Citimortgage, Inc. v Pena
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Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Mortgage foreclosure procedure and whether a court may sua sponte grant default-judgment relief against a non-answering defendant when the plaintiff's motion papers did not request that relief.
The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied Molina's motion under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) 5015(a)(4) [allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment or order for lack of jurisdiction to render it] to vacate the default-related portion of the 2016 order and the foreclosure judgment, and under CPLR 3215(c) [requires dismissal as abandoned where a plaintiff fails to timely seek default judgment unless sufficient cause is shown] to dismiss the complaint against her.
The Appellate Division reversed the denial of the CPLR 5015(a)(4) branch of Molina's motion, vacated so much of the August 17, 2016 order as sua sponte granted leave to enter a default judgment against her, and vacated the April 1, 2019 order and judgment of foreclosure and sale. The remainder of the order, including the denial of CPLR 3215(c) relief, was affirmed.
Because the plaintiff's notice of motion sought relief only against Roberto Pena and did not request a default judgment against Molina, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to grant that relief against her. Under CPLR 2214(a) and (b) [require a notice of motion to specify the relief demanded and the grounds therefor], failure to give proper notice renders the resulting order void, and a boilerplate request for 'such other and further relief' could not cure the defect.
Background
Citimortgage brought a mortgage foreclosure action against Roberto Pena, Ana M. Molina, and others. Pena answered the complaint, but Molina did not. The plaintiff later moved under CPLR 3211 [permits dismissal of pleadings on specified grounds] and CPLR 3212 [summary judgment rule] to dismiss Pena's answer and obtain summary judgment against him. The notice of motion did not mention Molina or seek default relief against her. Even so, in an August 17, 2016 order, the Supreme Court granted summary judgment against Pena, sua sponte granted leave to enter a default judgment against all non-answering defendants including Molina, and appointed a referee to compute the amount due. The court then entered an April 1, 2019 order and judgment of foreclosure and sale. Molina later moved to vacate the default-related relief and foreclosure judgment and to dismiss the complaint against her as abandoned.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied Molina's motion in full. It refused to vacate the portion of the 2016 order that had granted default relief against her and also refused to vacate the foreclosure sale judgment or dismiss the complaint against her as abandoned.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division modified the order. It held that the Supreme Court should have granted Molina's CPLR 5015(a)(4) motion to vacate so much of the August 17, 2016 order as sua sponte granted leave to enter a default judgment against her, and should also have vacated the April 1, 2019 order and judgment of foreclosure and sale. The appellate court otherwise affirmed the order.
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that New York courts cannot award dispositive relief against a defaulting party unless that relief is specifically requested in the moving papers. In foreclosure practice, a sua sponte default judgment entered without notice is jurisdictionally defective and void, and it may be vacated under CPLR 5015(a)(4). The case also confirms that a generic request for 'such other and further relief' does not authorize a court to grant unrequested default or other dispositive relief.
In a foreclosure case, if the plaintiff wants a default judgment against a non-answering defendant, the motion papers must expressly say so. If they do not, any sua sponte default relief and any foreclosure judgment built on it are void for lack of jurisdiction.