Dos Anjos v. Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC
Attorneys and Parties
Brief Summary
Construction site safety—slipping hazards from rainwater on a plastic vapor barrier causing injury while operating a power saw; application of Labor Law § 241(6) [imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers] and 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) [slipping hazards rule requiring that ice, snow, water, grease, or other substances be removed, sanded, or covered to provide safe footing].
The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Labor Law § 241(6) and denied defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss common-law negligence and Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6) claims.
The denial of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241(6) was reversed; plaintiffs were granted summary judgment on liability under that statute.
Plaintiffs established that rainwater accumulated on a plastic vapor barrier created a slippery condition in violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) and proximately caused the injury; defendants failed to raise a triable issue that the condition was an integral part of the work or that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause. Defendants also failed to make a prima facie showing to dismiss Labor Law § 200 [codifies the common-law duty of owners, contractors, and their agents to provide workers with a safe place to work] and common-law negligence claims.
Background
On January 12, 2018, at a Westchester County construction site, Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC served as program manager and retained Andron Construction Corp. as general contractor, which hired D&J Concrete Corp., the employer of plaintiff Jose Dos Anjos. While using a power saw, Dos Anjos slipped on rainwater that had accumulated on a plastic vapor barrier covering the floor, fell, and the saw activated and cut his left forearm. Plaintiffs sued for common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law § 200 [codifies the common-law duty of owners, contractors, and their agents to provide workers with a safe place to work] and Labor Law § 241(6) [imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers], predicated on 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) [slipping hazards rule requiring that ice, snow, water, grease, or other substances be removed, sanded, or covered to provide safe footing].
Lower Court Decision
The Supreme Court, Queens County, denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241(6) and denied defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims for common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6).
Appellate Division Reversal
The Appellate Division reversed insofar as appealed from and granted plaintiffs summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241(6) based on a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d). It affirmed the denial of defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss the claims for Labor Law § 241(6), Labor Law § 200, and common-law negligence, finding defendants failed to establish inapplicability, lack of violation, lack of proximate cause, or lack of notice, and that the condition was not shown to be an ordinary, obvious hazard of the employment.
Legal Significance
Confirms that water accumulation on a plastic vapor barrier constitutes a slipping hazard within the scope of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d) under the New York Codes, Rules and Regulations (NYCRR), and that owners/contractors may be held liable under Labor Law § 241(6) on summary judgment where the violation and proximate cause are established. Clarifies that the “integral part of the work” defense requires a showing that the hazard was inherent to the specific task, which defendants failed to demonstrate, and underscores that defendants must also address notice to defeat Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims.
Rainwater on a plastic vapor barrier at a construction site is a cognizable slipping hazard under 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(d); when such a condition proximately causes injury, plaintiffs can obtain summary judgment on Labor Law § 241(6), and defendants cannot avoid liability by invoking the integral-part-of-work or sole-proximate-cause defenses without concrete evidence.