M. W. v Nassau County
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Child welfare and foster care negligence; municipal liability; scope of governmental function immunity and qualified immunity under Social Services Law § 419
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, granted Nassau County summary judgment based on governmental function immunity.
The Appellate Division reversed the grant of summary judgment to Nassau County and denied the County’s motion.
The County failed to establish prima facie that the acts at issue were discretionary or that any discretion was actually exercised in relation to the alleged negligent supervision; and Social Services Law § 419 [provides qualified immunity to child protective services and related personnel for good‑faith discretionary actions in child protective matters] does not bar recovery for negligent supervision of children in foster care.
Background
Plaintiff, proceeding under the Child Victims Act (CVA) (CPLR 214-g) [revival statute allowing previously time-barred civil claims for child sexual abuse to be brought within a defined window], alleges Nassau County negligently placed and supervised her in a foster home where her foster father sexually abused her in the late 1970s. The County moved for summary judgment, asserting governmental function immunity and qualified immunity under Social Services Law § 419.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court (Steinman, J.) granted the County’s motion, holding the County was entitled to governmental function immunity.
Appellate Division Reversal
Reversing, the Appellate Division held the County did not meet its prima facie burden because it failed to show the relevant acts were discretionary or that discretion was actually exercised concerning the alleged negligent supervision. The court also rejected the County’s alternative ground—qualified immunity under Social Services Law § 419—as that statute does not bar negligent supervision claims involving foster care. The County did not advance lack of notice as an alternative basis. Under Winegrad, the motion should have been denied regardless of the sufficiency of plaintiff’s opposition.
Legal Significance
Clarifies that municipalities cannot rely on governmental function immunity at the summary judgment stage without evidence that discretionary authority was actually exercised in relation to the conduct at issue. Reaffirms that Social Services Law § 419’s qualified immunity does not foreclose negligent supervision claims regarding foster care placements under CVA actions.
To obtain summary judgment on foster care negligence claims, a county must demonstrate actual exercise of discretion tied to the alleged conduct; mere invocation of governmental function immunity or Social Services Law § 419 is insufficient.