disturb the indictment based on claims that he appeared before the grand jury in prison clothing and restraints because no timely objection was made. This decision underscores how a guilty plea and appeal waiver can sharply limit what issues can be raised later on appeal.
The People of the State of New York v. Dajahnya Little (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department upheld the conviction and sentence of a 16-year-old defendant who pleaded guilty to attempted first-degree gang assault for taking part in a brutal attack on a 14-year-old victim. The court ruled that her waiver of the right to appeal was knowing and voluntary, so it would not review the denial of youthful offender treatment, the length of her sentence, or the required fees and surcharges.
The People of the State of New York v. Sean S. (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department upheld the denial of Sean S.’s request for resentencing under New York’s Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act, finding that although he showed evidence of abuse and a troubled childhood, he did not prove that the abuse significantly contributed to the robbery and killing. The decision matters because it makes clear that abuse alone is not enough for DVSJA relief; defendants must present evidence directly linking that abuse to the crime.
Emily A. Kessler v. Spencer Martin Carr, Kristen H. Martin, Hayley Jean Kessler, and Christopher W. Kessler (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department affirmed the denial of the plaintiff’s request for summary judgment in a car-accident injury case involving New York’s no-fault “serious injury” threshold. The court held that the plaintiff’s own medical evidence created factual disputes about whether her neck condition was caused by the crash, was objectively measurable, or instead stemmed from temporary strain or preexisting degeneration. This matters because it shows that a plaintiff cannot win summary judgment when her own proof includes competing medical opinions.
Murphy v. City Mini Storage LLC (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In Murphy v. City Mini Storage LLC, the Fourth Department affirmed dismissal of a slip-and-fall case, finding that the property owner had no immediate duty to clear the sidewalk because light snow was still falling when the plaintiff fell. The court relied on video and other evidence of ongoing snowfall, and the decision shows that even light winter weather can protect property owners from liability unless there is proof the storm had ended or the hazard existed before it.
The People of the State of New York v. Riley F. Milton (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department affirmed a conviction after ruling that police could ask a detained man for his name and date of birth without first giving Miranda warnings. The court said those were routine identification questions, not an improper attempt to gather evidence, and the decision matters because it confirms that basic booking-type questions can still be used in New York even if the answers later help support criminal charges.
People of the State of New York v. Richard McGuire (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department reversed Richard McGuire’s drug and weapon convictions after finding that police unlawfully stopped his car based only on DMV database information showing his license was suspended. Because McGuire specifically challenged the accuracy of that information and prosecutors offered no records or other proof to back it up, the court suppressed the evidence from the stop and dismissed the indictment. This decision matters because it makes clear that, when DMV data is questioned, an officer’s testimony alone may not be enough to justify a traffic stop.
Vince's Pizza Plus, Inc. v. DeFedericis (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
In a dispute that began with a former pizzeria manager’s unpaid-wages case, the employer later brought separate claims accusing him of taking company funds and breaching his duties. The Fourth Department reinstated the employer’s lawsuit, holding that those claims were not barred by the earlier default wage judgment and were timely refiled under New York’s six-month saving statute.
The decision matters because it confirms that, in New York, related claims do not have to be brought as counterclaims in the first case if a later lawsuit would not undermine the earlier judgment.
Fleischman v. State of New York (Appellate Division, Fourth Department, July 24, 2026)
The Fourth Department upheld the denial of a request to file a late medical malpractice claim against the State based on treatment at SUNY Upstate Medical University Hospital before the patient’s death. The court said the proposed claim was too vague and that the medical records, without expert support, did not show a likely malpractice claim. This matters because it emphasizes that late claims against the State must be detailed and supported enough to show they have real merit.