Dos Anjos v Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Construction site safety—slipping hazards from rainwater accumulation on a plastic vapor barrier while using a power saw; compliance with New York Industrial Code requirements.
The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Labor Law § 241(6) and denied defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss the common-law negligence and Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6) claims.
The denial of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Labor Law § 241(6) was reversed; summary judgment on liability under § 241(6) was granted to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs established a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) [slipping hazards; employers shall not permit use of slippery floors/passageways; ice, snow, water, grease, or other foreign substances must be removed, sanded, or covered to provide safe footing] proximately caused the injury. Defendants failed to raise triable issues that the rainwater was integral to the work or that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause. Defendants also failed to make a prima facie showing to dismiss the § 241(6), § 200, or negligence claims.
Background
On January 12, 2018, at a Westchester County construction site, Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC (program manager) retained Andron Construction Corp. as general contractor, which hired D&J Concrete Corp., the employer of plaintiff Jose Dos Anjos. While handling a power saw, Dos Anjos slipped on rainwater accumulated on a plastic vapor barrier covering the floor, causing the saw to activate and cut his left forearm. Plaintiffs sued for common-law negligence, Labor Law § 200 [codification of the common-law duty of owners and contractors to provide a safe workplace], and Labor Law § 241(6) [imposes a nondelegable duty on owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers], predicated on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) [slipping hazards rule].
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241(6) and denied defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the common-law negligence and Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6) claims.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division reversed in part, granting plaintiffs summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241(6). Plaintiffs’ proof, including deposition testimony, established a proximate-cause violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) based on slipping on rainwater atop a vapor barrier. Defendants did not raise triable issues that the water was integral to the work or that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause. The court affirmed the denial of defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss: defendants failed to show 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) was inapplicable, not violated, or not a proximate cause; and for the § 200 and negligence claims, defendants failed to establish lack of notice of the dangerous condition or that it was an ordinary, obvious hazard. One bill of costs was awarded to plaintiffs.
Legal Significance
Reaffirms that rainwater accumulation on a plastic vapor barrier constitutes a slippery condition under 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) and is not inherently integral to concrete work, supporting Labor Law § 241(6) liability. Clarifies defendants’ burdens on summary judgment under Labor Law § 200 in dangerous-condition cases to show lack of creation or notice, and that arguments of sole proximate cause or integral-to-the-work must be supported by competent evidence.
Owners, contractors, and their agents face nondelegable liability under Labor Law § 241(6) where workers slip on rainwater creating slippery footing in work areas; water on a vapor barrier is not inherently integral to the task, and unsupported sole-proximate-cause defenses will fail.