Gawel v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Child Victims Act negligence litigation and the scope of permissible pleadings under CPLR 3024(b) in suits against religious and educational institutions.
The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied defendants’ motion to strike paragraphs 49, 56-74, 82, 97, 99, 106, and 108 from the complaint.
The Appellate Division modified, granting the motion to strike paragraphs 58-64, 68, 71, 73, and 108, and striking the phrase "clergy in general" from paragraph 82; the order was otherwise affirmed.
Certain allegations were deemed irrelevant, scandalous, and prejudicial under CPLR 3024(b) and unnecessary to support the claims, while other allegations were relevant to the negligence theories; the trial court’s contrary denial was an improvident exercise of discretion in part.
Background
In July 2021, plaintiff commenced this action under the Child Victims Act, CPLR 214-g [revival statute extending the time to sue for child sexual abuse claims], alleging negligence, negligent training and supervision, and negligent retention against St. Francis Preparatory School, St. Francis Monastery, and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn. Defendants moved under CPLR 3024(b) [rule permitting a party to move to strike scandalous or prejudicial matter unnecessarily inserted in a pleading] to strike paragraphs 49, 56-74, 82, 97, 99, 106, and 108 as scandalous, prejudicial, and unnecessary. The Supreme Court denied the motion. Defendants appealed.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Kings County (Campanelli, J.), denied the branches of defendants’ motion seeking to strike the identified paragraphs, finding the allegations relevant and necessary to support the pleadings in this Child Victims Act negligence action.
Appellate Division Reversal
On its own motion, the Appellate Division deemed the notice of appeal to be an application for leave to appeal and granted leave under CPLR 5701(c) [authorizes the Appellate Division to grant leave to appeal from orders not otherwise appealable as of right]. The court modified the order by striking paragraphs 58-64, 68, 71, 73, and 108 as scandalous and prejudicial and not necessary to the sufficiency of the pleading, and by striking the broad allegation "clergy in general" from paragraph 82 as irrelevant, scandalous, and prejudicial. The court affirmed the denial as to paragraphs 49, 56-57, 65-67, 69-70, 72, 74, 97, 99, and 106, holding those allegations are relevant and necessary to support the claims. The court noted that striking matter under CPLR 3024(b) does not preclude related facts or evidence from being offered at trial.
Legal Significance
The decision clarifies the application of CPLR 3024(b) in Child Victims Act pleadings: courts will strike allegations that are unnecessarily scandalous or prejudicial—particularly generalized assertions about broad classes like "clergy in general"—while preserving allegations that materially support negligence-based claims. It underscores the abuse-of-discretion standard and the balance between pleading sufficiency and prejudice.
In New York CVA cases, specific, case-related allegations that support negligence claims will remain, but generalized and inflammatory assertions that are not necessary to the pleading can be stricken under CPLR 3024(b).