The People of the State of New York v. Deshante Page
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Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Criminal procedure, specifically speedy-trial time calculation under CPL 30.30 [New York speedy-trial statute].
The Supreme Court, Bronx County granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment under CPL 30.30 and, on reargument, adhered to that dismissal.
The Appellate Division reversed the order adhering to dismissal, denied the CPL 30.30 motion, reinstated the indictment, and remitted the case for further proceedings.
The lower court miscalculated chargeable time by counting periods that should have been excluded, including delay tied to a codefendant's omnibus motion under CPL 30.30(4)(a) [excluding time for pretrial motions, including the period while such matters are under consideration by the court], reasonable post-motion preparation time, a defense-requested adjournment, and time after the People filed a certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness (SOR) where the court did not find the filings defective or illusory.
Background
Defendant sought dismissal of the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The timing dispute centered on several adjournment periods, including a 98-day delay caused by a codefendant's failure to serve an omnibus motion on the People, a 42-day period after the court decided the codefendant's omnibus motion, a 76-day period later corrected to 75 days under time-computation rules, a six-day period following defense counsel's request for an adjournment because counsel was unavailable, and a 30-day period after the People filed their COC and SOR on March 5, 2024.
Lower Court Decision
The lower court granted defendant's CPL 30.30 motion to dismiss the indictment in a July 18, 2024 order. It later granted the People's motion for reargument but, in a January 23, 2025 order, adhered to its original dismissal ruling.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the January 23, 2025 order, denied defendant's CPL 30.30 motion, reinstated the indictment, and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings. It also dismissed the appeal from the July 18, 2024 order as superseded by the later appeal. The court held that the 98-day period related to the codefendant's omnibus motion was excluded under CPL 30.30(4)(a) [excluding time for pretrial motions, including the period while such matters are under consideration by the court]; the 42-day period after decision on that motion was excluded as reasonable preparation time for hearings and trial; the agreed 76-day chargeable period should actually have been 75 days because the first day is excluded under General Construction Law § 20 [rule for computing time by excluding the first day]; the six-day period after February 28, 2024 was not chargeable because the adjournment was requested by defense counsel; and the 30 days after the March 5, 2024 COC and SOR filing were excluded because the court made no finding that the COC was improper or the SOR illusory under CPL 245.50(3) [governing certificates of compliance and readiness]. As a result, the People were chargeable with only 97 of 183 possible days.
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that speedy-trial calculations must exclude time attributable to codefendants' pretrial motions, reasonable prosecutorial preparation after omnibus-motion rulings, defense-requested adjournments, and post-readiness periods when a certificate of compliance and statement of readiness remain valid. It also underscores strict time-counting rules, including exclusion of the first day in computing chargeable periods.
A trial court may not dismiss an indictment under CPL 30.30 when excluded motion-related and defense-caused delays reduce the People's chargeable time below the statutory limit; here, once the excluded periods were properly accounted for, only 97 days were chargeable.