Walker v Jonis Holdings II, LLC
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Premises liability (slip-and-fall) on snow/ice; scope of the storm-in-progress rule and potential liability of snow removal contractors.
Granted separate motions by the property owners and snow removal contractors for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Reversed; both summary judgment motions were denied.
Movants did not establish prima facie that the ice resulted solely from an ongoing storm under the storm-in-progress rule [a property owner or snow removal contractor is not responsible for snow/ice accidents until a reasonable time after a storm ceases to remediate]; plaintiff alleged preexisting accumulation from prior snowfalls. Because movants failed to meet their initial burden, the motions should have been denied regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr. [if the moving party fails to make a prima facie showing, the motion must be denied regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers]). Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs. [limits direct tort recovery against a snow contractor absent limited exceptions when there is no privity] was inapplicable because the contractors were not sued directly.
Background
Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on a stairway at property owned by Jonis Holdings II, LLC and 49th Street Partners Group, LLC. The owners had contracted with Millamar Landscape Services and Millamar Construction Corp. for snow and ice removal. Although it was snowing during and immediately before the fall, plaintiff claimed she slipped on preexisting snow and ice from earlier events that had not been remedied.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Nassau County granted the separate motions of the owners and the snow removal contractors for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, accepting arguments premised on the storm-in-progress rule and the contractors’ nonliability.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division reversed and denied both motions, holding defendants failed to prove the ice formed solely from the ongoing storm rather than prior accumulations. Because movants did not meet their prima facie burden, the motions were denied without regard to plaintiff’s opposition. The court declined to reach Espinal because the contractors were not named as direct defendants. One bill of costs was awarded.
Legal Significance
Reaffirms that to invoke the storm-in-progress rule, defendants must show the hazardous condition was created solely by the ongoing storm; evidence or allegations of preexisting accumulation defeat summary judgment at the prima facie stage. Also clarifies that Espinal’s contractor-liability framework is irrelevant where the contractor is not a direct defendant.
Ongoing snowfall does not automatically immunize owners or contractors. If preexisting ice may have caused the fall, defendants cannot secure summary judgment under the storm-in-progress rule; and Espinal does not apply unless the contractor is sued directly.