Matter of Smelyansky v New York State Office of General Services
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Public-sector employment disability accommodation dispute over whether full-time telecommuting was a reasonable accommodation for an employee's anxiety-related disability, and whether the employer retaliated after she pursued accommodation rights.
Supreme Court dismissed the CPLR article 78 proceeding [procedure to review administrative action], finding the Office of General Services' decision rational, and upon reargument granted summary judgment dismissing the Human Rights Law claims, holding petitioner could not perform the essential functions of her job with full-time remote work and that the employer did not discriminate or retaliate.
The Appellate Division reversed the January 21, 2025 judgment, reinstated the discrimination, retaliation, and CPLR article 78 claims, and remitted for further proceedings. The separate appeal from the August 2, 2024 order was dismissed because the right to appeal from that order terminated upon entry of final judgment.
The employer failed to make the individualized, fact-specific showing required under Executive Law § 296 (3) (a) [requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for known disabilities] and related Human Rights Law standards. Its proof was conclusory, did not establish the employee's essential in-person job functions, did not show undue hardship, and left triable fact issues on both discrimination and retaliation under Executive Law § 296 (7) [prohibits retaliation for protected activity].
Background
Rachael Smelyansky worked for the New York State Office of General Services as a Contract Management Specialist 1. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the agency approved repeated accommodations allowing her to work remotely full time because of anxiety tied to COVID-19 exposure. In 2023, after the agency decided to reduce telework generally and require more in-person attendance, Smelyansky requested another extension of full-time remote work. The agency did not dispute that she had a disability, but denied the request, stating that in-person attendance was needed for spontaneous process questions, coworker interaction, and real-time direction from managers. It instead offered a gradual return-to-office schedule. Smelyansky challenged that determination through an administrative appeal, which was denied, and then brought a combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and plenary action under the Human Rights Law. She also alleged retaliation after the agency marked her absent without leave and withheld pay when she used Family and Medical Leave Act leave on scheduled in-office days that the agency said had to be made up.
Lower Court Decision
Supreme Court, Albany County, first dismissed the CPLR article 78 petition, concluding the agency's determination had a rational basis. Although the court initially denied summary judgment on the Human Rights Law discrimination and retaliation claims, it later granted reargument and awarded summary judgment to respondents, concluding as a matter of law that Smelyansky could not perform the essential duties of her position with the requested full-time telecommuting accommodation and that respondents' conduct was not discriminatory or retaliatory.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division held that respondents were not entitled to summary judgment. The court found that the Office of General Services relied on vague and generalized assertions about collaboration, supervision, and agency-wide telework concerns rather than a tailored assessment of Smelyansky's actual duties, how much time they consumed, which tasks truly required in-person presence, and whether remote work would create a specific undue hardship. The record also showed that she had worked remotely for about three years, had favorable performance evidence, and had support from her direct supervisor for the compatibility of telecommuting with her duties. The court further held that the agency's administrative denial was affected by an error of law because it conflated preferred workplace practices with essential job functions instead of applying the individualized Human Rights Law inquiry. As to retaliation, the court found triable issues of fact over whether the absent-without-leave designation and loss of pay were pretextual. It therefore reversed the judgment and remitted the matter for further proceedings.
Legal Significance
This decision reinforces that remote work may qualify as a reasonable accommodation under New York's Human Rights Law, and that an employer seeking dismissal must present a concrete, individualized record of the employee's essential job functions and any claimed undue hardship. General statements about morale, collaboration, or a return-to-office policy are not enough. The case also underscores that a good-faith interactive process is important but, standing alone, does not justify summary judgment if the employer's proof remains conclusory. In addition, it confirms that retaliation claims can survive summary judgment where the employer's explanation for attendance-related discipline is disputed.
An employer cannot defeat a disability-accommodation claim merely by saying in-person work is better. It must show, with job-specific evidence, that the employee's essential duties truly require physical presence and that the requested accommodation would cause a real undue hardship.