Moccasin v Suffolk County
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Municipal liability and emergency vehicle operations under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [qualifiedly exempts drivers of emergency vehicles from certain traffic laws during an emergency operation and precludes liability for otherwise privileged conduct unless the driver acted with reckless disregard for the safety of others].
Granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
The order granting summary judgment to Suffolk County, the Suffolk County Police Department, and Officer Peter Degere.
Although the reckless-disregard standard applied because the officer was responding to a maternity emergency, the defendants did not establish prima facie that Degere’s conduct was not reckless; record evidence left triable issues as to whether he traveled at high speed in a school zone with poor lighting in the center turn lane and/or abruptly merged into that lane without looking or signaling.
Background
Around 5:00 p.m. in January 2019, while responding to a radio call about a woman in labor with complications (an emergency operation under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 114-b [defines “emergency operation”]), Officer Peter Degere, driving southbound on Straight Path, moved into the shared center turn lane to pass a vehicle and struck plaintiff Michael Moccasin, who was traveling northbound in that center lane on a skateboard. The location included a school zone and allegedly poor lighting conditions.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, applying Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104’s reckless-disregard standard and dismissing the complaint.
Appellate Division Reversal
Reversed, on the law, with costs; motion for summary judgment denied. The court held that while Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104’s reckless-disregard standard governed because the officer was engaged in an emergency operation, defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact regarding potential reckless conduct—specifically, high speed in a center turn lane within a school zone under poor lighting and/or an abrupt unsignaled merge into the center lane without first checking to the left. Because defendants did not meet their prima facie burden, the burden never shifted to plaintiff (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.).
Legal Significance
Reaffirms that government defendants invoking Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 must first make a prima facie showing that their privileged, emergency-related conduct was not in reckless disregard; unresolved disputes about speed, signaling, lane usage, and surrounding conditions (e.g., school zone, lighting) can preclude summary judgment. It also underscores Kabir’s principle that the reckless-disregard standard applies only to the specific privileged conduct enumerated in § 1104(b), with other conduct governed by ordinary negligence.
Emergency responders receive qualified exemptions under VTL § 1104, but they cannot obtain summary judgment unless they eliminate triable issues of reckless disregard; evidence of unsafe speed or abrupt, unsignaled lane maneuvers in a center turn lane—especially in sensitive conditions like a school zone or poor lighting—will send the case to a jury.