The People v. Joshua Bourdeau
Categories
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Criminal law; whether the prosecution exceeded the felony speedy-trial time limit under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30(1)(a) [requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a felony criminal action].
The Supreme Court, Kings County, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the People were chargeable with 202 days of delay.
The Appellate Division reversed so much of the order as dismissed the indictment on statutory speedy-trial grounds and remitted for a hearing and a new determination.
The trial court incorrectly counted one day after the People's July 5, 2023 readiness notice, wrongly charged the People for two adjournments requested by defense counsel, and failed to hold a hearing under CPL 210.45 [governs motion procedure and requires a hearing where factual disputes must be resolved] on disputed periods of delay.
Background
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was denied his statutory speedy-trial right under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30(1)(a) [requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a felony criminal action]. He argued that the People were chargeable with more than 200 days. The People opposed, contending that most of the time was excludable because certain adjournments were requested by the defense and other periods involved factual disputes about excludability.
Lower Court Decision
By order dated April 30, 2024, the Supreme Court, Kings County, granted the speedy-trial branch of the defendant's motion without holding a hearing. The court found that the People were chargeable with 202 days, including counting the People's readiness as effective on July 6, 2023 rather than July 5, 2023, and charging the People for certain March 2023 adjournments.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division held that the record showed both the defendant and the court were notified of the People's readiness on July 5, 2023, so that day should not have been charged to the People. It further held that the periods from March 3 to March 8, 2023, and March 8 to March 9, 2023, were not chargeable to the People because defense counsel requested those adjournments, making them excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(b) [excludes delays resulting from continuances requested by or consented to by the defense]. Finally, because the papers revealed factual disputes over the periods from March 9 to April 17, 2023, April 17 to May 15, 2023, and May 15 to May 22, 2023, the court ruled that a hearing was required. It therefore reversed insofar as appealed from and remitted for a hearing and a new determination thereafter.
Legal Significance
This decision reinforces that in statutory speedy-trial litigation, the prosecution bears the burden of proving excludable time once the defendant alleges excessive delay, but courts must accurately calculate readiness dates and exclude defense-requested adjournments. It also confirms that dismissal without a hearing is improper when the motion papers raise genuine factual disputes about whether specific periods are chargeable.
A court cannot dismiss an indictment on CPL 30.30 grounds based on disputed facts without a hearing, and time attributable to defense-requested adjournments or a properly communicated readiness notice should not be charged to the People.