Delgado v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, September 17, 2026)
In a suit alleging repeated sexual assaults in New York and Nevada, the First Department let most of the plaintiff’s claims against Jason Miller move forward, including her New York assault, battery, gender-violence, and emotional distress claims. The First Department dismissed only the part of the emotional distress claim tied to alleged conduct in Nevada as untimely, underscoring that each alleged assault is treated as a separate event and that out-of-state claims may still be barred even when New York claims survive.
In the Matter of an Application for a Search Warrant to Search the Premises Located at the Art Institute of Chicago; In the Matter of The Art Institute of Chicago v. The Honorable Althea E.M. Drysdale et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, September 17, 2026)
The First Department vacated orders requiring the Art Institute of Chicago to surrender an Egon Schiele painting that heirs of Fritz Grünbaum claim was looted by the Nazis. The court held that New York’s criminal turnover statute cannot be used to decide a seriously disputed ownership fight over artwork; instead, that issue must be resolved in a civil case with full procedural protections.
In the Matter of Broadway PT 1710 LLC v. Kingdom Associates Inc. (Appellate Division, First Department, September 17, 2026)
This case involved a property owner’s attempt to quickly cancel a contractor’s $1.075 million mechanic’s lien on a Manhattan property. The First Department reversed, reinstated the lien, and dismissed the owner’s separate proceeding because the claimed problems were not defects visible on the face of the lien and the same issues were already being litigated in the pending foreclosure case.
The decision underscores that summary discharge is a narrow remedy and cannot be used to decide factual disputes about a lien’s validity.
Aurora Beauchamp et al. v. New York City Transit Authority et al. (Appellate Division, First Department, September 17, 2026)
The First Department cut parts of a massive damages award in a pedestrian-bus injury case where the Transit Authority had already admitted fault. It reduced the future medical expenses to the amount actually supported by expert proof and ordered a new trial on pain-and-suffering and loss-of-services damages unless the plaintiffs accept lower amounts. This matters because it shows that even in catastrophic injury cases, New York courts will rein in jury awards that go beyond the evidence or comparable cases.
Alam v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In Alam v. Uber Technologies, the Second Department reinstated a motor vehicle injury case after the trial court dismissed it under New York’s no-fault serious-injury rule. The court found factual disputes over the plaintiff’s neck, back, shoulder, and knee injuries, and said the defendant had not shown those injuries were unrelated to the accident. The decision matters because a defendant seeking early dismissal must address both the seriousness of the injuries and whether the crash caused them.
In the Matter of Newsday, LLC v. County of Nassau (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
Newsday sought Nassau County cybersecurity contracts and the County Executive’s past public calendars under New York’s freedom of information law, but the County refused, citing cybersecurity and safety concerns. The Second Department reversed in part and sent the case back for a private court review of the records, finding the County’s explanations too general to justify withholding everything and leaving open the possibility of releasing nonexempt portions with redactions.
Joseph Onorato, M.D., P.C. v. Bruck (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In Joseph Onorato, M.D., P.C. v. Bruck, the Second Department held that physicians—not their medical practice—were entitled to keep cash proceeds from an insurer’s conversion from a mutual company to a stock company, even though the practice had paid the insurance premiums. The court reversed the lower court’s ruling for the employer because the physicians were the policyholders and there was no agreement giving those proceeds to the practice. This matters because it confirms that paying premiums alone does not give an employer rights to demutualization proceeds.
Cole v. Shorter (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this car-accident injury case, the Second Department reinstated the plaintiff’s lawsuit after finding that the defendant was properly served and that dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was not justified. The court said the process server’s affidavit was enough to show valid service, and the defendant’s unsupported claim that she did not live at the service address was too weak to overcome it.
NYCTL 2011-A Trust v. 249 Brighton Corp. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that surplus money from a tax lien foreclosure sale could not be claimed by city agencies based on judgments tied to other properties. It also held that the contract buyer, Brighton Plaza, LLC, was entitled to only its $100,000 down payment, not the full $247,478.70 previously awarded, and sent the case back for a new hearing on the rest of the funds. This matters because it confirms that only interests attached to the foreclosed property can reach surplus proceeds, and a contract buyer’s claim is generally limited to its deposit.
Matter of McCracken v. Whinnery (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
This case involved a retired FDNY EMS supervisor who sought World Trade Center disability retirement benefits after claiming injuries from his 9/11-related service. The Second Department agreed that NYCERS wrongly denied the application because its Medical Board did not adequately explain how he could still perform the real physical demands of his job, but it ruled that benefits could not be awarded yet and sent the matter back for a new review. The decision matters because it shows that retirement denials must be clearly tied to actual job duties, and courts will not award benefits outright unless the record clearly proves disability.
Pryce v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department ruled for the property owner in a dispute over whether an old mortgage could still be foreclosed. It held that the lender accelerated the debt when it filed a 2009 foreclosure case, the six-year deadline expired in 2015, and the lender’s later voluntary dismissal of that case could not restart the clock under FAPA, so the mortgage may be cancelled and discharged.
Macri v. Fluor Enterprises, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In a slip-and-fall case involving a newly coated loading dock, the Second Department reinstated claims against Certa Pro, IBM, and Fluor Enterprises, finding that expert evidence raised factual questions about whether the floor was improperly finished and whether the defendants created a dangerous transition between two areas that looked the same but had different slip resistance. The dismissal of the claims against Fluor Corporation remained in place.
The decision matters because it shows that property owners, operators, and contractors may still face trial when expert proof suggests their installation choices or workmanship may have created a hidden slipping hazard.
Clara Luz Vargas Batista v. Allerton Ave Estates, LLC, et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
This case involved a woman who slipped on an icy sidewalk outside the defendants’ property during a snowstorm and claimed they failed to keep the area safe. The Second Department reinstated the case, finding that although a storm was in progress, the defendants did not show that the ice could not have been left from an earlier storm or that they lacked notice of that condition.
Pires v. Daniella Levi & Associates, P.C. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this legal malpractice case, a worker claimed two law firms mishandled his potential injury claim against New York City after a construction accident by failing to preserve it. The Second Department dismissed the claims against both firms, finding one firm was hired only for workers’ compensation work and that the complaint did not clearly show the other firm’s advice caused the loss of a viable case against the City.
The decision matters because it underscores that malpractice claims need clear proof of the attorney’s role and specific facts showing the client would have won the underlying case.
Ford v. Montclair Care Center, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department dismissed a wrongful death and negligence case against a nursing home arising from a resident’s alleged contraction of COVID-19 and death in the early months of the pandemic. The court held that the facility was protected by New York’s former pandemic immunity law because it showed it was providing care in good faith under emergency COVID-19 rules, and the plaintiff did not adequately allege gross negligence or other misconduct that would defeat that immunity.
Greene v. Five Towns Premier Rehabilitation & Nursing Center (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this nursing home wrongful death case, the plaintiff sued before receiving authority to act for the decedent’s estate, so dismissal for lack of legal capacity was proper. The Second Department held, however, that the case had to be dismissed without prejudice, not with prejudice, because this type of dismissal is not a decision on the merits and New York’s six-month savings rule may still allow the claim to be refiled.
Alvarez v. 100-10 67th Road Condominium (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In a slip-and-fall case, the Second Department ruled that the defendants could be sanctioned for failing to preserve surveillance footage after receiving notice to keep it. But it found that barring them from presenting any liability defense was too harsh and replaced that penalty with an instruction allowing the jury to draw a negative inference from the missing video. This decision highlights that New York courts will impose sanctions for lost evidence, but the penalty must be proportionate to the conduct involved.
U.S. Bank National Association v. Kotei (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that U.S. Bank could move forward with a foreclosure sale after finding that its 2017 notice of pendency was valid, even though an earlier notice had expired. The decision matters because it confirms that, in New York foreclosure cases, a lender may file a new notice before judgment so long as it gives enough information to warn buyers and others about the title risk.
Estate of Vivien Boninti v. South Shore Rehabilitation, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated an estate’s claims against a nursing home alleging that a resident contracted COVID-19 at the facility and later died. The court held that, although New York’s former COVID-19 liability shield for health care providers can still apply to conduct from that period, the nursing home was not entitled to dismissal at the outset because it did not provide enough evidence about the resident’s treatment to prove immunity.
Sosa v. Gonzaga (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
This case involved a property ownership dispute in which the plaintiff claimed he was the true owner and sought an injunction and to restore the case to the active calendar. The Second Department reversed the lower court and denied that request because the plaintiff did not follow the exact service instructions in the order to show cause. The decision is a reminder that in New York, failing to strictly comply with court-ordered service rules can defeat a motion, no matter the merits.
Jones v. New York City Housing Authority (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a tenant’s personal injury suit against NYCHA, which claimed she could not sue because she did not appear for a required pre-suit examination after allegedly slipping on soapy water in her apartment. The court held that once Jones’s lawyer said the exam could not go forward, NYCHA had to promptly reschedule it, and because it did not, it could not use her nonappearance to get the case dismissed.
Khodjaeva v. City of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In a personal injury case arising from a four-car chain-reaction crash on the Long Island Expressway, the Second Department held that the City of New York and its driver were liable after a City fire truck rear-ended a stopped vehicle and pushed it into other cars. The court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on liability and dismissed the defenses and counterclaim against the driver of the struck vehicle, reinforcing that in rear-end chain collisions, the rear driver must offer a real non-negligent explanation and “could not stop in time” is not enough.
Hassane v. Elbakry (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a passenger’s personal injury suit arising from a car crash into a tree, finding that the driver did not fully disprove the claimed injuries or show that New York’s serious-injury threshold was not met. It also denied the passenger’s request for judgment on liability because factual questions remained about alleged brake failure and whether the driver was confronted with an emergency. The decision highlights that both sides must directly address all injury claims and key defenses to win summary judgment.
Matter of Kelly C. (Anonymous) v. Chaya E. (Anonymous); R. E. (Anonymous) (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department held that a former partner who was neither a biological nor adoptive parent had standing to seek parental access to both children because the evidence showed the couple had agreed before conception to have and raise them together. It upheld standing as to one child, reinstated standing as to the second, and sent the case back for a best-interests hearing. The decision matters because it reinforces that standing comes first, and courts need real record support before finding that a shared parenting agreement ended.
Barnard v. Barnard (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this divorce dispute, the Second Department ruled that the husband was entitled to half of the wife’s checking and savings accounts because she did not prove the money was her separate property. The Second Department also sent the retroactive child support award back for recalculation so the husband could receive credit for mortgage payments he made, while leaving the maintenance and counsel fee awards in place.
The decision matters because it reinforces that bank accounts built up during a marriage are usually treated as marital property, and that retroactive child support must account for proven support-related payments made during the case.
Steuber v. LeBlanc (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this motor vehicle injury case, the Second Department reversed the trial court’s dismissal, denied both defense summary judgment motions, and reinstated the plaintiff’s claims. The court held that the defendants’ medical proof was not enough because it did not properly measure the claimed limitations, address all alleged injuries, or clearly show that the plaintiff’s condition was unrelated to the crash, underscoring the detailed evidence needed to defeat no-fault injury claims.
Matter of Hansen v. Suffolk County Board of Elections (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 14, 2026)
The Second Department dismissed Susan Hansen’s challenge to the Suffolk County Board of Elections’ invalidation of her petition for a Republican committee seat, ruling that she filed too late. The court said that even if formal notice was delayed, Hansen had actual notice of the invalidation by April 27, 2025 and waited until after the June primary to sue. This decision underscores that election-law deadlines are strictly enforced, and candidates must act quickly once they learn their petition has been rejected.
Torres v. Frank and Sal, LLC (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In Torres v. Frank and Sal, LLC, the Second Department dismissed the negligence claim against a grocery store after a man allegedly used a knife given to him by a store employee to stab the plaintiff outside the market. The court held the store did not owe the plaintiff a legal duty because it had no control over the man after he left and no special relationship with the plaintiff. This decision matters because it confirms that businesses are generally not liable for third-party attacks that happen off-site without a clear duty to protect the victim.
Kimberly Houghton, et al. v. John Piperaro, et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this personal injury case over alleged poor maintenance of leased property, the trial court barred the plaintiffs from using certain evidence after the defendants claimed they failed to turn over discovery. The Second Department reversed that ruling, finding there was no clear proof that the plaintiffs’ noncompliance was willful. The decision matters because it confirms that courts should not impose severe discovery penalties without strong evidence of deliberate misconduct.
Matter of Hillside Place, LLC v. Housing and Community Renewal of the State of New York (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
This case involved whether a landlord could add a $45 monthly rent increase to a rent-stabilized renewal lease when the lease instead used a 3% increase and never mentioned the $45 option. The Second Department reinstated DHCR’s decision removing the extra charge, holding that the landlord had not preserved the right to collect it and that an earlier order merely allowing an amended claim did not decide the issue.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Curtis (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department reversed a foreclosure judgment for Wells Fargo, finding the bank did not prove that its required 90-day pre-foreclosure notice listed at least five housing counseling agencies serving the borrower’s area, as New York law then required. The court denied Wells Fargo summary judgment and related foreclosure relief, while stopping short of dismissing the case, underscoring that lenders must strictly follow RPAPL 1304 before they can foreclose.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Hilario (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the Second Department reinstated the complaint but otherwise upheld the lower court’s refusal to grant the lender summary judgment, because the lender did not adequately prove it had the right to sue after the original HELOC agreement was lost. The decision matters because it shows lenders need detailed proof of ownership, possession, and how a lost loan document went missing, while courts generally cannot dismiss a case on their own for lack of standing without unusual circumstances.
Civetta Mechanical, LLC v. AWL Industries, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department ruled that a subcontractor’s lawsuit over a public construction project can move forward on its contract and good-faith claims, where it alleged the general contractor accepted its bid and worked with it after the bid was submitted before replacing it with another subcontractor. But the Second Department dismissed the subcontractor’s unjust enrichment, third-party beneficiary, and General Municipal Law claims, underscoring that contractors need specific facts to support noncontract claims and cannot sue under a taxpayer-protection bidding statute.
Nunez v. Trustees of Columbia University (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In Nunez v. Trustees of Columbia University, the Second Department held that an injured worker was entitled to summary judgment on liability after he fell while plastering a ceiling when his ladder moved for no apparent reason. The court ruled that this was enough to show a violation of New York’s ladder-safety law, and the decision matters because it confirms that property owners need real evidence to dispute these claims.
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v. Dresdner (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department dismissed a mortgage foreclosure case against the borrowers after finding the lender waited more than six years to seek a default judgment and did not adequately explain the delay. The court also said the borrowers did not give up their right to seek dismissal just by attending settlement conferences. This matters because it reinforces that foreclosure plaintiffs must act within one year after a default or risk losing the case as abandoned.
People v. Harley (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department left Jondell Harley’s burglary conviction in place but struck the parts of two orders of protection that made them run until 2035. The court found the orders lasted too long because the trial court did not credit Harley for time he had already spent in jail, and it sent the case back to set new expiration dates.
Bank of New York Mellon v. Conforti (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In Bank of New York Mellon v. Conforti, the Second Department held that the bank’s 2018 foreclosure case was too late because the mortgage debt had already been accelerated in a 2011 foreclosure action. The court ruled that, under FAPA, the bank’s later voluntary withdrawal of the earlier case did not restart the six-year limitations period, so it dismissed the foreclosure claim against 35 Pleasure, LLC and canceled the mortgage.
Peach, Inc. v. RJR Services, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In a dispute over money still owed from the sale of a window cleaning business, The Second Department ruled that the written purchase agreement and promissory note controlled the amount due. It cut the judgment from $65,197 to $12,152 plus contractual interest, holding that the seller could not rely on testimony about an earlier oral deal for a higher purchase price because the written contracts were clear and included a merger clause.
U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Morrison (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this mortgage foreclosure case, the trial court threw out U.S. Bank’s complaint on its own after the bank missed a deadline to seek a foreclosure judgment. The Second Department reinstated the case, holding that missing that deadline alone was not enough to justify a court-initiated dismissal. The ruling matters because it confirms that trial courts can use that power only in rare, exceptional situations.
Merchant Cash & Capital, LLC v. Blueshyft, Inc. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this breach-of-contract case, the issue on appeal was whether defense counsel could be sanctioned $1,500 for alleged frivolous conduct during the litigation. The Second Department reversed the sanction, finding that the attorney’s conduct did not meet New York’s standard for frivolous behavior. The decision matters because it reinforces that courts may sanction lawyers only when the conduct clearly fits that rule.
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Han Yang Cho (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated Deutsche Bank’s foreclosure case after ruling that the trial court improperly dismissed it on its own over an alleged missed filing deadline. The court also granted the bank a default judgment and an order of reference, making clear that foreclosure cases should not be thrown out for claimed procedural defects when the lender shows it complied with the court’s direction and proved service, the claim, and the borrower’s default.
People v. Sukram (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department largely upheld Andy Sukram’s drug possession convictions, finding that the photo identification, arrest, and most of the evidence seizures were lawful, and that any error in admitting cash from a fanny pack was harmless. But it ruled that he was sentenced under the wrong repeat-offender category for a nonviolent drug crime, so it reduced his prison terms from 14 years to 8 years.
Pablo Sanchez Ramirez, et al. v. Red Cloud Trucking, Inc., et al. (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In this rear-end crash case, the plaintiffs won on liability in the trial court, but The Second Department reversed and denied summary judgment. The court said being hit from behind usually supports negligence, but the defendants raised a real factual dispute by claiming the lead driver stopped suddenly for no clear reason, which means liability must be decided later rather than as a matter of law.
Lenihan v. Muhametja (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated the buyers’ fraud claim in a dispute over alleged hidden construction defects in a home and garage sold in Rockland County, finding factual questions about whether the sellers actively concealed problems. It left the breach of contract claim dismissed because the buyers did not identify any specific promise in the sale contract that remained enforceable after the closing. This matters because New York sellers may still face fraud claims for hiding defects, even though most contract obligations end when the deed is delivered.
Matter of Dopkin v. County of Nassau (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In Matter of Dopkin v. County of Nassau, the Second Department ruled that Nassau County improperly disqualified a probation officer applicant based on his driving and legal history without explaining why similar applicants had been treated more favorably. The court annulled the Civil Service Commission’s decision and sent the matter back for a new determination, underscoring that public employers must give a clear, reasoned basis for inconsistent hiring decisions.
Lori Joseph Builders, Inc. v. Ana E. Torres (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department threw out a $79,174.89 award against a homeowner in a dispute over home-building and site work, ruling that the contracts made only her late husband responsible for payment and were too unclear to enforce. The court also said the contractor could not recover under a fair-value theory because it did not prove what its services were worth, but it left intact the dismissal of the homeowner’s lien exaggeration claim because the lien was already invalid as untimely. The decision matters because it shows that payment liability depends on the contract’s actual wording, and contractors need solid proof to recover outside a valid contract.
Zeltser v. Kukolev (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
In a dispute over an alleged oral deal giving the defendants an ownership interest in a Staten Island home, along with claimed loans tied to the property, the Second Department dismissed most of the defendants’ counterclaims, including contract, conversion, fiduciary duty, accounting, and partition claims. The court allowed only the unjust enrichment claims to continue, underscoring that oral promises involving real estate usually cannot be enforced without a writing, though a party may still seek repayment for benefits it provided.
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Adekoje (Appellate Division, Second Department, September 16, 2026)
The Second Department reinstated a mortgage foreclosure case that had been taken off the active calendar and also struck down a lower court order that paused interest on the loan. The court said the dismissal notice did not properly warn that the case could be dismissed for delay, and the interest toll was imposed without notice, a request from the borrower, or proof that the lender had done anything to justify that sanction.
Appealmate
