Attorneys and Parties

Emmanuel Hiraldo
Plaintiff-Respondent
Attorneys: Albert Cohen, Charles Haviv

Baligh H. Moustafa
Defendant-Appellant
Attorneys: Marjorie E. Bornes

Ira M. Sturman
Defendant

Brief Summary

Issue

Motor vehicle negligence and summary judgment allocation of liability at a stop-sign-controlled intersection.

Lower Court Held

Granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability against defendant-driver Moustafa.

What Was Overturned

The grant of summary judgment on liability against Moustafa was reversed, and summary judgment was denied.

Why

Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie showing that Moustafa was negligent, given that Moustafa was traveling on the through street with the right-of-way and could have had only seconds to react to a stop-sign-controlled vehicle entering the intersection under Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) ยง 1142(a) [driver at a stop sign must yield to vehicles already in the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard]. The motion therefore had to be denied regardless of the sufficiency of opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr. [if the movant fails to make a prima facie showing, the motion must be denied regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers]).

Background

Plaintiff-passenger was riding in a vehicle driven by defendant Baligh H. Moustafa on 138th Street (no traffic control) when it collided at the intersection with a vehicle driven by defendant Ira M. Sturman traveling on 57th Road (controlled by a stop sign). Plaintiff sued both drivers for personal injuries and moved for summary judgment on liability solely against Moustafa.

Lower Court Decision

The Supreme Court, Queens County, granted the branch of plaintiff's motion awarding summary judgment on the issue of liability against Moustafa.

Appellate Division Reversal

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Moustafa, the Appellate Division held that plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that Moustafa breached a duty or that his negligence proximately caused the injuries. The court emphasized right-of-way principles at a stop-sign intersection under VTL ยง 1142(a) and noted that a driver with the right-of-way is not comparatively negligent when confronted with a vehicle that fails to yield and leaves only seconds to react. The court reversed the order insofar as appealed from and denied summary judgment against Moustafa, and declined to search the record to award summary judgment in Moustafa's favor.

Legal Significance

Reaffirms that even an innocent passenger seeking summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that the targeted driver was negligent; the presence of a stop sign for the other vehicle and the right-of-way for the targeted driver may preclude such a showing, especially where the right-of-way driver had only seconds to react. Also reiterates the Winegrad principle that a failure of prima facie proof requires denial of summary judgment regardless of the opposition.

๐Ÿ”‘ Key Takeaway

A plaintiff-passenger cannot obtain summary judgment against a right-of-way driver at a stop-sign intersection absent a clear prima facie showing of that driver's negligence; if the non-yielding vehicle enters leaving only seconds to react, summary judgment should be denied.