Attorneys and Parties

Jonathan Davidoff
Plaintiff-Respondent
Attorneys: Jonathan Davidoff, Danielle Shapero

Bruce Hershfield and Vicki Hershfield
Defendants-Appellants
Attorneys: Scott E. Reynolds

Brief Summary

Issue

Contract law dispute over whether a promissory note allowed recovery of additional attorneys' fees incurred in defending a prior appeal and in prosecuting a new action to collect attorneys' fees, i.e., 'fees on fees.'

Lower Court Held

The Supreme Court, Westchester County, granted Davidoff's cross-motion for summary judgment on liability and denied as academic the Hershfields' motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a) [rule permitting dismissal of a complaint at the pleading stage], holding that the note's terms clearly entitled Davidoff to recover those attorneys' fees.

Disposition

The Appellate Division reversed the order, denied Davidoff's cross-motion for summary judgment, and granted the Hershfields' CPLR 3211(a) motion to dismiss the complaint.

Why

The note did not contain unmistakably clear contractual language authorizing recovery of 'fees on fees' or fees incurred in suing to recover attorneys' fees. Because fee-shifting provisions are strictly construed, the court would not imply such a right.

Background

In 2018, Bruce and Vicki Hershfield sued Jonathan Davidoff and others for declaratory relief and to recover on a promissory note. Davidoff moved to dismiss the claims against him and sought attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court granted that relief, and after a hearing awarded Davidoff $20,207.86 in attorneys' fees in an April 30, 2020 order. The Hershfields appealed that fee award, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Davidoff then brought this separate breach of contract action, alleging that the note entitled him to recover additional attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the prior appeal and in bringing the new action.

Lower Court Decision

The Supreme Court concluded that the promissory note unambiguously allowed Davidoff to recover the claimed attorneys' fees. It therefore granted his cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and denied, as academic, the Hershfields' motion to dismiss the complaint under CPLR 3211(a) [rule permitting dismissal of a complaint at the pleading stage].

Appellate Division Reversal

The Appellate Division held that interpretation of the unambiguous note was a question of law, and that attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting a claim for attorneys' fees require a specific contractual provision or statute. Strictly construing the note, the court found no clear language expressly allowing recovery of fees incurred to recover attorneys' fees. Because the note lacked unmistakably clear intent to permit such 'fees on fees,' Davidoff failed to establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and the complaint should have been dismissed.

Legal Significance

The decision reinforces New York's strict approach to contractual fee-shifting. Even where a party previously recovered attorneys' fees under a note, additional fees for defending an appeal or suing to collect those fees are not recoverable unless the contract expressly and clearly authorizes them. Courts will not infer a duty to indemnify for 'fees on fees.'

🔑 Key Takeaway

A contract must contain explicit, unmistakably clear language if a party seeks to recover attorneys' fees incurred in pursuing or defending a claim for attorneys' fees; general fee provisions are not enough.