Ian Peck et al. v. Milbank LLP et al.
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Attorney professional responsibility and alleged attorney deceit under New York Judiciary Law § 487 [attorney deceit statute imposing liability for intentional deceit of a court or party].
The Supreme Court, New York County, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the Judiciary Law § 487 claim.
The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the Judiciary Law § 487 cause of action.
Plaintiffs failed to allege cognizable intentional deception: pursuing note enforcement based on a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous trust is not § 487 deceit; no qualifying conflict that would affect professional judgment under Rule 1.7(a) [rule on conflicts of interest with current clients]; no “court or party” to be deceived regarding non-litigation representation; and the cited deposition/affidavit statements either occurred after withdrawal from representation or did not amount to intentional misrepresentation.
Background
Plaintiffs alleged that Milbank LLP and attorney Georgiana J. Slade orchestrated and pursued litigation to enforce certain notes in knowing contravention of the decedent noteholder’s estate plan and trust, and that they concealed conflicts stemming from Slade’s father’s co-investments with the decedent and his alleged animus toward plaintiff. Plaintiffs also alleged Slade misrepresented the effect of the decedent’s estate plan in an affidavit, and misstated her recollection of knowledge about her father’s co-investments during depositions. A prior appellate decision had recognized ambiguity as to the trust provision’s meaning and operability before probate (Matter of Peck, 191 AD3d 537, 537 [1st Dept 2021]).
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court (Borrok, J.) denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the Judiciary Law § 487 claim, allowing it to proceed.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed, with costs, and granted the motion to dismiss the § 487 claim. The court held that: (1) advocating a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous trust provision—even if previously believed otherwise—is not intentional deceit under Judiciary Law § 487 (citing Bill Birds, Inc. v Stein Law Firm, P.C., 35 NY3d 173, and Kaufman v Moritt Hock & Hamroff, LLP, 192 AD3d 1092); (2) any representation outside litigation could not deceive a court or party (Bill Birds; Doscher v Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 148 AD3d 523); (3) no qualifying conflict was pleaded under Rule 1.7(a) because plaintiffs did not allege that Slade shared her father’s animus or knew she would inherit his interests, nor how any shared financial interest would impair professional judgment; (4) the affidavit’s trust interpretation was not unreasonable; (5) post-withdrawal deposition testimony fell outside the statute; and (6) Slade’s deposition statements about lacking specific recollection were not inconsistent with decade-old memorandum footnotes. Given this resolution, the court did not reach arguments on judicial proceedings privilege, collateral action, egregiousness, or damages.
Legal Significance
Reaffirms that Judiciary Law § 487 targets intentional deceit of a court or party, not hard-fought advocacy over ambiguous legal instruments. Conflicts-based § 487 theories require a concrete, client-impairing conflict under Rule 1.7(a), and statements after counsel’s withdrawal are outside the statute. Allegations of changed legal interpretation or imperfect recollection, without more, will not sustain § 487 liability.
Ambiguous trust provisions and evolving legal interpretations do not transform zealous advocacy into Judiciary Law § 487 deceit; plaintiffs must plead intentional deception of a court or party or a concrete, adverse-effect conflict to survive dismissal.