Attorneys and Parties

Cheung-Wor Ha
Appellant-Respondent
Attorneys: James G. Bilello, Martha E. Donovan

Maxel Edwards
Respondent
Attorneys: Warren Holland, Jehovenn Honculada

Dykes Lumber Company, Inc.
Respondent

Maria Sherman, et al.
Plaintiffs-Appellants

Brief Summary

Issue

Motor vehicle negligence and summary judgment in rear-end chain-collision cases.

Lower Court Held

The Supreme Court, Kings County denied Cheung-Wor Ha’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross-claims against him.

What Was Overturned

The Appellate Division reversed the denial and granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims against Ha.

Why

Ha established a prima facie showing that, while safely slowing with his foot on the brake behind a stopped lead vehicle, he was struck from behind by the Edwards/Dykes vehicle and propelled into the lead vehicle; respondents failed to raise a triable issue of fact or provide a nonnegligent explanation.

Background

This case arises from a three-vehicle chain-reaction collision on the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway. The plaintiffs were in the lead vehicle, followed by the defendant Cheung-Wor Ha, whose vehicle was followed by a Dykes Lumber Company, Inc. vehicle operated by its employee, Maxel Edwards. Edwards’s vehicle struck the rear of Ha’s vehicle, which then struck the plaintiffs’ vehicle. Plaintiffs sued Ha, Dykes, and Edwards. Ha moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross-claims against him; the respondents (Dykes and Edwards), but not the plaintiffs, opposed. A cross-appeal by the plaintiffs was deemed dismissed under 22 NYCRR 1250.10(a) [rule providing for dismissal of appeals not timely perfected].

Lower Court Decision

By order dated March 21, 2024, the Supreme Court, Kings County denied Ha’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross-claims insofar as asserted against him.

Appellate Division Reversal

The Appellate Division reversed on the law, with costs, granting Ha’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims against him. The court held that a rear-end collision with a stopping or stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence against the rear vehicle and that a middle vehicle in a chain collision meets its prima facie burden by showing it was stopped or safely slowing when struck from behind and propelled forward. Ha met this burden and the respondents failed to raise a triable issue.

Legal Significance

Reaffirms that in rear-end chain-collision cases, a middle vehicle can obtain summary judgment by demonstrating it was stopped or safely slowing and was rear-ended, which constitutes a nonnegligent explanation for being propelled into the lead vehicle. Also notes procedural enforcement of 22 NYCRR 1250.10(a) [rule providing for dismissal of appeals not timely perfected] as to the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal.

🔑 Key Takeaway

In three-car rear-end collisions, an operator of the middle vehicle is entitled to summary judgment when evidence shows the vehicle was stopped or safely slowing behind a stopped lead vehicle and was struck from behind, absent a nonnegligent explanation creating a triable issue.