Carpenter v City of Norwich et al.
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Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Employment and reputational consequences in law enforcement hiring, arising from a settlement of police misconduct charges and a later report to the Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS).
Supreme Court partially denied defendants' summary judgment motion, holding that triable issues of fact existed on plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Appellate Division reversed the denial of summary judgment on the first, second, and third causes of action and dismissed the claims for breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Although the DCJS report was arguably false because plaintiff's disciplinary charges had been withdrawn before his resignation, the report was made pursuant to 9 NYCRR part 6056 [regulations establishing a Central State Registry of Police Officers and Peace Officers and requiring employers to report when an officer ceases service and the reason], so it was protected by a qualified privilege and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of malice. The alleged conduct also was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support intentional infliction of emotional distress. As to contract, the settlement's plain language did not bar brief, nonspecific references to the stipulation in personnel records, and plaintiff offered only speculation that defendants improperly disclosed confidential settlement materials.
Background
Plaintiff was a former police officer with the City of Norwich Police Department. In 2016 he received a notice of termination based on misconduct allegations involving harassment and sexual harassment of subordinate officers. He grieved the termination, but in 2017 he and the City entered into a stipulation of settlement under which the notice of termination would be withdrawn, plaintiff would be reinstated to the payroll retroactively, remain off duty, and irrevocably resign effective January 31, 2018. Afterward, plaintiff sought other law enforcement jobs with the City of Norwich and Chenango County, but he was disqualified after failing to disclose details of the settlement. His later CPLR 3211 (a) (7) [rule allowing dismissal for failure to state a cause of action] challenge in a CPLR article 78 proceeding was dismissed. He then brought this action for breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Lower Court Decision
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint against the Norwich Police Department and dismissed the punitive damages claim against the City, but otherwise denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court found triable issues of fact on all three remaining causes of action.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division modified the order by granting summary judgment to defendants on the breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. On defamation, the court held that the City chief's report to DCJS stating that plaintiff resigned while a disciplinary process had commenced could be read as defamatory and, under later case law, was technically false because the disciplinary process had ended when the stipulation withdrew the charges before the effective resignation date. Even so, the report was made under a legal reporting duty and therefore enjoyed qualified privilege, and plaintiff failed to show actual malice because the chief relied on then-existing DCJS guidance. On the emotional distress claim, the conduct did not rise to the extreme and outrageous level required. On the contract claim, the settlement only barred disclosure of the stipulation and notice of termination and required limited responses to prospective employers; it did not prohibit personnel forms noting that plaintiff was removed, reinstated, and resigned pursuant to a stipulation. Defendants also produced proof that they did not disclose the confidential documents to outside employers, and plaintiff's contrary theory was speculative.
Legal Significance
The decision underscores that mandatory or legally motivated reports by police employers to DCJS under 9 NYCRR part 6056 may be protected by qualified privilege in defamation cases, even where the report later turns out to be inaccurate, unless the plaintiff can prove malice. It also highlights that confidentiality clauses in employment settlements will be enforced according to their plain language, and courts will not expand them to prohibit neutral administrative notations not expressly barred by the agreement.
A former police officer cannot survive summary judgment merely by showing that a registry report was inaccurate or that a settlement was important to future employment prospects. Where the employer acted under a legal reporting obligation, lacked proof of malice, and complied with the settlement's actual text, defamation, emotional distress, and breach of contract claims will fail.