The People of the State of New York v. Salina Brown-Shook
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Criminal law: whether a defendant’s postplea statements at a Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) hearing triggered the narrow exception to preservation and required the trial court to inquire further or permit withdrawal of the guilty plea.
Accepted an open guilty plea, later granted DVSJA alternative sentencing and imposed a prison term without further inquiry into voluntariness despite postplea self-defense testimony.
Judgment of conviction and sentence; matter remitted.
Defendant’s testimony at the DVSJA hearing raised a plausible justification defense and negated intent elements of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (see Penal Law § 60.12 [authorizes reduced/alternative sentencing for eligible domestic violence survivors when abuse was a significant contributing factor]; §§ 120.05[2] [assault in the second degree—intent to cause physical injury with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument]; 265.01[2] [criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree—intent to use unlawfully against another]; 265.02[1] [criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree—elevates certain fourth-degree possession]). Under the narrow exception to the preservation rule, the court was obliged to conduct further inquiry or allow plea withdrawal and failed to do so.
Background
Defendant was indicted in November 2020 for assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree after a January 1, 2020 altercation with her former partner during which she stabbed and cut him with a knife. The victim was later murdered, and the People were open to a cooperation-based resolution. Defendant failed to appear in June 2021; a bench warrant issued, and she was remanded in November 2021. In February 2022, she entered an open plea to the full indictment with the understanding that bail would be set and she could seek alternative sentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) (Penal Law § 60.12). She waived appeal. After a hearing, the court granted DVSJA treatment and, in January 2023, imposed concurrent two-year prison terms plus three years of postrelease supervision.
Lower Court Decision
County Court accepted the open plea, set bail, conducted a DVSJA hearing, granted the application, and sentenced defendant to concurrent two-year terms with three years of postrelease supervision. Although at the DVSJA hearing defendant testified that she acted in self-defense and lacked intent to harm, the court did not inquire further into the voluntariness of the plea or offer withdrawal.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division (3–2) reversed. The court held that although the plea voluntariness challenge was unpreserved, the narrow exception to the preservation rule was triggered by defendant’s postplea testimony at the DVSJA hearing, which suggested lack of intent and a justification defense not addressed during the plea colloquy. County Court was required to make further inquiry or permit withdrawal of the plea but did neither. The judgment was reversed and remitted for further proceedings. The dissent would have found the exception inapplicable because the statements were made in the context of the agreed DVSJA hearing and defendant reaffirmed her plea.
Legal Significance
Trial courts must treat a defendant’s postplea, pre-sentence statements— including those made during collateral proceedings like DVSJA hearings—as potentially triggering the narrow exception to preservation when they negate elements or suggest involuntariness. When such statements arise, courts must either conduct further inquiry to ensure a knowing and voluntary plea or allow withdrawal. The decision underscores the interplay between DVSJA mitigation proceedings and the integrity of guilty pleas.
Postplea testimony at a DVSJA hearing that plausibly raises justification or negates intent can trigger the narrow exception to preservation and obligate the court to inquire or permit withdrawal; failure to do so requires reversal and remittal.