Attorneys and Parties

Defendant-Appellant: Clinton Benjamin
Attorneys: Harold V. Ferguson, Jr.

Respondent: The People of the State of New York

Brief Summary

Issue

Criminal law—sentencing surcharges and fees; appellate modification in the interest of justice.

Lower Court Held

The Supreme Court, New York County, accepted defendant’s guilty pleas to attempted murder in the second degree (Indictment No. 2561/17) and bail jumping in the second degree (Indictment No. 2350/17), imposed an aggregate five-year sentence, and assessed mandatory surcharges and fees.

What Was Overturned

The Appellate Division vacated the surcharge and fees imposed with respect to Indictment No. 2561/17 only.

Why

Exercising its interest-of-justice authority and relying on People v Chirinos, 190 AD3d 434, 435 (1st Dept 2021), with the People consenting to the relief.

Background

Defendant Clinton Benjamin pled guilty to attempted murder in the second degree under Indictment No. 2561/17 and to bail jumping in the second degree under Indictment No. 2350/17. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of five years and imposed statutory surcharges and fees at sentencing.

Lower Court Decision

Judgment of conviction entered April 17, 2019 (Supreme Court, New York County, Statsinger, J.), imposing an aggregate five-year sentence and assessing surcharges and fees on both indictments.

Appellate Division Reversal

Modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to vacate the surcharges and fees associated with Indictment No. 2561/17 only; otherwise affirmed. The court relied on People v Chirinos and noted the People’s consent.

Legal Significance

Reaffirms the Appellate Division, First Department’s authority to modify a sentence to remove financial surcharges and fees in the interest of justice, consistent with People v Chirinos, particularly where the prosecution consents.

🔑 Key Takeaway

In the First Department, courts may vacate sentencing surcharges and fees in the interest of justice—especially with the People’s consent—while leaving the underlying conviction and custodial sentence intact.