The People v Manuel Espinosa
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Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Criminal law; whether a sentencing court may issue an order of protection for a person who was not a victim or witness to the crime of conviction.
The Supreme Court, Kings County, accepted Espinosa's guilty plea to attempted burglary in the third degree, imposed sentence, and issued an order of protection that included Angel Rivera.
The Appellate Division vacated only the portion of the order of protection issued in favor of Angel Rivera and otherwise affirmed the judgment.
Although the issue was unpreserved under CPL 470.05[2] [preservation rule requiring an objection or other timely challenge in the trial court], the Appellate Division reviewed it in the interest of justice under CPL 470.15[6] [permits appellate interest-of-justice review] and held that, under CPL 530.13[4] [authorizes criminal court orders of protection for victims or witnesses], the court lacked authority because Rivera was neither a victim nor a witness to the crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty.
Background
Manuel Espinosa pleaded guilty in Supreme Court, Kings County, to attempted burglary in the third degree. At sentencing, the court issued an order of protection that included Angel Rivera. Espinosa appealed from the judgment, and the appeal also brought up for review the sentencing order of protection.
Lower Court Decision
The lower court convicted Espinosa upon his guilty plea and imposed sentence on August 20, 2019. At the same time, it issued an order of protection that, among others, named Angel Rivera as a protected person.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division held that Espinosa did not preserve his challenge to the Rivera portion of the order of protection because he did not object at sentencing or otherwise raise the issue before the trial court. Even so, the court exercised its interest-of-justice jurisdiction and vacated that portion of the order because Rivera was neither a victim nor a witness to the particular crime of conviction. The judgment of conviction was otherwise affirmed.
Legal Significance
This decision reinforces that a criminal court's authority to issue an order of protection at sentencing is limited by CPL 530.13[4] [authorizes criminal court orders of protection for victims or witnesses]. A protected person must fall within the statutory category tied to the offense of conviction. The case also shows that an appellate court may correct an unauthorized order of protection despite lack of preservation by invoking its interest-of-justice power under CPL 470.15[6] [permits appellate interest-of-justice review].
A sentencing court cannot include someone in an order of protection unless that person is a victim or witness to the crime of conviction; if it does, the improper portion may be vacated on appeal even when no objection was made below.