Marin v Reyes
Categories
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Civil procedure in a personal injury action brought under the Child Victims Act, specifically whether a default order and a $20 million default judgment should be vacated under CPLR 5015(a)(1) [vacatur of a default based on a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense].
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, denied the defendant's motion to vacate the October 24, 2022 default order and the July 25, 2023 judgment after finding he had not sufficiently established grounds for relief.
The Appellate Division reversed the September 19, 2024 order insofar as appealed from and granted the branches of the defendant's motion seeking to vacate both the default order and the $20,000,000 judgment.
The defendant showed a reasonable excuse because his prior attorney repeatedly misled him about the status of the case, he stayed in contact and did not intend to abandon the litigation, and he promptly retained new counsel after learning of the default. He also showed a potentially meritorious defense through nonparty witness affidavits contradicting the plaintiff's allegations about the timing and location of the alleged acts.
Background
The plaintiff commenced this personal injury action on August 13, 2021 under CPLR 214-g [Child Victims Act revival provision]. The defendant was served with a summons with notice on August 25, 2021 and retained counsel shortly thereafter, but no response was filed. The plaintiff moved on August 16, 2022 for leave to enter a default judgment, and that motion was granted on October 24, 2022. After the defendant failed to appear at the damages inquest, judgment was entered on July 25, 2023 for the plaintiff in the principal sum of $20,000,000. In October 2023, the defendant, represented by new counsel, moved to vacate the default order and judgment under CPLR 5015(a)(1) [vacatur of a default based on a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense].
Lower Court Decision
After holding a hearing limited to whether the defendant had a reasonable excuse for the default, the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, denied the motion. The lower court left in place both the order granting leave to enter a default judgment and the resulting $20 million judgment entered after the inquest on damages.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying vacatur. The record showed that the defendant had been repeatedly misled by prior counsel, remained attentive to the case, communicated with counsel whenever he learned of developments, and reasonably believed the matter was being handled. The court also emphasized that he did not act willfully or abandon the litigation and moved promptly after discovering the judgment. In addition, affidavits from nonparty witnesses with personal knowledge contradicted the plaintiff's allegations, which was enough to establish a potentially meritorious defense. Based on those factors, the appellate court reversed and granted vacatur of both the default order and the judgment.
Legal Significance
This decision reinforces that attorney neglect will not automatically be imputed to a client where the record shows the client was misled by counsel, stayed engaged, and did not intentionally default. It also underscores New York's policy favoring resolution on the merits, particularly where the defendant promptly seeks relief and presents concrete evidence supporting a defense.
A defendant can obtain vacatur of a default under CPLR 5015(a)(1) when he proves both a reasonable excuse and a potentially meritorious defense, especially where prior counsel misled the client and witness affidavits directly challenge the underlying allegations.