Deloach v. McNeil
Categories
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
This personal injury and traffic accident case concerns whether a utility company's parked work truck qualified for the special liability protection given to hazard vehicles under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) [exempts hazard vehicles while actually engaged in hazardous operation on or adjacent to a highway from ordinary traffic rules].
The Supreme Court, Kings County, held that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) applied and granted summary judgment to the Consolidated Edison defendants, dismissing the complaint against them.
The Appellate Division reversed the portion of the order granting summary judgment to Consolidated Edison, Inc. and Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., and denied that branch of their motion.
The Con Ed defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that their truck was actually engaged in a hazardous operation, because they did not establish that the truck was being operated or parked in a manner that would restrict, impede, or interfere with the normal flow of traffic as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 117-b [defines hazardous operation as the operation or parking of a vehicle on or immediately adjacent to a public highway while actually engaged in an operation that would restrict, impede, or interfere with normal traffic flow].
Background
The plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a February 2016 collision at the intersection of Waverly Avenue and Willoughby Avenue in Brooklyn. Defendant Jason C. McNeil was driving on Waverly Avenue, which had a stop sign at the intersection. A truck allegedly owned by the Con Ed defendants was parked on Willoughby Avenue near the corner, and McNeil claimed that the truck blocked his view. The plaintiff alleged that the Con Ed defendants were negligent in parking the truck where it obstructed sight lines and contributed to the crash. Con Ed argued that the truck was a utility hazard vehicle under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 117-a [defines hazard vehicle to include a utility-owned or utility-operated vehicle used in construction, maintenance, and repair of its facilities], because its employees were performing manhole-related work nearby with cones and flashing lights set up.
Lower Court Decision
The lower court accepted Con Ed's argument that the truck was covered by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) and therefore that Con Ed could not be held liable under an ordinary negligence standard. It granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the Con Ed defendants.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division reversed insofar as appealed from. It held that, on summary judgment, Con Ed had the burden to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and it failed to do so. Although the evidence showed that Con Ed employees were present to work in a manhole on an adjacent sidewalk and had parked the truck nearby with cones and flashing lights, that proof did not establish as a matter of law that the truck was actually engaged in an operation that restricted, impeded, or interfered with the normal flow of traffic. Because Con Ed failed to make its prima facie showing, its motion had to be denied regardless of the plaintiff's opposing papers.
Legal Significance
The decision underscores that a utility defendant seeking the protections of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) must prove more than that its truck was parked near a worksite. It must show that the vehicle was actually engaged in a qualifying hazardous operation within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 117-b. The court also noted that the plaintiff did not raise separate issues concerning Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202 [proscribes stopping, standing, or parking a vehicle in specified places], the fact that the accident occurred in New York City, or the relevance of local exemptions, so those questions were not addressed.
A parked utility truck is not automatically protected by the reckless-disregard standard. To win summary judgment, the utility must affirmatively show that the vehicle was actually engaged in a traffic-impeding hazardous operation at the time of the accident.