Danielle W. v. Desheng Li et al.
Categories
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Motor vehicle personal injury liability involving an employer-owned vehicle, pedestrian roadway restrictions, and the emergency doctrine.
The lower court denied Kumo Sushi Lounge II Inc.'s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it.
The Appellate Division reversed that order and, upon searching the record, directed dismissal of the complaint against all defendants, including KSL, driver Desheng Li, and vehicle owner Chan Juan Huang.
The appellate court found defendants established prima facie that the child pedestrian's act of unlawfully running into the Hutchinson River Parkway was the sole proximate cause of the collision under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229-a [prohibits pedestrians from occupying the location where J.W. was traversing]. It further held that Li acted reasonably under the emergency doctrine and satisfied Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a) [requires drivers to exercise due care to avoid colliding with a pedestrian on a roadway], while plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Background
This action arose from a November 20, 2020 nighttime collision on the Hutchinson River Parkway in the Bronx. Desheng Li was driving a van owned by Chan Juan Huang and allegedly acting within the scope of his employment for Kumo Sushi Lounge II Inc. when the van struck 12-year-old J.W. Li testified that he was traveling about 45 miles per hour in the right lane when he first saw J.W. about 100 feet ahead, standing in a grassy area to the right of the highway. According to Li, J.W. then made a running motion and ran toward the roadway when the van was about two car lengths away. Li testified that he removed his foot from the accelerator and began moving into the left lane to avoid the child, but the front right side of the van struck J.W. when he entered the highway. Police administered sobriety tests, permitted Li to drive away, and issued no ticket, violation, or citation.
Lower Court Decision
Supreme Court, Bronx County denied KSL's motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint as against it, allowing the personal injury claims to proceed.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed, granted KSL's summary judgment motion, and directed entry of judgment dismissing the complaint against all defendants. The court held that Li was confronted with a sudden and unforeseen emergency and took reasonable evasive action within seconds by easing off the accelerator and attempting to change lanes. It concluded that the child pedestrian's unlawful entry into the parkway was the sole proximate cause of the accident under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229-a [prohibits pedestrians from occupying the location where J.W. was traversing]. The court also found no breach of Li's common-law duty of reasonable care and held that Li satisfied Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a) [requires drivers to exercise due care to avoid colliding with a pedestrian on a roadway]. Plaintiff's arguments about conflicting testimony and the Noseworthy doctrine were rejected because the record did not support an inference of negligence by Li.
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that summary judgment may be granted in pedestrian collision cases where the evidence shows the pedestrian suddenly entered a prohibited roadway area and the driver responded reasonably to an emergency. It also illustrates that the emergency doctrine can resolve negligence claims as a matter of law when the defendant's account is unrebutted and no factual issue exists. In addition, the court confirmed that the Noseworthy doctrine does not lessen a plaintiff's burden absent facts permitting an inference of negligence.
A driver who encounters a child or other pedestrian suddenly running into a restricted highway may obtain summary judgment if the evidence shows the driver had only seconds to react, took reasonable evasive steps, and the pedestrian's unlawful roadway entry was the sole proximate cause of the collision.