Rosario Lardiere v Site 6 DSA Owner LLC, et al.
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
This construction-accident case concerned whether a sales representative visiting a job site to check on air-handler equipment was protected by Labor Law § 240(1) [special protection to workers engaged in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure] and Labor Law § 200 [protection not limited to those injured while performing construction work], and whether his employer could be held on indemnity or contribution theories.
The motion court denied plaintiff summary judgment on liability under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 200 and common-law negligence, dismissed the § 240(1) claim against the owners, NYU Langone, Hunter Roberts, and Peepels, dismissed most § 200 claims except initially against Hunter Roberts and Peepels, denied Gil-Bar's motion to dismiss third-party claims, and later on reargument dismissed the § 200 claim against Hunter Roberts and Peepels as well.
The Appellate Division reinstated the Labor Law § 200 claim against Hunter Roberts and Peepels, dismissed all affirmative defenses based on plaintiff's comparative negligence and culpable conduct, and dismissed the third-party complaint and all cross-claims against Gil-Bar. It otherwise affirmed, including dismissal of the Labor Law § 240(1) claim.
The court held plaintiff was not a protected worker under Labor Law § 240(1) because he was a salesman, not a construction worker, and his employer Gil-Bar was not contracted to perform construction or any enumerated activity. But Labor Law § 200 is broader and can apply even where the injured person was not doing construction work. Summary judgment on § 200 and negligence was still improper because factual disputes remained about who cut the pipe supports, why that was done, and whether Hunter Roberts failed to coordinate the trades or created the hazard. Comparative-fault defenses were dismissed because there was no evidence plaintiff caused the accident, and Gil-Bar was dismissed because it did no project work tied to the accident and no applicable indemnity agreement covered this incident.
Background
Plaintiff Rosario Lardiere worked for Gil-Bar Industries, a company that sold heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) component equipment but did not perform construction work and had no laborers on staff. He visited the construction site after brokering the sale of air handlers to Peepels Mechanical Corp., the HVAC subcontractor. While there, a pipe fell on him after supporting hanger rods had been cut. Plaintiff alleged violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 200 and common-law negligence against the owners and project participants. Third-party claims were also asserted against Gil-Bar.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability and denied his request to strike affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence and culpable conduct. It granted summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) claim against the owners, NYU Langone, Hunter Roberts, and Peepels, and dismissed the Labor Law § 200 claim against the owners except Hunter Roberts. It denied Gil-Bar's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint and cross-claims. In a later order on reargument, it dismissed the Labor Law § 200 claim against Hunter Roberts and Peepels.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division modified the August 21, 2024 order to strike all affirmative liability defenses based on plaintiff's comparative negligence and culpable conduct and to dismiss the third-party complaint and all cross-claims against Gil-Bar. It reversed the November 13, 2024 order and reinstated the Labor Law § 200 claim against Hunter Roberts and Peepels. The court otherwise affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's Labor Law § 240(1) claim and the denial of plaintiff's request for summary judgment on his Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims.
Legal Significance
The decision draws a clear distinction between Labor Law § 240(1) and Labor Law § 200. Section 240(1) protects only workers engaged in enumerated construction-related activities, so a salesperson inspecting equipment at a job site is outside the statute's protection when neither he nor his employer is performing covered work. By contrast, § 200 is not so limited and may extend to nonconstruction workers injured by unsafe site conditions. The case also confirms that comparative-fault defenses cannot stand without evidence that the plaintiff caused the accident, and that third-party indemnity and contribution claims fail where the proposed third-party defendant had no role in the work causing the accident and no applicable indemnity contract.
A person visiting a construction site in a sales capacity is generally not covered by Labor Law § 240(1), but may still pursue Labor Law § 200 and negligence claims if injured by dangerous site conditions; meanwhile, owners and contractors cannot keep comparative-fault or indemnity claims alive without proof tying the plaintiff or the third party to the accident.