People v Grigoroff
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Criminal law—admissibility and scope of expert testimony on false confessions; voluntariness of confession and jury instructions on police promises.
After a retrial, the County Court convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree and two counts of attempted burglary in the second degree, while limiting the defense expert’s false-confession testimony, excluding parts of the expert’s curriculum vitae, scheduling trial when the defense expert could only appear via conditional video, and declining to give the “Promise by the Police” jury charge.
The judgment of conviction was reversed and the case remitted for a new trial.
Cumulative evidentiary and procedural errors—unduly restricting defense false-confession research (including Innocence Project and University of Michigan exoneration studies), excluding portions of the expert’s curriculum vitae, and forcing video-recorded testimony for the defense expert while the People’s expert testified live—deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The court also noted it was error not to give the “Promise by the Police” instruction under CPL 60.45(2)(b)(i) [statute deeming a confession involuntary if obtained by a police promise creating a substantial risk of false incrimination], to be corrected on retrial.
Background
On December 31, 2008, a victim was found dead outside the Garrison Garage in Putnam County. On May 1, 2009, the then 18-year-old defendant was interrogated for approximately 12 hours and gave statements indicating that he, his identical twin, and Byron Mountain intended to burglarize an office at the site, during which Mountain allegedly shot the victim. The defendant was arrested on June 9, 2009. At a 2010 trial, he was convicted, but the Appellate Division reversed for reasons unrelated to the confession while noting police deception during interrogation. At the 2017 retrial, where the confession remained the sole incriminating evidence, the defense presented an expert in disputed confessions who evaluated the defendant and found him more vulnerable than average to falsely confessing (low IQ, antisocial behavior, and personal history). Despite an earlier May 5, 2017 order permitting broad expert testimony on false confessions and the defendant’s evaluation, a different trial judge curtailed references to key empirical studies, excluded parts of the expert’s curriculum vitae, scheduled trial when the defense expert could not appear live (requiring conditional video testimony), and declined the defense request for the jury charge on police promises.
Lower Court Decision
The County Court allowed limited expert testimony on false confessions but precluded discussion of empirical studies (Innocence Project DNA exonerations and University of Michigan exoneration data demonstrating false confession rates and overrepresentation of persons with mental illness or intellectual disability), excluded titles from the defense expert’s curriculum vitae, and scheduled trial such that the defense expert was presented by edited video while the People’s expert testified live and characterized the field as scant and “primitive.” The court declined to instruct the jury on the “Promise by the Police” charge despite evidence of alleged promises during the 12-hour interrogation. The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the second degree and two counts of attempted burglary in the second degree.
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division conducted an independent weight-of-evidence review under CPL 470.15(5) [authorizes the Appellate Division to conduct an independent weight-of-the-evidence review] and found the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Nonetheless, it reversed in the interest of justice, holding that the trial court improperly restricted the defense expert by excluding relevant, accepted research on false confessions (including studies pertinent to defendants with lower IQ), improperly withheld portions of the expert’s curriculum vitae, and created an unfair disparity by forcing the defense expert’s edited video testimony while the People’s expert testified live. These cumulative errors, where the confession was the sole evidence and the defense hinged on expert testimony about false-confession vulnerability, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The court further noted it was error not to give the CJI2d “Promise by the Police” instruction [pattern jury instruction explaining that police promises may render a statement involuntary] consistent with CPL 60.45(2)(b)(i) [statute deeming a confession involuntary if obtained by a police promise creating a substantial risk of false incrimination], to be addressed on retrial. The court found the principal’s hearsay statement admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining expert methodology, and deemed the prosecutor’s summation comments largely fair and, in part, unpreserved under CPL 470.05(2) [preservation requirement for appellate review].
Legal Significance
The decision reinforces that expert testimony on false confessions—including reference to accepted empirical research and the expert’s qualifications—is relevant and admissible when tailored to the defendant and interrogation. Courts should avoid creating unfair disparities in expert presentation (live versus video) and must give the “Promise by the Police” jury instruction when supported by the evidence. Cumulative evidentiary and procedural errors that undermine a defense centered on the voluntariness of a confession warrant reversal in the interest of justice.
When a confession is the sole inculpatory evidence, trial courts must permit robust, research-supported false-confession expert testimony and provide the “Promise by the Police” instruction when requested and supported; cumulative limitations and presentation disparities can require reversal and a new trial.