Attorneys and Parties

Cassondra Leslie
Plaintiff-Appellant
Attorneys: Brian J. Isaac, Jillian Rosen, Michael H. Zhu

City of New York
Defendant-Respondent
Attorneys: Deborah A. Brenner, Elina Druker

Jennifer Marinello
Defendant-Respondent
Attorneys: Deborah A. Brenner, Elina Druker

New York City Fire Department
Defendant-Respondent
Attorneys: Deborah A. Brenner, Elina Druker

Brief Summary

Issue

Personal injury negligence arising from a pedestrian struck by a municipal ambulance; summary judgment standards and the emergency doctrine.

Lower Court Held

The Supreme Court, Queens County, granted summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint as against the City of New York and Jennifer Marinello.

What Was Overturned

The Appellate Division reversed and denied summary judgment, reinstating the claims against the City of New York and Jennifer Marinello.

Why

Defendants failed to make a prima facie showing of freedom from fault and did not eliminate triable issues of fact regarding due care, visibility, signal status, speed, and whether the emergency doctrine applied; the record left factual disputes for a jury.

Background

Plaintiff Cassondra Leslie alleged she was struck by an ambulance owned by the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) and operated by defendant Jennifer Marinello while she was crossing at Beach 26th Street and Seagirt Boulevard in Far Rockaway. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Marinello was not at fault and that the emergency doctrine applied. The motion targeted, among others, the City of New York and Marinello. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion, dismissing the amended complaint as to those defendants.

Lower Court Decision

The Supreme Court, Queens County (Chereé A. Buggs, J.), granted that branch of defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against the City of New York and Jennifer Marinello.

Appellate Division Reversal

The Appellate Division reversed the order insofar as appealed from, with costs, and denied that branch of the defendants' motion. The court held defendants did not establish, prima facie, that Marinello was free from fault where evidence raised issues of fact concerning the pedestrian signal, speed, line of sight, and whether she used due care to see and avoid the plaintiff. The court also found issues of fact as to the applicability of the emergency doctrine, including whether Marinello’s conduct contributed to the claimed emergency and whether the plaintiff’s presence in the crosswalk was sudden or reasonably anticipated. Because defendants failed to meet their initial burden, the court did not reach the sufficiency of plaintiff’s opposition under Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853.

Legal Significance

The decision reinforces that defendants seeking summary judgment in pedestrian–vehicle negligence cases must make a strong prima facie showing of no fault; disputes over signal status, speed, visibility, and due care commonly preclude summary disposition. It also underscores that the emergency doctrine is typically a jury question, particularly where the driver’s conduct may have contributed to the situation.

🔑 Key Takeaway

In pedestrian collision cases, summary judgment for a driver—especially one operating an emergency vehicle—will be denied where factual conflicts exist about visibility, due care, and the circumstances of any alleged emergency.