Greehy v County of Suffolk
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Municipal tort liability and the evidentiary burden for conscious pain and suffering (including pre-impact terror) on summary judgment.
After granting reargument, the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, adhered to its prior grant of summary judgment dismissing the conscious pain and suffering claim against the Town defendants, though it reinstated the wrongful death claim by finding issues of fact on liability.
The dismissal of the conscious pain and suffering cause of action against the Town of Brookhaven and its Highway Department.
The Town defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing the decedent did not experience conscious pain and suffering; testimony that a witness found the decedent unresponsive 45–60 seconds after impact was insufficient to negate potential pre-impact terror, pain during impact, or consciousness in the immediate aftermath. Under Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., the motion had to be denied regardless of plaintiffs’ opposition once the movants failed to meet their initial burden.
Background
Plaintiffs, co-administrators of the estate of motorcyclist John P. Greehy, allege the Town of Brookhaven and its Highway Department negligently allowed a stop sign to be obstructed, leading to a fatal collision between the decedent and a vehicle driven by James P. Conner. Plaintiffs sought damages for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering, including pre-impact terror (i.e., the decedent’s perception of grave injury or death before impact). The Town defendants moved for summary judgment. An initial order granted the motion, noting no opposition, but plaintiffs later established their opposition had been timely filed and sought reargument.
Lower Court Decision
On December 29, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the Town defendants’ motion in full, stating no opposition had been filed. On June 5, 2024, upon reargument, the court recognized plaintiffs’ opposition and denied summary judgment on wrongful death due to triable issues as to Town fault, but adhered to dismissing the conscious pain and suffering claim against the Town defendants.
Appellate Division Reversal
Reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs. Upon reargument, the Appellate Division vacated the prior grant of summary judgment dismissing the conscious pain and suffering claim against the Town defendants and denied that branch of the Town’s motion. The court held the Town failed to establish, prima facie, the absence of conscious pain and suffering (including pre-impact terror) where the only proffered evidence was a witness’s observation that the decedent was unresponsive 45–60 seconds after the crash.
Legal Significance
Reaffirms that on summary judgment the defendant bears the initial burden to negate conscious pain and suffering, including pre-impact terror; post-accident unresponsiveness observed shortly after impact does not, by itself, satisfy that burden. Also reiterates the Winegrad principle that failure to meet the movant’s prima facie burden requires denial without regard to the sufficiency of the opponent’s papers.
Defendants seeking summary judgment on conscious pain and suffering must present competent proof negating pre-impact terror or immediate post-impact consciousness; a witness finding the decedent unresponsive less than a minute after impact is insufficient, and the claim should proceed.