Maria A. Diaz De-Rivas v. Esplanade 99 LLC
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Civil procedure — vacatur of a default on a summary judgment motion based on law office failure tied to an unsubmitted adjournment stipulation under 22 NYCRR § 202.8(e) [Uniform Rules for Trial Courts provision governing motion practice and adjournments; stipulations to adjourn must be properly submitted/approved].
The Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion to vacate a default order that had granted Esplanade 99 LLC summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint.
The denial of the motion to vacate the default order and the resulting default-based grant of summary judgment.
Plaintiff showed a reasonable excuse—counsel’s mistaken belief that a second stipulation adjourning the return date beyond 60 days had been accepted, constituting law office failure—and a potentially meritorious opposition; there was no pattern of delay or prejudice, and the Supreme Court did not explain why the excuse was unreasonable, contrary to 22 NYCRR § 202.8(e).
Background
Esplanade 99 LLC moved for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint. The parties agreed to a second stipulation to adjourn the motion’s return date for more than 60 days, but plaintiff’s counsel failed to properly submit the stipulation to the court as required. The court, treating the motion as unopposed, granted summary judgment on default on April 23, 2024. Plaintiff moved to vacate the default, explaining the failure as law office error and asserting potentially meritorious defenses. On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court denied vacatur.
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court (New York County) denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate the default order that had granted Esplanade’s unopposed summary judgment motion, leaving the dismissal of the claims against Esplanade in place.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed, granted the motion to vacate, and remitted for briefing and a determination of Esplanade’s summary judgment motion on the merits. The court held that counsel’s belief that an adjournment had been granted was a reasonable law office failure, there was no pattern of dilatory conduct or prejudice, plaintiff showed a potentially meritorious opposition, and the Supreme Court failed to articulate why the excuse was unreasonable.
Legal Significance
Reaffirms that a one-time law office failure can constitute a reasonable excuse for vacating a default, particularly where an adjournment stipulation was informally agreed but not properly submitted under 22 NYCRR § 202.8(e), and that only a potentially meritorious opposition is required at this stage—less than what is needed to defeat summary judgment on the merits.
When a default arises from an unsubmitted adjournment stipulation and there is no pattern of delay or prejudice, courts should vacate the default upon a showing of reasonable law office failure and a potentially meritorious opposition, and then decide the motion on the merits.