Chiriboga-Herrera v. Litt
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Construction site fatality at a residential property; applicability of New York Labor Law § 240(1) [imposes a nondelegable duty on owners, contractors, and their agents to provide workers proper protection from elevation-related hazards], § 241(6) [imposes a nondelegable duty on owners and general contractors, and their agents, to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers and to comply with specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor], § 200 [codifies the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to maintain a safe workplace], and the homeowner's exemption to §§ 240(1) and 241(6) [exempts owners of one- and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work].
The Supreme Court, Nassau County granted the homeowner’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing all Labor Law and common-law negligence claims against him based on the homeowner’s exemption and lack of supervision/control.
The grant of summary judgment to homeowner Marty Litt dismissing the complaint was reversed as to plaintiff-appellant Joselyn Natalia Chiriboga-Herrera.
Litt failed to make a prima facie showing that the work was connected to his residential use at the time of the accident and failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether he directed or controlled the decedent’s work. He also failed to address both premises-condition and means-and-methods theories under Labor Law § 200, so he did not negate all potential concurrent causes; thus, summary judgment was improper regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition.
Background
While working on a construction project at property owned by Marty Litt, the decedent, William Orlando Barzallo-Diaz, was struck in the head by a falling beam weighing approximately 1,000 pounds and died at the scene. The plaintiffs, as co-administrators, sued for violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), 241(6), and common-law negligence. Before depositions and completion of discovery, Litt moved for summary judgment, claiming the homeowner’s exemption to §§ 240(1) and 241(6) and asserting he did not supervise or control the decedent’s work.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Nassau County granted Litt’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint against him based on the homeowner’s exemption and the absence of evidence that he supervised or controlled the method or manner of the decedent’s work.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division reversed as to Joselyn Natalia Chiriboga-Herrera, denied Litt’s summary judgment motion, and awarded one bill of costs to her. It held Litt did not establish, prima facie, that the work was for his residential use at the time of the accident or that he lacked supervision or control over the decedent’s work. Litt also failed to establish entitlement to dismissal under Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence because he did not address both premises-condition and means-and-methods theories. The appeal by Elva Castro was dismissed because no appeal lies from an order entered on the appealing party’s default (CPLR 5511 [no appeal lies from an order entered on the default of the appealing party]). The separate appeal by Spiotta Construction Management Corp. was deemed dismissed pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1250.10(a).
Legal Significance
The decision underscores that a homeowner invoking the Labor Law homeowner’s exemption must show the work was connected to residential use at the time of injury and that the homeowner did not direct or control the work. It also reaffirms that where both premises conditions and means-and-methods are implicated under Labor Law § 200, a moving owner must negate liability under both theories to obtain summary judgment, particularly at a pre-deposition stage. If the movant fails to make a prima facie showing, the motion must be denied regardless of the opponent’s papers.
Property owners seeking early summary judgment under the homeowner’s exemption and Labor Law § 200 must demonstrate residential use at the time of the accident, absence of direction or control over the work, and address both premises and means-and-methods theories; failure to do so defeats summary judgment even before discovery is complete.